Poem from earlier, slightly edited

I'm sure everyone is trying to act sprightly right now, so we can't have Wyatt as our latest in artistic decoration. Instead, here's a re-worked form of an earlier poem.

/scar

0. 

Near a night-club,

The way the stars were,
and the palm trees sketching outlines along their spectre,
was almost
a song over
the loud blare of a wordless noise
repeating itself.

**

As the long night went on
a word appeared in the clouds,
and it said,
the plait of flat lights in the sky
was an illumination,
a painting.

**

The people did not stir,
but kept hopefully to their dance
hoping wildly that it might be
something else entirely –
the plaintive, detached glimmer they ignored
and shunned.

**

They liked loudness, yet not the silence
in which you may observe the glimmer
of a hopeful stone.
The chaos of a wild
evening ploughed through the music they heard -
meaning removed for dance beats,
hollowed.
And this dance was their only heartfelt art.

**

A quaint evening’s chorus
was made of plain choirboys
with nothing to say, and too many
ways to say it. They were lying.

But so it was, for they praised God,
but only looked to the crowd.
One might think them deceptive.
The exultantly ordinary laity never would.

Some people would be bored when you first
decried Valentine’s Day.

**

Yet, the stars
rung on with a clear hope, if you looked,
while the clouds almost whispered:
"Silence, stillness,
coldness,
strife is the noise of others
making senseless noise:
it is not your demesne,"
slowly, quietly.

the stars sung something like, 'Holy, Holy, Holy,'

starlit trees held in their light near the street,
walking down a pavement staring apart, and hoping to get seen.

The stars had a music of their own,
quite different from that of others,
yet it was no classical music,
it was real.
The light of
Valentine’s Day moons is like a strange ode,
where the day's halo rings on indefinitely
after the clock strikes, for the night is
all its denizens care for. The moon as if to say,

“Is it a chore of constancy, or the rush
for love without a face? The palest shade of night
shall not shine tonight.”
And so it never did.
There was no such special night.
It was a forgery.
And there were no stars, either, not
even of the vulgar, media kind.

The only truth was in the music of stars and of the spheres
that stared at them as out of a window,

But in capital, ordinarily, people moved closer
to capital, and thus attained some success,
and anything else was alternative, detached and rude.

The way past the open gazes
led to a secluded lilt of leaves and sky,
almost transmuted
seen at night.
We may hold the world to account if they did not listen.
In a decentred system, no-one else could ever be law.
Yet perhaps the moonlight sings, far away.

2. Half-light

Quiet oaks
of a Swindonian garden might render
in opal when in focus, yet
the sky still reflects itself in a distant pond.
The sun is a shadowed eye.
It is silent. It is like abandoned factories,
which call out, ghost-like, in a dour town,
as if to display a way out of this.

3. Creep Song.

Wait! Is there a sweeter slumber in the grave below,
or in the light of thine eyes? Mistress, tell me,
I need to know. Somebody told me. If I were
more perjured I should cry, ‘Calumny!’ and
no doubt be met with sympathy. What, then,
should leave your creep so isolated and serious?

For Hoxha is oft hated, I have seen in most encounters,
I have had with those who were not creeps,
And if I were to hope with a hope
that formed bunkers, would I not
then be called rogue? Aye, this occupies me.
But what else occupies me? Well, the Bible and God.

I am alike all of my kind,
a kin to all of my cause.
When people
decried Tarquin's treatment of Lucrece, then truly
could I say, “I am the table.” In feminism, I am the aggressor.

Yet am I not the victim of a label? Fie, fie,
as even Shakespeare may have said, indicating by it their feminism,
it is victim blaming, to hold against this creep
the rape culture of an age, which admittedly
might just involve me. Yet if a creep likes something,
no doubt its ‘friends’ must separate it from the creep.
In this way creeps are like all subversives.

Their claims are false, for in light we are
and may play with light.
But shall I
give my view on light, or would this not
rather offend the respectable religions
that you have held to?
So I must get your reply,
if I am to go on in this light.

To seek radically is to go to the root of the matter,
and the root of the person,
the person without embellishment.
Let your vision free,
that it may improve your paintings,
and further your illustrative economic diagrams.
Let not your diagrams remain uncared for.

Though it is not a fashion. Some say it is
a fashion to sigh, but it is rather plain.
One must rather detach, and seek another thing,
and then not sigh for what is left behind. But
to enjoy it is another thing. Where is the love
to shelter creeps?

**

So, you see,
Brunei was a function of Tokyo,
Canada was a function of the USA,
Britain was also.
So far as you are concerned,
they must all blur to one thing,
to something empty, a flag pinned
to sanctify the profane.

A narrow path
would not have looked good on a priest’s
credit card.

If drugs are a function of peer pressure,
then people liked them in saying so.

Brooding,
half-realised shapes - hopes for escape - were strewn on the walls
of the no-doubt asylum where a creep grows up,
condemned there for punishment. But do not
most ‘jocks’ and Biebers resemble Creep’s detractors?
So we are circled around,
by wardens in many shapes and sizes,
teachers or boy bands,
all these are the same.

