To identify stirrings of opposition to the system as a positive move or something to be developed is at least compatible with communism.
To identify these stirrings as the final point, and not something to be developed, is at best liberalism. It stops at this partial criticism and does not think that this could go further - a modus operandi more traditionally associated with conventional liberalism.
Saturday 21 January 2017
Tuesday 10 January 2017
Karl Marx: Style and Distortion
In general, political beliefs which appeal to 'the people' or a class of 'ordinary people' are often held to be suspect, because they are tacitly speaking about the reader. When they refer to these masses, they mean to refer to an overall category which these readers are or might as well be in. Hence, when they attempt 'rousing' rhetoric and so on, this can also serve to promote the listeners and involve them in this upwards movement - in a slightly back-handed manner. Populism tends to use this to notable effect, although even North American politicians are known to frequently call on populist rhetoric and especially on the campaign trail. There are other reasons why people are concerned about such beliefs, but we shall discuss that in a post following this.
In general, when people in capitalism encounter Marxism and related viewpoints in a positive manner, they are experiencing some amount of disillusionment with official politics and trying to see past the illusions of such political forms. However, that Marxism is effective in intercepting this, or the revolutionary or 'disillusioned' element in such societies, is not entirely coincidental. It is actually something which is deeply inter-woven in Marxist texts in a stylistic sense, which invites their viewing in such a context.
However, this can at times seem to distort the message. If a text is encountered in the context of disillusionment, then it often has to be seen in the context of another political view or situation. It cannot present a focussed and emphatic proclamation of its perspective, but must respond to other things or possibly qualify this. For instance, Das Kapital is forced in its presentation of value to continually respond to possible criticisms of itself - which many critics have taken as an authoritative documentation of ways to dispute it. These opposed points force their way into the texts. That readers then complain, although of course people would do whatever they could to dispute or question the points made by Marxism, that it is too boring and laboured is really to leave Marx no way out in this endeavour.
Nonetheless, these texts which were abandoned by most do hold notable interest. There is no need to heap calumny upon condemnation just for mild personal caprice.
-
The effectiveness of Marx in intercepting certain situation is manifested in multiple ways. However, we must also note that this form of political straying, or disillusionment with the major Parties and beliefs, can also seem to capitalism like a turn towards laissez-faire. Hence, its promoters do their best to assimilate this form of politics into a sort of indifferent, ecstatic, laissez-faire posturing. They will take for granted that that is what is being attempted, as they will not acknowledge the albeit complex content of revolutionary politics. Hence, Marxism can also form something of an ambiguous area. The strictness of Das Kapital, which at least firmly defines that which it takes issue with, can often dissuade these although they might occasionally also assume that they know what it's on about without engaging with it. In any case, after this general caution we may move on.
Firstly, let us examine the structuring of a paragraph in the article 'The June Revolution.' We are first presented with a somewhat 'optimistic,' rousing - but highly subdued - couple of sentences.
"Fraternite, [...] this fraternity which in February was proclaimed and
inscribed in large letters on the facades of Paris, on every prison and
every barracks -- this fraternity found its true, unadulterated and prosaic
expression in civil war, civil war in its most terrible aspect, the war
of labor against capital. This brotherhood blazed in front of the windows
of Paris on the evening of June 25, when the Paris of the bourgeoisie held
illuminations while the Paris of the proletariat was burning, bleeding,
groaning in the throes of death."
The next paragraph is a slightly peculiar adventure where Marx anticipates their future of requesting alms from Engels, and eventually follows this 'burning, bleeding and groaning' with a paragraph ending about how the people thought they had destroyed, "their enemy when they had overthrown the enemy of their enemies, their common enemy." It is at the least a decent example of 19th Century slap-stick, like much of the 1848 revolution.
This kind of structure is reprised yet again, however, and quite clearly, in the following paragraph:
"The February revolution was the nice revolution, the revolution of universal sympathies, because the contradictions which erupted in it against the monarchy were still undeveloped and peacefully dormant, because the social struggle which formed their background had only achieved an ephemeral existence, an existence in phrases, in words. The June revolution is the ugly revolution, the nasty revolution, because the phrases have given place to the real thing, because the republic has bared the head of the monster by knocking off the crown which shielded and concealed it."
Oddly, this could also be used to describe other February Revolutions, although revolutions in June need not have the same historical co-ordination. Strangely, even the description of the February revolution goes from paraphrasing praises to a negative appraisal.
This structure becomes quite entrenched, even in slightly subtle ways, through the rest of the text. For example:
"Order! was Guizot's war-cry. Order! shouted Sebastiani, the Guizotist, when Warsaw became Russian. Order! shouts Cavaignac, the brutal echo of the French National Assembly and of the republican bourgeoisie."
"Is the deep chasm which has opened at our feet to mislead us, democrats, or cause us to believe that the struggle for a form of polity is meaningless, illusory and futile?"
"For whom did you make the February revolution, you rascals -- for yourselves or for us? The bourgeoisie put this question in such a way that it had to be answered in June with grape-shot and barricades."
"Thus the workers fought in February in order to be engulfed in an industrial crisis."
In general, this structure of a clear and inviting situation - at least in appearance - followed by a grim atmosphere is one which relates quite clearly to the sense of disillusionment or slipping away from certain portrayals. Strangely, this kind of thing is now associated more with the Soviet Union, although of course usually it is the preserve of Marxism and conspiracy theories. An aesthetic which so favours conspiracy theorists is one which is generally safe from such extensive foreign intrusion, although the Cold War was a site of many 'conspiratorial' actions and groupings (the name itself is conspiratorial - claiming a war when each nation itself stringently avoids declaring a state of war) and hence allows these elements a seeming alibi. However, conspiracy theories can be iffy in this regard: after presenting an appealing image of things, they then wish to demonstrate that things are not appealing - but this would seem if anything to encourage an overly optimistic view of things and the sense that only minor obstacles must be dealt with or shoved out of the way. Generally, this is unrealistic even by the conspiracists' terms: they portray a situation where a whole realm exists often out of most people's explicit control, and which is rather sinister. The perspective where conspiracy theorists merely become part of the glorification of the social system is that of the person with comfortable personal position in this system, who expects much from it or aspires to receive this and hence can only admit conspiracies to appear on the sides. Apart from this, conspiracy theories can at the least involve notable observations on a society which is highly 'alienated' in Marx's terms and where events might appear to inhabit a realm apart from the disenfranchised citizens of the nation. They hence deal with elements which call this social system into question. In any case, their format allows for Marx to seem highly appropriate to certain situations, in terms of political conflict - at least if these are present.
The danger otherwise is that people might dismiss it as garish and overly dark, or in general not see the appeal in such texts.
Nonetheless, this type of method tends to be prominent, in various forms, as Marx continues on. The general tone of this is quite apt:
"For the entire duration of its rule, for as long as it gave its grand performance of state on the proscenium, an unbroken sacrificial feast was being staged in the background – the continual sentencing by courts–martial of the captured June insurgents or their deportation without trial. The Constituent Assembly had the tact to admit that in the June insurgents it was not judging criminals but wiping out enemies."
While most Christianity speaks of walking away from 'the world,' before sanctifying and chanting hymns to everything in it, Marxism at least on some level attempts to enact this. It moves from the official 'performance' to a tone quite different, and often dark in subject-matter. The texts with Engels can often be of interest because this tendency interacts with some others, with various results; however, generally Marx's texts written without such interference are not as well recognised. This might be in part due to the style bringing up things people would rather not be reminded of.
In any case, such distortions do have occasional note in popular culture. Even in video games, the sudden shift of a 'heroic' journey to a dark place with blood-thirsty characters in Lavender Town has been associated in pop culture with not only horror but also suicides. There is something that people find unnerving about it, allowing for rather exotic or troubling stories to be easily associated with it. Likewise, Dracula has an influential shift from the tone of the early novel, giving notes on the location almost reminiscent of travel-writing, to the sudden influx of a darker atmosphere which seemingly appears in the form of an animal. The whole of the area is tainted with this kind of darkness, as though it had distorted into something new. The animals are strange, and so are the people - indeed, the image of an eccentric or highly peculiar person is called upon for Dracula's associate, albeit with the absurdity occasionally played up to the point where it might seem inadvertently humorous rather than fitting with the pathos of the story. This is less thorough in that novel, however, where a neat ending must be drawn regardless - the distortion is a phenomenon that enters into the style, but not an abiding characteristic. However, Marx's use of it can not only easily lead to associations such as that which Wurmbrand drew to the Satanic, but can at times lead to notable insights in the area. In this sense, Marxism cannot stay fixated upon the idea of rousing or positive emotions, but must deal with the darker aspects of what is before it. Hence, it has an interest which can easily continue to torment and disturb anew.
In general, when people in capitalism encounter Marxism and related viewpoints in a positive manner, they are experiencing some amount of disillusionment with official politics and trying to see past the illusions of such political forms. However, that Marxism is effective in intercepting this, or the revolutionary or 'disillusioned' element in such societies, is not entirely coincidental. It is actually something which is deeply inter-woven in Marxist texts in a stylistic sense, which invites their viewing in such a context.
However, this can at times seem to distort the message. If a text is encountered in the context of disillusionment, then it often has to be seen in the context of another political view or situation. It cannot present a focussed and emphatic proclamation of its perspective, but must respond to other things or possibly qualify this. For instance, Das Kapital is forced in its presentation of value to continually respond to possible criticisms of itself - which many critics have taken as an authoritative documentation of ways to dispute it. These opposed points force their way into the texts. That readers then complain, although of course people would do whatever they could to dispute or question the points made by Marxism, that it is too boring and laboured is really to leave Marx no way out in this endeavour.
Nonetheless, these texts which were abandoned by most do hold notable interest. There is no need to heap calumny upon condemnation just for mild personal caprice.
-
The effectiveness of Marx in intercepting certain situation is manifested in multiple ways. However, we must also note that this form of political straying, or disillusionment with the major Parties and beliefs, can also seem to capitalism like a turn towards laissez-faire. Hence, its promoters do their best to assimilate this form of politics into a sort of indifferent, ecstatic, laissez-faire posturing. They will take for granted that that is what is being attempted, as they will not acknowledge the albeit complex content of revolutionary politics. Hence, Marxism can also form something of an ambiguous area. The strictness of Das Kapital, which at least firmly defines that which it takes issue with, can often dissuade these although they might occasionally also assume that they know what it's on about without engaging with it. In any case, after this general caution we may move on.
Firstly, let us examine the structuring of a paragraph in the article 'The June Revolution.' We are first presented with a somewhat 'optimistic,' rousing - but highly subdued - couple of sentences.
"The workers of Paris were overwhelmed by superior strength, but they
were not subdued. They have been defeated but their enemies are vanquished."
Hence, there is no decisive demolition here. As we have noted, by this category readers of various kinds are also designated or involved, and hence here it seems a re-assuring and slightly encouraging statement. It refers, like the Christian myth, to perseverance despite the odds, to the re-assuring ability to keep going. However, contrast this to what follows:
"The momentary triumph of brute force has been purchased with the destruction
of all the delusions and illusions of the February revolution, the dissolution
of the entire moderate republican party and the division of the French
nation into two nations, the nation of owners and the nation of workers.
The tricolor republic now displays only one color, the color of the defeated,
the color of blood. It has become a red republic."
After the dedicated denial of a decisive destruction, now we are presented with images of not only decisive but slightly hyperbolic destruction. Words like 'all' and 'entire' appear notable, along with repetitions of certain words which serve to stress this aspect of their text. However, this is not merely a contrast. This is the general direction of the paragraph from its opening.
The final sentence might seem vaguely humorous insofar as a 'red' republic could give the overly-optimistic sense of a communist region, but in any case it just lurks there like a punch-line hanging ghost-like between the lines.
Hence, from the presentation of perseverance and a cause, we are led instead into a portrayal of general destruction and blood-shed. The final sentences meditate for a while on the theme of blood. Of course, part of the point here is of interest: with the decline of the moderates, the division is no longer as clearly obscured. At least not to Marx, which is fortunate.
The situation is also of interest: it describes a National Assembly being set up in the throes of an uprising, with various political forces within it. After some time of being indecisive, they were eventually displaced. This would seem to indicate the paralytic force of these diverse strains being placed together in this eclectic organisation. This situation would recur later on in history, albeit leading instead to things like Stalin instead of an eventual monarchist revival. Which some might not find entirely dissimilar.