Selena Gomez
may claim to have lost their virginity. I don’t consider it worth it.
Yet trysts are made on a whim, and value. To be a creep is to be revolutionary.

4. Year Zero. (ZeroNowhere.)

What need have we for the sound
of contented words, lacking content?
Our words must hang like silence, in darkness:
mysterious and obscure, yet sublime.
The years pass as a hollow pantomime.
Five years of 'Ellie Goulding' planted
the seeds for 'Sia,' and by that point
people may well have clamoured for
more obscure screeds on reds and 1984,
instead they got a Taylor Swift record,
which might well not tell them anything.
That’s where we come in - if anywhere at all.
Like the stillness of long-empty hallways, and quiet speculation,
socialism is most certain in silent contemplation.

5. Savage (unedited.)

The promises of
yesterday are like a glassed-off
garden’s grey shadow.

If you wish, you may
never be seen again, but shush
before you’re tortured.

It is a brief note
that the day is wan or in spring,
but a quiet gaze.

A revision of a Wyatt poem

Thomas Wyatt was a Tudor-era writer of crass poems. We have hence altered one of his poems, to more fully express the modern framework. His sonnets are typical and trite love poems, generally reducing the other to an object which could be closer or further away. Yet he is no good at this, while other poets of that 'era' exceeded him. Wyatt represents an ambiguous or transitional period in the social system, which he merely ran across in all its confusion. It is hence of passing interest to those who would confuse people now concerning the social system. It is still too complex for this. We hence have edited this appropriately:

They Flee From Metal

They flee from metal that sometime did metal seek

With naked foot, in my hidden chamber.

I have seen them gentle, tame, and metal,

That now are sell-outs and do not remember

That sometime they worshipped metal gods

To fight false metal; and now they range,

Busily seeking ideology like a Leninist.

Thanked be Marx it would be otherwise,

And thus twenty times better; but once in special,

In American array after a pleasant guise,

When white metal from her outskirts did fall,

And she me caught with her deep worshipfulness;

Therewithall sweetly did to me temporise

And softly said, “Dear heart, how like you me now?”

It was not true metal: I saw their heresy.

But all is turned through my metalness

Into a strange fashion of forsaking;

And I have leave to go of her piousness,

And she also, to use new pop music fads.

But since that I am so kindly treated,

I would fain slay her with the steel she hath deserved.

Land and Capital

The role of 'land' in capitalism is something that Marx placed a surprising emphasis on. They noted that revolution should go "seriously from the ground up," from "land ownership," and often commented on the importance of land to revolution. Hence, despite a focus elsewhere, Marx saw this aspect of capital as a central one. This might seem to resemble the capitalistic struggle with 'feudalism,' however a socialist revolutionary seizure would no doubt have to face it differently. Marx also stressed that the landowner in capitalism acts on a different basis to that in feudalism, a different social basis altering it. Hence, this would set a different task.

Hence, let us briefly set out the roles of land ownership and capital in capitalism, by way of comparison. In capitalism, objects are reduced to expressions of abstract and social value, and hence their own nature is abstracted from. Land ownership in capitalism hence seeks to 'naturalise' this formulation of the object, or take the object as somehow 'inherently' reduced to bare value. This is of course absurd. They hence simply seek to vulgarise the nature of things. Due to their inability to deal with these things fully, they hence merely take forms and try to 'colonise' and run them in averse ways. Hence, 'land owners' as a class often rented off land to others, their own tendencies driving them away from this that they claimed. However, due to the absurdity of their task it was often a self-undermining pursuit - it hence required people who were often quite devoid of content, and even they might be insecure. Capital, on the other hand, dealt with this abstraction in terms of the social relations it gave rise to. Hence, the abstraction there appeared as part of a process.

In dealing with communism, people often claim to come across a sense of 'apathy' and 'skepticism.' This is in many ways false - how many aspects of culture actually manifest this claimed 'cynicism'? Nonetheless, this is how people embroiled in ideological illusion represent their relation to 'communism.' This is further mediated by their capitalistic viewpoint hindering their understanding of 'communism.' Eventually, then, this seems to say little on their part about communism. Nonetheless, the general orientation is closer to the function of the land owning class, a generic attempt to naturalise the mode of social relations. It is foreign to capital, which seeks to carry out this process and hence is far from 'apathetic' about how the social relations are formulated. Capital would hence be more 'anti-communist,' although this is merely a knee-jerk reaction and hence depends on what others opt to label their 'communism.' Hence, the vulgarisation of land somehow seems to 'usurp' capitalism here. However, there is also something murkier there. When this aspect of land ownership conflates itself with capital, what you have is not an advocacy of capitalism but of a 'rig.' In lieu of the capitalist process, you have an actually 'naturalised'  social process posited where the land owner is the characteristic class. Instead of the abstractions appearing as part of a process, they are merely to be 'recognised' - hence, the 'social process' is reduced to a rigged enactment of this, not allowed to occur freely and as a process. It is hence not only anti-socialist, it is also dubious in its allegiance to capitalism.