Hence, after the stirring initial theme, you do not have a continuation but rather a 'descent' or rather a distortion. This allows Marx to make more notable and insightful political points than are usually allowed to ordinary populists. However, the overall movement is in general a disillusioned one, where after a general sense of hope this is turned into a dark 'realisation.' Most political figures or texts would rather stop at the first, strangely. Marx, however, does better than that here.
Of course, this kind of shift or distortion in tone need not always imply the blatant conjuring of blood and wanton destruction. Nonetheless, it can take up a slightly humorously exaggerated form as in this rather special paragraph:
The next paragraph is a slightly peculiar adventure where Marx anticipates their future of requesting alms from Engels, and eventually follows this 'burning, bleeding and groaning' with a paragraph ending about how the people thought they had destroyed, "their enemy when they had overthrown the enemy of their enemies, their common enemy." It is at the least a decent example of 19th Century slap-stick, like much of the 1848 revolution.
This kind of structure is reprised yet again, however, and quite clearly, in the following paragraph:
"The February revolution was the nice revolution, the revolution of universal sympathies, because the contradictions which erupted in it against the monarchy were still undeveloped and peacefully dormant, because the social struggle which formed their background had only achieved an ephemeral existence, an existence in phrases, in words. The June revolution is the ugly revolution, the nasty revolution, because the phrases have given place to the real thing, because the republic has bared the head of the monster by knocking off the crown which shielded and concealed it."
Oddly, this could also be used to describe other February Revolutions, although revolutions in June need not have the same historical co-ordination. Strangely, even the description of the February revolution goes from paraphrasing praises to a negative appraisal.
This structure becomes quite entrenched, even in slightly subtle ways, through the rest of the text. For example:
"Order! was Guizot's war-cry. Order! shouted Sebastiani, the Guizotist, when Warsaw became Russian. Order! shouts Cavaignac, the brutal echo of the French National Assembly and of the republican bourgeoisie."
"Is the deep chasm which has opened at our feet to mislead us, democrats, or cause us to believe that the struggle for a form of polity is meaningless, illusory and futile?"
"For whom did you make the February revolution, you rascals -- for yourselves or for us? The bourgeoisie put this question in such a way that it had to be answered in June with grape-shot and barricades."
"Thus the workers fought in February in order to be engulfed in an industrial crisis."
In general, this structure of a clear and inviting situation - at least in appearance - followed by a grim atmosphere is one which relates quite clearly to the sense of disillusionment or slipping away from certain portrayals. Strangely, this kind of thing is now associated more with the Soviet Union, although of course usually it is the preserve of Marxism and conspiracy theories. An aesthetic which so favours conspiracy theorists is one which is generally safe from such extensive foreign intrusion, although the Cold War was a site of many 'conspiratorial' actions and groupings (the name itself is conspiratorial - claiming a war when each nation itself stringently avoids declaring a state of war) and hence allows these elements a seeming alibi. However, conspiracy theories can be iffy in this regard: after presenting an appealing image of things, they then wish to demonstrate that things are not appealing - but this would seem if anything to encourage an overly optimistic view of things and the sense that only minor obstacles must be dealt with or shoved out of the way. Generally, this is unrealistic even by the conspiracists' terms: they portray a situation where a whole realm exists often out of most people's explicit control, and which is rather sinister. The perspective where conspiracy theorists merely become part of the glorification of the social system is that of the person with comfortable personal position in this system, who expects much from it or aspires to receive this and hence can only admit conspiracies to appear on the sides. Apart from this, conspiracy theories can at the least involve notable observations on a society which is highly 'alienated' in Marx's terms and where events might appear to inhabit a realm apart from the disenfranchised citizens of the nation. They hence deal with elements which call this social system into question. In any case, their format allows for Marx to seem highly appropriate to certain situations, in terms of political conflict - at least if these are present.
The danger otherwise is that people might dismiss it as garish and overly dark, or in general not see the appeal in such texts.
Nonetheless, this type of method tends to be prominent, in various forms, as Marx continues on. The general tone of this is quite apt:
"For the entire duration of its rule, for as long as it gave its grand performance of state on the proscenium, an unbroken sacrificial feast was being staged in the background – the continual sentencing by courts–martial of the captured June insurgents or their deportation without trial. The Constituent Assembly had the tact to admit that in the June insurgents it was not judging criminals but wiping out enemies."
While most Christianity speaks of walking away from 'the world,' before sanctifying and chanting hymns to everything in it, Marxism at least on some level attempts to enact this. It moves from the official 'performance' to a tone quite different, and often dark in subject-matter. The texts with Engels can often be of interest because this tendency interacts with some others, with various results; however, generally Marx's texts written without such interference are not as well recognised. This might be in part due to the style bringing up things people would rather not be reminded of.
In any case, such distortions do have occasional note in popular culture. Even in video games, the sudden shift of a 'heroic' journey to a dark place with blood-thirsty characters in Lavender Town has been associated in pop culture with not only horror but also suicides. There is something that people find unnerving about it, allowing for rather exotic or troubling stories to be easily associated with it. Likewise, Dracula has an influential shift from the tone of the early novel, giving notes on the location almost reminiscent of travel-writing, to the sudden influx of a darker atmosphere which seemingly appears in the form of an animal. The whole of the area is tainted with this kind of darkness, as though it had distorted into something new. The animals are strange, and so are the people - indeed, the image of an eccentric or highly peculiar person is called upon for Dracula's associate, albeit with the absurdity occasionally played up to the point where it might seem inadvertently humorous rather than fitting with the pathos of the story. This is less thorough in that novel, however, where a neat ending must be drawn regardless - the distortion is a phenomenon that enters into the style, but not an abiding characteristic. However, Marx's use of it can not only easily lead to associations such as that which Wurmbrand drew to the Satanic, but can at times lead to notable insights in the area. In this sense, Marxism cannot stay fixated upon the idea of rousing or positive emotions, but must deal with the darker aspects of what is before it. Hence, it has an interest which can easily continue to torment and disturb anew.
Sunday 8 January 2017
The Elections: Aftermath and Fallout
In general, Bernie Sanders at least initially attempted to hijack the Democratic Party for a given, relatively radical political programme. However, this is complicated by several factors. The Democratic Party is a Party with a long history and which has several complex inter-relations with the Republican Party - especially after Obama's 'bipartisanship' binge - which moderate its action and its running of the state in harmony with these others. In general, in a two-Party state where each Party is fairly stable (and in this case similar), both Parties will eventually come to consider themselves essentially the ruler of the state in harmony - that is, as essentially one harmonised ruling Party. They are both fluid, and the government frequently passes from one to the other, which each attempts to make as easy a transition as possible to ensure the stability of the government - as Americans seemingly change their opinion on the state they would prefer every few years. In general, however, the Democrats are hence not a vehicle that can easily accommodate use by a political programme, or be assimilated into use as a vehicle for a vaguely radical political agenda simpliciter. There are many obstacles to this use, and obligations which the Party has habitually fulfilled and is formed around.
Hence, Bernie Sanders was eventually given trouble by someone who essentially represents a fairly hollow 'establishment' - the Clinton campaign, run mostly based on being a notable 'name' in the Democratic Party. This is dynastic politics, and quite blatant about it. Compared to Sanders, their politics were loosely sketched and have generally not remained constant - they were merely holding ground, as Sanders was so to speak entering their 'house.' It seems absurd that a political Party also forms a 'house, 'in the gambling sense, that others must take on despite a political hollowness - nonetheless this is the case. However, Sanders generally speaking did not seek to combat this directly, and hence was generally speaking unwilling to challenge the agendas of the Democratic Party or agitate for its general renewal. Instead, their campaign opted to merely promote Sanders and opt for more or less generic forms of campaigning with the main difference being the slogans and name - their campaign was in most things not distinguished from the others, and hence could hardly fuel resistance to the others. They needed some distinction to allow them to engage in 'negative,' critical takes on politics as it was and the Democratic Party, and they did not gain this. By the end, the campaign took on a high emphasis on donors - and of course a notable donation requires sufficient money - such that their eventual capitulation to the business-favouring Democratic Party was not that much of a surprise, nor something which Sanders' supporters can merely displace blame over. It eventually, later on, had the general properties of a pessimistic gambling den.
Their continuing promotion of the campaign well after they stood a notable chance of the nomination perhaps suggests that their figures concerning the amount of voluntary promotion done were in part fictionalised. Otherwise, there was little to encourage it, apart from the occasional recreational bout of cold-calling. Such forms of promotion are often treated with scorn in other fields, regardless.
In any case, the Sanders campaign attempted to import a foreign content into the field of major political Parties, without displacing what was already there - hence, they ran into issues in these circumstances. The Democratic Party went stubbornly with a 'conventional,' name-based candidate, Clinton, who was possibly the closest thing to apolitical of most recent politicians. However, Clinton was saddled with several hits to their reputation, which would have been debilitating to most other candidates. They did, however, have some borrowed momentum from a previous campaign in a time when politics was a more major and pressing concern - as opposed to now when official politics is just staffed with celebs and people with familiar names and media ruckus - and, also notably, had significant backing among somewhat tiresomely mild-liberal celebrities and such. They hence at least had the momentum to carry through a campaign which mostly disregarded politics and could try to ignore Sanders' beliefs; identity politics then served to seal this modus operandi and secure indifference to the content of the Sanders campaign.
Identity politics in official politics can be harmful, as people are essentially locked in as soon as they are accused of violating it - to defend themselves from the accusation is counted as yet another violation. In any case, the accusation by itself - in the present-tense - is seen as a notable slight. However, in most circumstances, this has several limitations and this form of aggravated identity politics evaded official politics so far as the political had to be taken seriously. Past a certain point, it is an accusation where the validity and hence content of the accusation is not something which is of interest, and hence on the one hand is generally only possible in an overall situation which is something of a rig, and on the other hand can easily dissolve into nothing without a notable and artificial infrastructure and atmosphere to back it up.
Nonetheless, there were positive aspects to the Sanders campaign. For one thing, as much as their attempt to smuggle a foreign content into the Democratic Party while letting it be was problematic, it was at the same time a manifestation of a certain level of indifference to official politics. They merely tried to drift their politics into the Democratic Party, as if it was insubstantial or they did not care to consider it. While they were not as a movement 'negative' enough, there was a certain sense of being liberated from this realm as well. Further, among both the Trump and Clinton campaigns based on 'name,' dynastic politics, reality TV and shallow controversy, the Sanders campaign was one of the few identified with the political and hence which was strictly speaking in place in the area. We have discussed this previously. This is a notable divergence from the others, and although hemmed in is quite impressive.
However, Trump by contrast frequently attempted to distract attention from domestic politics by raising issues like immgration almost to the exclusion of such politics. In lieu of a particular political direction, they substituted generic slogans like 'Make America Great Again,' and relied on the media to make something out of this. However, we may ask: why does Trump, who is not usually held responsible for many problems of domestic politics, feel such a pressing need to constantly distract attention elsewhere? Before dealing with this question, we must note that Trump essentially started the wave which Clinton rode of essentially apolitical or media-based candidacy, and hence that in riding this to nomination Clinton was essentially benefitting Trump.
In any case, it must be noted that so far as his politics do turn up, he is often much closer to the usual Democrat than to Republicans. His views on major social issues are generally highly liberal, and would disenfranchise many traditional conservatives of the Bush-era and similar. In an era where traditional conservatives would usually want urgent support, the Republican choice of Donald Trump is a capitulation. The Republican Party no longer represents its previous political core, it has no real political importance any more. However, apart from being close to the Democrats in terms of politics, he is also trying hard to distract attention from domestic politics and hence cover the tracks - of the Democrats. What candidate would need to hesitate to make specious promises, and then mostly idle when in office, if they had someone like Donald Trump to distract all attention from these misdemeanours and the nation generally? Hence, considering the state as a whole, Donald Trump is often serving the Democrats and working in their interests - which is highly useful in such a two-Party context. He has also accompanied a crippling of the opposition to the Democrats. To reprise some of the low-brow humour prominent around the time of the 2008 election, if Obama isn't a Republi-can, Trump can certainly seem like a Democ-rat.