Generally, 'socialist' organisations with a modus operandi harmonised with the system are similar: the capitalistic process is merely 'naturalised,' and seen as something they should 'adapt' to. This also applies to most socialist 'outreach,' where capitalistic tendencies are allowed to be the criterion of socialist expression. This hence often tends merely to end up in explicit liberalism. Socialism cannot express itself if it sets up capitalism as an authority over this expression - it then has no content.

Hence, Marx's comment criticises the class which represents the 'naturalised' form of capitalism's categories. Hence, they deal with a vision of revolution which stands against the 'value' nexus, or comes from outside of this process. This vision is not their usual, so it appears as an incidental adjunct of revolution. It is nonetheless a potentially profound category. Hence, when their critique in 'Das Kapital' begins from general categories, people often find this departure inexplicable. However, it is connected to this critique of 'landownership,' and hence it seeks to deal with the categories of capitalism and criticise them directly in their effect on things. As a result, people expect Marx to restrict themselves to a criticism of the process, which criticism they are associated with. Marx hence further attacks the arbitrary expropriation of things based on capitalism, or the assumption that this capitalistic reduction of things gives one authority over them. They hence also locate the 'authority' thus formed in the capitalistic society or as a social form, noting that it only appears as 'personal' form of authority due to the contradictory form of this society. Further, this society is hence made 'intrinsic' to the person, as is its contradiction; as a result, they are eventually torn asunder by this posited 'personal struggle.' Further, this approach hence explains their decision, in the 'final' chapter of volume 3, to stress 'landownership' in their criticism. It is in some ways a natural result of the opening: that it will culminate with the system being attacked fundamentally or the concept of revolution, further that this is connected to the 'landlord' category. To have a problem with Marx's choice of a categorical criticism is also to take issue with any revolutionary tendencies in Marx.

Hence, the criticism of 'landowners' is tied to the fundamental criticism made elsewhere. This has hopefully helped to clarify the significance of such criticism, and that it is not simply done arbitrarily.

A Comment on Halloween

On Halloween, society seeks to assimilate or interact with that which affronts and scares it. This assimilation is, of course, duplicitous: it is acknowledged as foreign and frightening, so it is precisely what will not be assimilated. Often, even this process is paralysed; for instance, by other reactions to the feared like 'offence.' In addition, this is all done in the name of 'Halloween' or society's encounter with hostility, which people get involved in. Given the duplicity of the task, it will often devolve into merely people wearing 'safe' costumes and celebrating - abandoning any seeming point to this occasion. In any case, however, this kind of 'horror' is rarely substantial.

As such,  'horror' of any interest which is associated with it will be predominantly of two kinds. Firstly: things which are already fearsome, and remain so. In this case, it does not matter that it is Halloween. Halloween is assimilation, which these are not drawn in by. Secondly: insofar as society interacts with fearsome elements, these may also react within this framework. This leads to the common tropes of Halloween taking on a distorted form, due to foreign elements counter-acting them. Hence, some aspect of society is rendered in a self-negating form. However, this is ultimately also inconsistent from the perspective of the feared elements, which have to both remain fearsome and take up the opposite perspective to merely assimilate this. Hence, in the end substantial horror in this event reduces to merely the attempted equation of opposites. That phrase might seem familiar.

One might draw analogies between Halloween and another main organ of assimilation, Hollywood. Again, the whole purpose of that institution is people assimilating things that they are not. In the process, the 'actors' abandon their own identity to instead merely follow the dictates of capital in this area. They are hence reduced to empty vessels for capital, which then tries to use these to assimilate foreign trends - hence, the empty vessels are to try and assimilate other fields. Where these empty vessels are normalised, one can hardly expect that much of worth. It might occasionally gain from a positive interaction with external forms of film-making, however of itself it cannot do much of ultimate worth. Hence, 'glimmers' of validity will occasionally show, yet rarely something that can hold together without the hollowness of the enterprise trivialising it. Nonetheless, we may compare this 'industry' to 'Halloween,' albeit with less independence. In either case, society sets itself an absurd task.

People hence must engage in the festival of Halloween with a sense of duty. However, perhaps this duty is actually a result of 'aloof' or 'isolated' figures sought in a social context, and not things which are 'feared' and instead run from. More generally, people also seek figures who they see portrayed in an analogous social context to theirs, and they are encouraged to for multiple reasons. Perhaps these others have different forms of interaction or expression. In any case, these more coherent attempts at search are derailed into the apparent form of society 'assimilating the fearful,' perhaps in part due to the attempt to fit these aloof figures into our own everyday social forms. This was in part also due to a society which was unstable and transient - in a situation of foreboding. Hence, when searches go in directions that ultimately turn out hollow, it might be that the search had a different basis altogether.

The Accessible Theory (A Book), Chapter 1

This.

The Accessible Theory (A Book)

Preface:

As a common complaint about books like Das Kapital is their length and ensuing inaccessibility, we have decided to publish a book which avoids these problems completely. We hence present the first volume of this highly abridged work. This shall hopefully encourage readers unwilling to explore more 'obscure' books too much. In this book, we seek to convey clearly what the reader is to get from each chapter. Further, this is expressed in clear terms.