In general, the Democrats might seem slightly polite this election, content to elect a candidate who effectively rides off their place in the Party rather than adding much to it - unlike their campaign behind Obama, where they ran a fairly pronounced political campaign. However, if on the one hand they are settling for minimalism rather than focussing on a general story, this is compensated for by their focus on the other side of things - by the Democratic turn of the Republicans. Clinton's 'story' is merely that they were established, and breezed through into the candidacy (sort of), essentially because they were favourites: this betrays a lack of focus here. Democratic liberalism is spread too thinly in this election, and cannot conjure the same focussed and pseudo-partisan campaign. Hence, in another sense, Clinton was one of the recent candidates most open to threat: they were faced with continual interrogations and attacks, although their status was mobilised to get around this. While they might do decently, their campaign was unlikely to disqualify their opponent completely because they did not have that that level of trust. Hence, despite a few slips, Trump was ultimately able to return to a challenging position and eventually get past Clinton, who did not have the cleanliness or sense of immunity that would maintain their advantages. Bernie Sanders, who was generally viewed as somewhat trust-worthy, and even praised by such as Trump for it, might have avoided this obstacle. However, they would have had to rely on a Democratic infrastructure quite unsuited to promoting their half-radical cause, which is just as much an obstacle. They eventually did not get that far. This is in some ways unfortunate, but in some ways the suggestion that they wouldn't have done worse at the elections might spur further movements in this direction.
Recent times have also seen some slightly strange political commentary, such as Obama being compared to the villain of the 'Hunger Games' because they use 'hope' followed by 'fear' or threat. Peculiar. One always figured that the villain of the Hunger Games must be Slenderman. In any case, this slightly vague designation of using 'hope' followed by 'fear' could characterise the state or political movements generally, or indeed any body that enforces nation-wide law (ie. generally the primary characteristic of the state.) First they promote a cause or hope for it, then they enforce it. In general, being the villain of the Hunger Games and indeed most Russia-invoking dystopian novels is an honour only fit for socialists, and while Obama is occasionally confused with one this is not enough for them to claim the title.
In general, it was not necessarily a surprise that Sanders was not Democratic candidate, although they are the least empty candidate. Meanwhile, the two-Party rule continues, with people assuming that there is a more significant division while the Parties themselves are aware that they have near-completely ruled the state. Hence, after the appearance of a division, as a sort of minor pittance, things generally settle into a sort of uniformity punctuated by occasional 'issues' that quickly dissipate. Conservatives could not, as it now appears, trust the Republicans to put forward their political qualms. In trusting the Republicans over time, they have increasingly accepted capitulation on social issues. The Christian religion is increasingly reducing to the hatred of Islam, and both candidates' Christianity is taken for granted and no longer needs the notable displays of the Bush era. It is still pernicious, but no longer concerned about political agendas or social change - it is hence neutralised in this realm. Contemporary Christianity has as its spiritual home only the funeral, where religious praise is heaped on various people for little reason other than their celebrity. People's affection is so much for the dead, that the living who wish for such praise would do better to join the dead. The Trump-Clinton division was always likely to be uncertain, but Trump had sufficient lee-way due to Clinton's uncertain reputation. Eventually that was enough in this case. Nonetheless, there is a notable level at which this election involves a promotion of status and media promotion over politics, to the point that the latter becomes irrelevant. This problem would subsist regardless of which candidate won, and this indifference to political actors gives them some freedom to push through their apparent agenda.
Hence, Bernie Sanders was eventually given trouble by someone who essentially represents a fairly hollow 'establishment' - the Clinton campaign, run mostly based on being a notable 'name' in the Democratic Party. This is dynastic politics, and quite blatant about it. Compared to Sanders, their politics were loosely sketched and have generally not remained constant - they were merely holding ground, as Sanders was so to speak entering their 'house.' It seems absurd that a political Party also forms a 'house, 'in the gambling sense, that others must take on despite a political hollowness - nonetheless this is the case. However, Sanders generally speaking did not seek to combat this directly, and hence was generally speaking unwilling to challenge the agendas of the Democratic Party or agitate for its general renewal. Instead, their campaign opted to merely promote Sanders and opt for more or less generic forms of campaigning with the main difference being the slogans and name - their campaign was in most things not distinguished from the others, and hence could hardly fuel resistance to the others. They needed some distinction to allow them to engage in 'negative,' critical takes on politics as it was and the Democratic Party, and they did not gain this. By the end, the campaign took on a high emphasis on donors - and of course a notable donation requires sufficient money - such that their eventual capitulation to the business-favouring Democratic Party was not that much of a surprise, nor something which Sanders' supporters can merely displace blame over. It eventually, later on, had the general properties of a pessimistic gambling den.
Their continuing promotion of the campaign well after they stood a notable chance of the nomination perhaps suggests that their figures concerning the amount of voluntary promotion done were in part fictionalised. Otherwise, there was little to encourage it, apart from the occasional recreational bout of cold-calling. Such forms of promotion are often treated with scorn in other fields, regardless.
In any case, the Sanders campaign attempted to import a foreign content into the field of major political Parties, without displacing what was already there - hence, they ran into issues in these circumstances. The Democratic Party went stubbornly with a 'conventional,' name-based candidate, Clinton, who was possibly the closest thing to apolitical of most recent politicians. However, Clinton was saddled with several hits to their reputation, which would have been debilitating to most other candidates. They did, however, have some borrowed momentum from a previous campaign in a time when politics was a more major and pressing concern - as opposed to now when official politics is just staffed with celebs and people with familiar names and media ruckus - and, also notably, had significant backing among somewhat tiresomely mild-liberal celebrities and such. They hence at least had the momentum to carry through a campaign which mostly disregarded politics and could try to ignore Sanders' beliefs; identity politics then served to seal this modus operandi and secure indifference to the content of the Sanders campaign.
Identity politics in official politics can be harmful, as people are essentially locked in as soon as they are accused of violating it - to defend themselves from the accusation is counted as yet another violation. In any case, the accusation by itself - in the present-tense - is seen as a notable slight. However, in most circumstances, this has several limitations and this form of aggravated identity politics evaded official politics so far as the political had to be taken seriously. Past a certain point, it is an accusation where the validity and hence content of the accusation is not something which is of interest, and hence on the one hand is generally only possible in an overall situation which is something of a rig, and on the other hand can easily dissolve into nothing without a notable and artificial infrastructure and atmosphere to back it up.
Nonetheless, there were positive aspects to the Sanders campaign. For one thing, as much as their attempt to smuggle a foreign content into the Democratic Party while letting it be was problematic, it was at the same time a manifestation of a certain level of indifference to official politics. They merely tried to drift their politics into the Democratic Party, as if it was insubstantial or they did not care to consider it. While they were not as a movement 'negative' enough, there was a certain sense of being liberated from this realm as well. Further, among both the Trump and Clinton campaigns based on 'name,' dynastic politics, reality TV and shallow controversy, the Sanders campaign was one of the few identified with the political and hence which was strictly speaking in place in the area. We have discussed this previously. This is a notable divergence from the others, and although hemmed in is quite impressive.