Hopefully you shall enjoy this. It is an exciting pathway for literature, and it should not disappoint you.

The Nation, Reprise

A nation is a political entity, not necessarily a geographical one. It is the form taken by a political force, when it has attained political power.

However, the modern nation has no political substance. Its state and politics alters every few years; further, in a capitalistic system the political agenda is avoided in favour of the actions of atomised actors. The state is reduced to tending to private, economic interests. Hence, ultimately, it is forced to fall behind capital, although in practice this is to evade the political in favour of economic interests. However, more decisively, the 'politics' of a nation are hence insubstantial, an empty 'hole' to be filled by foreign content. This nation is ultimately also 'insubstantial.'

Hence, the nation is reduced to arbitrary, 'geographical' boundaries, in lieu of a substantial political entity. Its politics are indefinite, variable,and ultimately empty. Hence, politically the nation means nothing. It is merely an 'obstacle,' an extent of land barred from political forces. It is in contradiction with itself, however, and hence ultimately limited and torn apart.

Hence, although the political is an aspect of humans, it appears in an 'alienated' form - the 'political' plays out in a realm separated from itself, it is torn away from itself. That which it wants and which is a content proper to it, is enacted where it is not. There is a certain level of superstition or 'patriotism' which is inherent to this. It is hence connected to what we have previously referred to as the 'imaginative' element of capitalistic economies. Further, there arises an even more degenerated politics that calls for replacing struggle with 'co-operation' between nations and 'leaving behind differences,' merely indulging in the emptiness which the capitalistic economy reduces politics to. Nonetheless, along with this 'patriotism' is the firmer 'nationalism' - the demand that the political element establish itself in a primary role, and subject the other elements of the nation which have trivialised it. This is still, in some ways, often merely a distortion of the 'patriotism' of nations, expressing yet not decisively expressing the contradictions of the capitalistic nation. It often scavenges among the nations and people there for an identity, it does not like communism aim primarily at a break with this and towards the future. Hence, while a necessary form taken by the continual self-negation of the counterfeit-political, it is nonetheless itself often limited. It often, in any case, plays a generic political role, set out for it by this system - when the nationalistic comes to play a decisive role, as it must, then it will eventually break free of this generic character. However, it might initially be reluctant about this, about lacking a clear 'anchor ' or 'belonging' in a systematic niche. This must nonetheless occur, in such a situation.

However, along with this development, there is also the continuing 'externalisation' of political and substantial movements from themselves, the manufacturing of hollow, 'phantom' versions of these. These artificial forms are still contradictory, and in a way more contradictory. They are also highly 'derivative' and empty. Nonetheless, you hence have a 'realm' which cannot be accessed by the political, or indeed by official and straightforward means, which hence exists at a level of separation from the realm of genuine content. To keep this separate, the 'gateways' to it must be increasingly 'rigged' and targetted towards limiting genuine content from getting through - eventually barring the gates to the field entirely, or consigning it to the 'imaginative.' Nonetheless, these alienated realms must eventually expand into a right leviathan, akin to an informal aristocracy.

Firstly, however, this then starts to 'self-cannibalise' - its participants are obligated to act this way towards each other, as this is how they function. Hence, actors are set apart, again as though by a screen, and act in parallel as though 'self-sufficient'. They ultimately stand together against the genuine content, or in a 'reactionary' sense; nonetheless, they inhabit a form of 'pseudo-capital' that still threatens this division. However, as this 'realm' is self-undermining, or continually absorbs hostile elements, the hierarchy there - given that they are 'cut off' by default - is merely determined by who can continue to stand out despite inimical tendencies. While all elements in this realm relate to the content similarly, they hence are mostly distinguished by their ability to stay a focus despite the others starting to cut them off and subjecting them to their own means. This relates not to their standing out, necessarily, rather to their channeling things in that direction relative to the others. This cannot occur in too complex a form, given their role.

Hence, among the nations, 'nationalism' draws on conflicts and division. Aggressive modern regimes - Nazi Germany, the USSR, ISIS - have generally arisen in the after-math of war and conflict. Hence, they draw on 'cycles' of conflict and hatred, which are a contradiction that must eventually, dragon-like, explode and tear the world order apart. In some way, these incursions foreshadow its end. As the realm of the national and political is quickly set against the capitalistic form, this aggravation is hence aggressive - while in the cultural realm it is usually only destructive or makes the whole field appear peculiar. Nonetheless, if these nations do not turn against the system itself, they cannot support this division and will be supplanted by those who are less mired in it. The nations which attempt to avoid getting caught up in their division will 'survive,' until the whole system disappears. Likewise, more generally: nations which turn against the system, yet remain branded, by it will have problems with nations more 'consistent' with it. However, the nations that hijack this division do so with a purpose higher than the system, not merely to survive as a 'stable' entity within it. Hence, if they encounter problems with this, this does not impinge on their purpose - which shall eventually be realised. In this progression, 'nationalism' will eventually leave this circumscribed role and take on an independent form.