However, Trump by contrast frequently attempted to distract attention from domestic politics by raising issues like immgration almost to the exclusion of such politics. In lieu of a particular political direction, they substituted generic slogans like 'Make America Great Again,' and relied on the media to make something out of this. However, we may ask: why does Trump, who is not usually held responsible for many problems of domestic politics, feel such a pressing need to constantly distract attention elsewhere? Before dealing with this question, we must note that Trump essentially started the wave which Clinton rode of essentially apolitical or media-based candidacy, and hence that in riding this to nomination Clinton was essentially benefitting Trump.
In any case, it must be noted that so far as his politics do turn up, he is often much closer to the usual Democrat than to Republicans. His views on major social issues are generally highly liberal, and would disenfranchise many traditional conservatives of the Bush-era and similar. In an era where traditional conservatives would usually want urgent support, the Republican choice of Donald Trump is a capitulation. The Republican Party no longer represents its previous political core, it has no real political importance any more. However, apart from being close to the Democrats in terms of politics, he is also trying hard to distract attention from domestic politics and hence cover the tracks - of the Democrats. What candidate would need to hesitate to make specious promises, and then mostly idle when in office, if they had someone like Donald Trump to distract all attention from these misdemeanours and the nation generally? Hence, considering the state as a whole, Donald Trump is often serving the Democrats and working in their interests - which is highly useful in such a two-Party context. He has also accompanied a crippling of the opposition to the Democrats. To reprise some of the low-brow humour prominent around the time of the 2008 election, if Obama isn't a Republi-can, Trump can certainly seem like a Democ-rat.
In general, the Democrats might seem slightly polite this election, content to elect a candidate who effectively rides off their place in the Party rather than adding much to it - unlike their campaign behind Obama, where they ran a fairly pronounced political campaign. However, if on the one hand they are settling for minimalism rather than focussing on a general story, this is compensated for by their focus on the other side of things - by the Democratic turn of the Republicans. Clinton's 'story' is merely that they were established, and breezed through into the candidacy (sort of), essentially because they were favourites: this betrays a lack of focus here. Democratic liberalism is spread too thinly in this election, and cannot conjure the same focussed and pseudo-partisan campaign. Hence, in another sense, Clinton was one of the recent candidates most open to threat: they were faced with continual interrogations and attacks, although their status was mobilised to get around this. While they might do decently, their campaign was unlikely to disqualify their opponent completely because they did not have that that level of trust. Hence, despite a few slips, Trump was ultimately able to return to a challenging position and eventually get past Clinton, who did not have the cleanliness or sense of immunity that would maintain their advantages. Bernie Sanders, who was generally viewed as somewhat trust-worthy, and even praised by such as Trump for it, might have avoided this obstacle. However, they would have had to rely on a Democratic infrastructure quite unsuited to promoting their half-radical cause, which is just as much an obstacle. They eventually did not get that far. This is in some ways unfortunate, but in some ways the suggestion that they wouldn't have done worse at the elections might spur further movements in this direction.
Recent times have also seen some slightly strange political commentary, such as Obama being compared to the villain of the 'Hunger Games' because they use 'hope' followed by 'fear' or threat. Peculiar. One always figured that the villain of the Hunger Games must be Slenderman. In any case, this slightly vague designation of using 'hope' followed by 'fear' could characterise the state or political movements generally, or indeed any body that enforces nation-wide law (ie. generally the primary characteristic of the state.) First they promote a cause or hope for it, then they enforce it. In general, being the villain of the Hunger Games and indeed most Russia-invoking dystopian novels is an honour only fit for socialists, and while Obama is occasionally confused with one this is not enough for them to claim the title.
In general, it was not necessarily a surprise that Sanders was not Democratic candidate, although they are the least empty candidate. Meanwhile, the two-Party rule continues, with people assuming that there is a more significant division while the Parties themselves are aware that they have near-completely ruled the state. Hence, after the appearance of a division, as a sort of minor pittance, things generally settle into a sort of uniformity punctuated by occasional 'issues' that quickly dissipate. Conservatives could not, as it now appears, trust the Republicans to put forward their political qualms. In trusting the Republicans over time, they have increasingly accepted capitulation on social issues. The Christian religion is increasingly reducing to the hatred of Islam, and both candidates' Christianity is taken for granted and no longer needs the notable displays of the Bush era. It is still pernicious, but no longer concerned about political agendas or social change - it is hence neutralised in this realm. Contemporary Christianity has as its spiritual home only the funeral, where religious praise is heaped on various people for little reason other than their celebrity. People's affection is so much for the dead, that the living who wish for such praise would do better to join the dead. The Trump-Clinton division was always likely to be uncertain, but Trump had sufficient lee-way due to Clinton's uncertain reputation. Eventually that was enough in this case. Nonetheless, there is a notable level at which this election involves a promotion of status and media promotion over politics, to the point that the latter becomes irrelevant. This problem would subsist regardless of which candidate won, and this indifference to political actors gives them some freedom to push through their apparent agenda.
Friday 6 January 2017
Crisis
Crisis is ultimately an important part of any Marxist take on capital's tendency to down-fall. Crisis is in general terms when the contradictions of capital are clearly displayed. The artificial, inverted processes of the economy - with its organisation of the production process - run counter to the actual social process which it super-imposes itself on and attempts to hijack. These contradictions are also central to Marxist accounts of capital's down-fall, on the one hand due to elementary considerations (capitalism does not evolve into communism by a harmonious movement, as if communism were just a form of capitalism), and on the other hand based on the Hegelian dictum that transience is also a property of the object itself. Other views, however, which do not take into account this transience, tend to attribute crisis to merely particular factors. There is hence a certain gulf between these views of crises. Nonetheless, crisis is important to Marxism not only in helping to preserve a sense of its uniqueness and difference from other viewpoints, but also in terms of its close, inherent relation to the mechanism of capitalism's self-undermining.
Firstly, crisis is the manifestation of the contradictions of capital in such a way as to prevent it from going on. Secondly, crisis cannot be an impediment to this down-fall, as any notable resistance to capital which causes obstruction will lead into crisis. This especially if it could form a problem for profits.
Finally, any voluntaristic rendering of capital's problems falls under several problems. For one thing, all laws of capital militate and have always militated against it: the working class and others have a distinct disadvantage to the capitalist class in the field of negotiation, and are further harmed by the limitations associated with the falling rate of profit and the weakening of their negotiating position by the change in the organic composition of capital. Labour's position, and such, weakens as time goes on due to its expulsion from capital. For another, it attempts to portray communism as a result not of capital's contradictions but rather as a positive growth from it, and hence merely an out-growth of capitalism's own dynamic. Communism ends up positively identified with capitalism. With this 'communism,' Obama's proposals might well qualify as dogmatic and left-communist.
However, crisis theory has a different portrayal of events. Communism is identified with the abolition of capitalism via the contradictions of capital which manifest capital's problems. These reveal capital to be a distortion of the process of production and social organisation, and not its inherent form. Of course, despite this capital is nonetheless the basis of the social production process' organisation, and hence when it experiences difficulties most of society is caught up in this. They have generally relied on capital, but now they might find themselves cast out and hence unable to rely on capital. This creates a general strata who are somewhat distanced from capital, and hence the overall society. While capital might not wish to incorporate them explicitly, it still has to attempt to establish uniformity by as it were scolding or disciplining them into the fold. As with 'austerity,' their political action now takes on a 'moral' garb. Students and so on can easily also form a part of this strata, but it has to be noted that the point of their courses and so on is their integration into capitalist society and the attempt to form a harmonious part of it - hence, in concrete terms students still generally tend to have their directions and aims mapped out by capital and hence in practical terms act by active derivation from capital. Only students who are somewhat distanced from these studies and capitalist directions will earn a real association with the system's displaced strata. The rest will merely go forth and attempt to evangelise the merits of this system to all and sundry. In any case, crisis is a time when people are brought to consider the overall configuration of society, and not merely specific and particularised forms this displays them. It also expresses a decisive limitation in all attempts to merely transform capitalist society generally to a 'more favourable' form contrary to its nature - hence, these attempts may lose some steam from their hollowness being revealed by crisis, as their distinction from revolutionary politics is their taking capital being society's form for granted or taking it as an inherent form and this precisely is undermined by the advent of the crisis.
Hence, communism is not identified with capital positively, but rather relates to it negatively - it is a negation of capital which is also posited in the form of capitalism's inherent contradictions undermining its own functioning. It is hence both immanent, and a negation.
Nonetheless, crisis theory often wants to posit in the form of a 'law' what is not a law. For instance, positing that crisis will inevitably lead to an uprising faces several problems - people's forbearance is after all not an exact economic quantity. The precise circumstances which might lead to this are not something which can be specified in an exact form. Judging by the early Christians, and even the martyrs of the modern age (Islamists are associated with suicide bombings, Western Christians with getting in the way), things could go quite a long way with no revolution arising out of necessity. Crises are, after all, destructive - if people accept this destruction, then they will merely lead to destruction and not to 'communism.' The limits of this destruction might be unclear - if a person will give up their life and possibly those of others nearby in martyrdom, what will they not sacrifice to circumstances? In any case, this might lead only to a 'general dissolution' and not to communism. All of this depends on the spirit of the age, and indeed as Marxists tend to note earlier ages could not be stirred to communist revolution no matter how fervent their struggle.
Can we then posit an 'inevitable' revolution on this basis, in any practical sense? Partially, but this is categorical and not readily apparent. If capitalism's sublation is already displayed in crisis - its contradictions leading to its demise - then a social transformation is already posited. The forces which comprehend this are also the forces which lead beyond capitalism. Crises are a symptom of a disease, and the maleficent bacteria is 'communism.' Still, in terms of the direct effects of crisis, there are limitations at pausing there and assuming that as if by formula it will lead to the over-throw of capital. There is no such law to the human. One may only set one's hope on possibilities, although this approach can still reveal by one means or another a point close to necessity.
Capital attempts to assert a harmonic society on the basis of private property or isolated, separate demesnes. In this process, the gaps increasingly undermine capital's bloated castle of glass.
As a result, crisis theory goes in the right direction, but it does not go far enough in the direction it generally wants to. While it deals with the economy, it takes for granted some spirit or other in whatever quantity of people. It does not truly determine as a law that as things proceed communism must exist, as opposed to other alternative responses. In lieu of people, it substitutes abstractions behaving by 'laws' that need not apply to people. As such, we merely find that communism is a possibility that might occur given the appropriate response to circumstances, or the appropriate formation of a resistant approach to social relations - and even then requires further buttressing against other threats. Communism hence need not appear as immanent to capitalist society here. In feudal society, the promulgation of exchange-relations and compensation was indeed a harmful force tending to dissolution; communists merely took this form and hypostatised it upon capitalism, which would be erroneously to attribute to capitalism the same frailties as actually were its raison d'être. In general, however, the crisis-centric view, if developed, might at least seem to evidence some form of 'faith' in the cause in a concrete sense, if not a concrete view of the factors leading to its necessity. It implies a view of communism which is substantively posited as a system beyond capital and resulting from its collapse and over-throw, rather than one which is merely an extension of capitalist production. Hence, the view of communism is substantiated to some extent by the identification of it with the phenomenon of the crisis, it already takes on a concrete significance vis-à-vis the current system.
In general, then, crisis theory is an important moment in the portrayal of communism, but does not by its effects substantiate communism's necessity and validity as the next form of society. This may be exceeded by a categorical view of the significance of the crisis and its place in relation to capitalist society, which points to a further understanding of the place of communism. Nonetheless, much of humanity is commonly held to live in suffering and need, and nonetheless this has often led to similar placidity and social apathy rather than otherwise. What seems aimed for is a status between such impoverishment and dependence on the one hand, and on the other hand without much personal achievement of place within capitalism so far as it lasted. This will rarely occur, however, except in the form of people who rather than being a part of capitalism's general process do not adjust to the system or wish to do so, and hence are cast out - communists, in brief. Outside of this, realistically there are usually many hypotheticals still in play. Nonetheless, at the least a calmer view of the overall historical scene and the place of communism keeps communism a clear focus and gives a hint of its inevitability.