The Untethered System

For Hegel, the 'system' or theoretical was a context which was essential to its components. Hence, the system was the standard by which they were measured, the place where they gained a direction, and gave a place to fields such as the political sphere, etc. This, in any case, would mean by implication that the helm of these had at the least to be held by a thinking being, or individual - even if viewed without Hegel's overall perspective. However, other than this Hegel also attempted to place the categories into this schema in transmuted form. In some ways this was merely to 'sanctify' them, and hence the concern over the Hegelian's conservatism. However, at the same time they were rendered 'fluid' or given an action of their own, which was a clear property of the system. As a result of this, they appeared in transmuted form - nonetheless, as the system calls on them, they are also factors that act upon the system. This transmutation hence nonetheless was capable of dealing with these thing as they were, or considering the consequence of their entering the system. Given this, let us look at some of the consequences of Hegel's treatment of things via their system.

Many thinkers, such as Aquinas, dealt with the concept of 'standard.' God was portrayed as the 'standard' of virtues: to have a virtue was to partake of the virtue in itself, which was 'God.' In polytheism, deities were often embodiments and governors of traits; this was then integrated into the Christian view. This could involve the idea that a given quality presupposes a being which embodies or perfects this quality, which forms the 'standard' for this quality. Hence, for a slightly simplified instance, the idea that for something to have a quality, it must partake of this quality in its 'absolute form.' The quality would hence be elevated into a being of its own, an 'absolute' by which all things of this type were measured. Hegel's take was more 'psychological,' if you like. For Hegel, these 'qualities' and forms were 'measured' by their place in the 'Idea' or spirit. Hence, their place in the single Mind, and its overall schema, determined the place of all of these forms. Of course, this 'Mind' was the absolute Idea, which was in for a somewhat rocky journey on its path - moving through several limited forms. Few hindrances were spared it. Nonetheless, the overall portrayal of qualities is hence to locate their place in an overall schema, or a theoretical one, which is a further development of this. Those such as the Cathars had demonstrated how polytheism is inherent in even the strict 'monotheistic' religions, and hence even the more religiously 'conventional' Hegel attempted to move beyond this limitation towards the systematic. This has further, and important, consequences.

The concept of 'design,' or an inherent reason or causa finalis in things, has traditionally been linked to religion. Hegel develops this, by identifying a God with an underlying logic of 'progress' or 'directionality.' Unlike many previous portrayals of a 'Great Chain of Being,' Hegel hence attempts to not only place creatures in a definite place, rather he also attempts to give each of these places a direction and aim in the movement of the schema. Thus, the concept of a 'dialectic' is central: it ensures a sense of 'liveliness' to the schema, or a sense of inherent direction and motion to creatures within it. This is slightly complex, however it gives this 'conceptual' realm a sense of independent motion. Hence, Hegel completes the portrayal of inherent final causes. The problem with this is 'populism': as each member is, by its part in the schema, given a direction and purpose, all of them appear purposeful. Hence, they might even appear 'oppressed' by the schema, which still delimits them; however, outside of this they have no purpose or claims. As the schema is all-embracing, all things that may exist here are attributed a purpose and place in Spirit. This is hence 'positivistic,' as Marx and Kierkegaard would faintly touch on. Kierkegaard, notably, invoked in contrast an image of a 'break' or 'leap of faith' in contrast to the stable progression of the system. Further, he opposed correctly this potential portrayal of a general 'harmony' which ultimately limits its own values. Nonetheless, the 'system' hence draws on and completes several aspects of this perspective of an 'inherent' purpose within creatures and the world.

 Kierkegaard in some ways formed a schema of his own. In contrast to the apparent choice of Either/Or, with its pseudo-Hegelian categories, Kierkegaard then allowed for a further category of 'faith': a break with the previous. Hence, instead of a comfortably developed system, the one category represented 'judgement' over the others. This complemented his Christian portrayal of 'dying (becoming nothing) to the world,' or evacuating that which is 'of the world.' Hence, in a way with Kierkegaard the system was taken to the point of a new 'extremism.' This is allied to an 'individual' in their movement away from the social. Hence, 'inherent' purpose is partially avoided, the purpose is rather seen as a distinct process. Nonetheless, the destination is unclear. The 'break' is not truly a suspension of inherent purpose, but rather the replacement of man's inherent nature with another's: 'God.' Here, one's own movement is converted into that of another. However, this is hence not systematic, rather it relies on scripture and 'faith' to validate it.

Hence, in some ways, Kierkegaard avoids 'inherent purpose,' and rather locates purpose in eschewing this 'inherent' movement generally. However, how is this complete departure to be done? Hence, a God must appear there to allow us to avoid this movement, however the God themselves remains in their 'inherent' nature, and merely replaces the human's 'immediacy' with another's. This complete departure hence culminates in a scripture which gives sufficient license to opposed views. It is artificially limited.

Hence, Hegel claimed development and aim for the conceptual or human realm, Marx in some ways tried to re-capture this element of the 'dialectic' yet did so incompletely. The 'Hegelian' schema is in some ways a necessary concomitant of the dialectic. Movement becomes conceptual, and hence this realm starts to act as animated. While such a 'dialectic' follows from things such as Zeno's arrow, it nonetheless also complements such 'schema,' rather than this 'transformation' of concepts then being restricted to describing other things. Hence, in 'dialectical' forms that shun this kind of schema, the properties that the concepts have taken on are summarily removed from them and attributed elsewhere. However, in general, we can only usually consider things given an apt framework, including even where such things are to be placed - the dialectic is not a type of mosquito, for a simple instance. Nonetheless, for a dialectic, given this framework the consideration that follows occurs naturally. Hence, the major problem is things that might obstruct this inherent progression. Nonetheless, it hence follows that dialectics is something that may be known 'inherently,' or which has an inherently persuasive power to comprehension - when presented intact. Furthermore, without an appropriate framework this understanding cannot happen, so that the factor conditioning this is merely the framework. Hence, the motion in thought which is occurring there must be a property which is 'innate' to thought, or it could not be understood. This dialectic can only be 'applied' in any sense to things derived from a similar process. Nonetheless, it is not always perceived.

(Speaking of 'innate' understanding of 'language' is, of course, artificial. Language is not about 'accuracy,' generally, it is a human construct based on preferences and mores. It need not be used in this vein, however its 'innate' nature is pre-determined. Hence, such claims of 'innateness' early on generally concerned other things. Indeed, the validity of these things was not always the question, hence implying that this process hence depends on several factors. Of course, 'demonstrations' of this, such as in Meno, are problematic: they direct focus, and 'correct' certain proclamations, hence the external element is of course important. Of course, people cannot 'impart'  understanding, etc., they can only express viewpoints which the others may agree or disagree on. Here there is a similar confusion to much of the 'religious' - the human essence is given elsewhere, and thus humanity is subject to an external force thoroughly. Their internality is hence externalisd, and reduced to external influence, leading to passivity. This externalisation is hence taken for granted; internality is not enacted.)

The 'dialectic' is therefore a process which cannot be turned freely inside-out. It concerns concepts, and these cannot be freely treated as one likes - and still be dialectic. Indeed, if their own movement is contingent or impeded, then they have no real 'dialectic.' Thought is always thorough, in that people despite their contradictions must nonetheless form a given whole in these - perhaps despite themselves. Hence, these tend to undermine them. An account may be given of a person's thought, where the contradictions are represented in their interaction - although the person can never see them in this way. However, as a result their thought will always have a 'holistic' movement, it is never a blank space to be filled. If a 'dialectic' is granted, then this is a matter of the concepts' own movement. If a 'dialectic' is not granted, then objects cannot be understood as moving or having life, including oneself. Nonetheless, this 'innate' factor can nonetheless be missed, in some cases, when people instead 'externalise' it or take it as a factor not of the concepts themselves - an imparting of animation to them - and instead as merely an external factor that does not impact on the concepts. They might claim that the concepts are given life or a process in this way, only to systematically avoid this occurring. This is also an internal process, however it is problematic. It is ultimately empty, as well.

One can not generally 'intend' to impart 'understanding' - the aim is not understood. One may only express understanding.

Finally, what does Hegel's theory mean for notable 'social systems'? Each, evidently, has an 'eternal' or general part: they play a role in the eternal process. However, in addition to this they have an apparent 'independence' and 'formation.' This independence is, however, 'illusory' - if they actually had an existence apart from this eternal process, they would set themselves up as themselves self-sufficient and eternal forms. Hence, they must ultimately be reducible to this position, as notable systems or socio-political modes. Here, however, we notice a 'limitation' in the Hegelian schema: as social systems involve human interactions, the seeming independence of social systems is a 'part' of these and enacted by some. However, this is ultimately illusory and transient. Hence, an 'imaginative' or fictitious element of society takes a hold, and is perhaps dominant. This is composed of both people and social elements, and these shall pass away. They may be 'replaced,' so long as the process has not yet eschewed them or attained 'self-realisation.' Nonetheless, the 'schema' as such seems to attempt to 'sanctify' them. The actual result is that the positive process cannot generally 'maintain' them forever, due to its own nature realising itself through the process - which is precisely what the process is. Hence, eventually this must be 'founded' in a direct manner upon the world - or 'enforced.' However, 'enforcement' implies judgment, or a perspective that comprehends this. In any case, then, the role of people in this 'historical process' is clear: they relate in some way or other to this aspect of 'Spirit' or the process. 'History' waited on them, and required appropriate processes to develop. Only through this being realised appropriately, and radiating from where this occurs, can the historical process thus 'complete.' Nonetheless, this possibility will inevitably arise.