Firstly, crisis is the manifestation of the contradictions of capital in such a way as to prevent it from going on. Secondly, crisis cannot be an impediment to this down-fall, as any notable resistance to capital which causes obstruction will lead into crisis. This especially if it could form a problem for profits.
Finally, any voluntaristic rendering of capital's problems falls under several problems. For one thing, all laws of capital militate and have always militated against it: the working class and others have a distinct disadvantage to the capitalist class in the field of negotiation, and are further harmed by the limitations associated with the falling rate of profit and the weakening of their negotiating position by the change in the organic composition of capital. Labour's position, and such, weakens as time goes on due to its expulsion from capital. For another, it attempts to portray communism as a result not of capital's contradictions but rather as a positive growth from it, and hence merely an out-growth of capitalism's own dynamic. Communism ends up positively identified with capitalism. With this 'communism,' Obama's proposals might well qualify as dogmatic and left-communist.
However, crisis theory has a different portrayal of events. Communism is identified with the abolition of capitalism via the contradictions of capital which manifest capital's problems. These reveal capital to be a distortion of the process of production and social organisation, and not its inherent form. Of course, despite this capital is nonetheless the basis of the social production process' organisation, and hence when it experiences difficulties most of society is caught up in this. They have generally relied on capital, but now they might find themselves cast out and hence unable to rely on capital. This creates a general strata who are somewhat distanced from capital, and hence the overall society. While capital might not wish to incorporate them explicitly, it still has to attempt to establish uniformity by as it were scolding or disciplining them into the fold. As with 'austerity,' their political action now takes on a 'moral' garb. Students and so on can easily also form a part of this strata, but it has to be noted that the point of their courses and so on is their integration into capitalist society and the attempt to form a harmonious part of it - hence, in concrete terms students still generally tend to have their directions and aims mapped out by capital and hence in practical terms act by active derivation from capital. Only students who are somewhat distanced from these studies and capitalist directions will earn a real association with the system's displaced strata. The rest will merely go forth and attempt to evangelise the merits of this system to all and sundry. In any case, crisis is a time when people are brought to consider the overall configuration of society, and not merely specific and particularised forms this displays them. It also expresses a decisive limitation in all attempts to merely transform capitalist society generally to a 'more favourable' form contrary to its nature - hence, these attempts may lose some steam from their hollowness being revealed by crisis, as their distinction from revolutionary politics is their taking capital being society's form for granted or taking it as an inherent form and this precisely is undermined by the advent of the crisis.
Hence, communism is not identified with capital positively, but rather relates to it negatively - it is a negation of capital which is also posited in the form of capitalism's inherent contradictions undermining its own functioning. It is hence both immanent, and a negation.
Nonetheless, crisis theory often wants to posit in the form of a 'law' what is not a law. For instance, positing that crisis will inevitably lead to an uprising faces several problems - people's forbearance is after all not an exact economic quantity. The precise circumstances which might lead to this are not something which can be specified in an exact form. Judging by the early Christians, and even the martyrs of the modern age (Islamists are associated with suicide bombings, Western Christians with getting in the way), things could go quite a long way with no revolution arising out of necessity. Crises are, after all, destructive - if people accept this destruction, then they will merely lead to destruction and not to 'communism.' The limits of this destruction might be unclear - if a person will give up their life and possibly those of others nearby in martyrdom, what will they not sacrifice to circumstances? In any case, this might lead only to a 'general dissolution' and not to communism. All of this depends on the spirit of the age, and indeed as Marxists tend to note earlier ages could not be stirred to communist revolution no matter how fervent their struggle.
Can we then posit an 'inevitable' revolution on this basis, in any practical sense? Partially, but this is categorical and not readily apparent. If capitalism's sublation is already displayed in crisis - its contradictions leading to its demise - then a social transformation is already posited. The forces which comprehend this are also the forces which lead beyond capitalism. Crises are a symptom of a disease, and the maleficent bacteria is 'communism.' Still, in terms of the direct effects of crisis, there are limitations at pausing there and assuming that as if by formula it will lead to the over-throw of capital. There is no such law to the human. One may only set one's hope on possibilities, although this approach can still reveal by one means or another a point close to necessity.
Capital attempts to assert a harmonic society on the basis of private property or isolated, separate demesnes. In this process, the gaps increasingly undermine capital's bloated castle of glass.
As a result, crisis theory goes in the right direction, but it does not go far enough in the direction it generally wants to. While it deals with the economy, it takes for granted some spirit or other in whatever quantity of people. It does not truly determine as a law that as things proceed communism must exist, as opposed to other alternative responses. In lieu of people, it substitutes abstractions behaving by 'laws' that need not apply to people. As such, we merely find that communism is a possibility that might occur given the appropriate response to circumstances, or the appropriate formation of a resistant approach to social relations - and even then requires further buttressing against other threats. Communism hence need not appear as immanent to capitalist society here. In feudal society, the promulgation of exchange-relations and compensation was indeed a harmful force tending to dissolution; communists merely took this form and hypostatised it upon capitalism, which would be erroneously to attribute to capitalism the same frailties as actually were its raison d'être. In general, however, the crisis-centric view, if developed, might at least seem to evidence some form of 'faith' in the cause in a concrete sense, if not a concrete view of the factors leading to its necessity. It implies a view of communism which is substantively posited as a system beyond capital and resulting from its collapse and over-throw, rather than one which is merely an extension of capitalist production. Hence, the view of communism is substantiated to some extent by the identification of it with the phenomenon of the crisis, it already takes on a concrete significance vis-à-vis the current system.
In general, then, crisis theory is an important moment in the portrayal of communism, but does not by its effects substantiate communism's necessity and validity as the next form of society. This may be exceeded by a categorical view of the significance of the crisis and its place in relation to capitalist society, which points to a further understanding of the place of communism. Nonetheless, much of humanity is commonly held to live in suffering and need, and nonetheless this has often led to similar placidity and social apathy rather than otherwise. What seems aimed for is a status between such impoverishment and dependence on the one hand, and on the other hand without much personal achievement of place within capitalism so far as it lasted. This will rarely occur, however, except in the form of people who rather than being a part of capitalism's general process do not adjust to the system or wish to do so, and hence are cast out - communists, in brief. Outside of this, realistically there are usually many hypotheticals still in play. Nonetheless, at the least a calmer view of the overall historical scene and the place of communism keeps communism a clear focus and gives a hint of its inevitability.
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