Hence, none of this should usually be dismissed swiftly. The general consequences of this are notable, and cannot be left alone. Further, it does not resolve into abstract social virtues, such as opposition to things like 'radicalism,' 'hierarchy' or (quite similarly) 'hate,' rather it posits a concrete and focused struggle. It notes that, without the theoretical, one only has a pursuit of such particular  social virtues and aims, which eventually turns on itself. This is hence akin to a 'polytheism,' where each gives their blessings to a certain deity. This is ultimately either cut short by death, or it will turn on itself - for all sides of it will be realised. Nonetheless, the theoretical transcends and orders it, by necessity - it is like a 'stance,' or a grip made by oneself that nonetheless will have a firm hold.

Further Reptilian Poetry

Here, I present a recently released reptilian poem.

The Deeps

In depths untamed, the salamander
weaves their mysterious path
upon a raiment of fire.
In the flickering light, the reptilian
takes on many strange forms,
yet is hidden in this.
The reptilian hides, in arcane fire, then strikes
savagely.

The komodo dragon's languid, merciless stare is steely.

In the desert, the lizard
slithers seamlessly across the sand.
The way of the reptilian is hidden,
and barren, yet in this land
he may move most freely.

Commenters may give feed-back or reviews on this excellent poem, however only by keeping strictly to the following format:

The following paragraph copied exactly, although you may choose from one of the options in brackets:

This poem is a stellar piece of poetry, for all (reptilians/time.) Its depiction of the world is as (enlightening/exciting/exquisite) as its use of the sonnet form is (immaculate/classically Petrarchan). From the (opening image of the salamander/imagery of fire upon a lizard), it never looks back, and continues with exotic and (mysterious/sensitive) imagery. Hence, the pathos of the (reptilian/earthly order/subversive) is most fully brought out.

The title (aptly presages the poem with its reference to 'depth'/is slightly New Romantic, however this is quickly redeemed by assimilating this back into terms of contemporary ie. reptilian poetry). The poem itself opens with a reference to the salamander, a peculiar creature; this compounds a sense of the mysterious and exotic developed by the title. It is (incredible/deep/characteristic of the ingenuity of the reptilian mind). Hence, the ('occult'/'eccentric'/'opinionated') character rumoured of the salamander is most clearly exploited. This foregrounds the (poem/masterpiece). The mention of 'depths untamed' and the 'mysterious' salamander compound the sense of (the virtues of obscurity/the reptilian mystique). The poem further examines the salamander's setting: a 'raiment of fire.' Hence, an inconstant element safeguards the salamander's mystery. Hence, the salamander becomes almost an (elemental/incarnation of fire/fire god), its fire lighting the way for the following points.

The reptilian is hence similar to (rumours of cultural Marxism, which rumoured form in fact is merely a skewed interpretation of actual reptilian influence/the 'flickering light,' in its ability to take on 'many strange forms,' and hence also to 'flicker'). Nonetheless, retaining the mystique of the oblique salamander, it remains peculiar in this peculiar form. However, others may not truly comprehend it, at least not (as much as I, the esteemed critic, appreciate the depth of the poem's eternal message and the true wisdom of the reptilian/fully/without complex meditative techniques). Hence, to many this ancient and modern wisdom is a 'closed book.' Yet the author acknowledges this, with their reference to 'arcane' fire. Hence, they are aware of these possibilities.

Their reference to the reptile 'striking' foreshadows the later reference to the aggressive komodo. Hence, the hidden-ness of reptilians is also a threat to others. They are hence 'conspiratorial' in some way, which arises innately. Along with the fire, we have also the image of the (barren desert/desert/exquisitely described desert/barren desert). In this isolation, the reptilian moves freely and in tune with the area. Hence, the reptilian movement is cleverly distilled into a series of (vivid/evocative/perfect) images. 

To summarise, this piece of reptilian poetry (does a credit to its kind/is, as is typical for the reptilian in this field, astounding). It gives a fresh, exciting and (reptilian/exquisite/marvellous) take on the elements, one which they should be proud of. While the peculiar choice of rhyming 'freely' with 'steely,' in the final couplet of the sonnnet, might seem out-of-place, they aptly juxtapose these traits of the reptilian in a (striking/careful/vivid) manner. Nonetheless, this is not characteristic, in this poem. It has so few problems, that (a whole genre of poetry could arise around praise of it/reptilians everywhere must celebrate it/it is not for an age, but for all time/its very sight will harm the anti-reptilian hordes/it will be accounted as a historic treatment of the sonnet). Hence, this poem is worth any reader's time. I hope to have illustrated the poem, both in its flaws and its virtues, as clearly as any could.

This may be altered only by choosing one of the phrases or words in red brackets, separated by strikes, and removing the others. Hence, for an example:

To summarise, this piece of reptilian poetry is, as is typical for the reptilian in this field, astounding. It gives a fresh, exciting and reptilian take on the elements, one which they should be proud of.

  
Do this for the whole review, and you will have a review of your own to post! Thank you, readers. You may post it in the comments here.

The commenter with the most highly judged answer will get a post featuring their comment. Others may also get a mention as a compensation. If the top commenter likes (we don't want to, however it is the standard for these things) we will post alongside this a reptilian poem or dispatch of their own. However, due to among other things sensivity to criticism (LEAVE REPTILIANS ALONE), reviews must follow the above format and be generally positive. Anything else will be disqualified as 'hate speech.'  We shall only reply to note how offended we were and how much you hurt our feelings, in as liberal a tone as possible.

Hence, we open the door to your reviews. Good luck, readers.

Follow-up: FA Socrates and social organisation, or, Wehrmacht our way to Wembley

We'd like to draw attention to this excellent comment by Socratic fascist and commenter Zanthorus:

Occasionally when I'm bored I scroll through the reddit front page, and sometimes I see posts from the subreddit r/LateStageCapitalism. There was one recently that was an explanation of Popper's view that a 'tolerant' society was justified in using 'intolerant' means to fight against advocates of 'intolerance', and another attempting to critique white nationalism and related nationalist groupings on the basis of the threat they pose to civil society. Of course, one of the principle enemies of the open, civil society advocated by Popper and all liberals is Marxism, yet this tends to go completely unnoticed, even by apparent 'anti-capitalists'.

I remember a few years back when I first started getting into politics, the BNP was gaining some political ground, and so opposing them was all the rage politically. At the time it seemed like the whole of the British left was caught in some kind of 'anti-Nazi' hysteria. We even had the wonderful spectacle of the SWP calling on the British state to censor Nick Griffin's appearance on question time. Yet not even a few months later they almost seemed to evaporate from the political scene. So much for the fascist danger.

I feel like anti-fascism is pretty closely tied with activism. Anti-fascists get a sense of gratification from having 'achieved' something when they're successful in their confrontation with whatever tiny grouplet they're confronting. This has a diverting effect since it's easy for them to continue producing such achievements by focusing on a relatively small fish, and especially one which is already swimming upstream, whereas if they tried focusing their efforts on the flow of the stream itself they would have to confront their own impotence.

 We gave the following response to these points:

"As far as 'activism,' while activism can occur without clear commitment, you're correct that it can be connected to a kind of 'active-ism' - people want to see 'results' and 'action,' and hence a spectacle, and as a result these things are sold to them in cheap ways. Hence, an emphasis on 'getting something now,' in the De Leonite phrase - De Leon, of course, also made a connection between politics of 'activism' alongside anti-electoralism and 'getting something now,' although undeveloped and slightly misleading. This 'active-ism' is often evident in the category of 'activity' itself, as socialists use it - or of activity as a 'separate realm' generally. Hence, you have a general point. However, on a more general note, 'activism' where a form of action is inherently valuable reduces to theory - it is only carried out for its theoretical validity, and is reducible to the theoretical advocacy of it. The action has no existence apart from theory, and derives from it, if it is carried out in this way. Hence, for 'activism' separate from theory, the emphasis has to be on 'results' - which hence leads to this manufacturing of a spectacle. However, as 'results' are contingent, this ultimately reduces to passivity, and is far from revolutionary, coherent or substantive.

"With 'anti-fascism,' this sense of gratification is also tied up with the 'activist' eschewing or emptying of political viewpoints - you also ally with the more 'active' bourgeois forces, against a 'pantomime villain' that they also find most evil. Hence, this seems like a 'generally' good action, as even most capitalism recognises this struggle. Of course, even fascism itself is perhaps too noble for such a movement to comprehend or align with. A movement without clear commitments, or a 'tolerant' or even 'multicultural' one, is still unable to align with strict and substantial movements. We sort of experienced this ourselves on places like RM, where things which had content were criticised for this in favour of a crass formalism, which reduced to: let the bourgeois and its apologists determine how we operate. Hence, the 'arguments' you refer to in the first paragraph are specious, and merely sophistic promotion of what is in actuality a limitation: that even such an apparent 'openness' is actually a 'closing' to, well, anything with determination. Hence, likewise, the critique of Hegel is empty drama - 'look at how EVIL this guy was, and the disturbing implications of' - rather than having a theoretical nature."

-

I also added this on Socrates, who is vaguely relevant. Zanthorus had a post elsewhere involving Socrates recently, which was immediately received with criticism as too 'conceptual' or with criticism of Socrates. We have placed it here for the moment, so that you may view it at ease: https://pastebin.com/L1S84jA9. Anyway, my comment:

"Socrates expressed, in his time, an advanced perspective that gave the rule of Reason an explicit and developed form in society. This is, as you note, something ultimately socialistic. They accompanied other notable martyrs of the time, such as Jesus. Of course, a Socrates is someone advanced beyond most, and to kill him is to presume too much. As he likely noted, the democratic authorities had little basis for the authority to do this, outside of people-pleasing (not regarding the fundamental qualities such as Reason lying within these): hence, it was an ultimately specious decision. According to the relevant records, he rightly noted that history at the time required the spur of a coherent central power (as with the Roman Imperium, which displaced a broken 'republic' that in any case the people themselves dissented against: a general reductio of the project), not the multiplicity and people-pleasing of democracy. Further, he criticised capitalistic tendencies and money-centricity, as well as 'oligarchy.' Hence, his viewpoint is ultimately quite coherent, even given that the criticism of capitalistic tendencies is more absolute because it is not restricted to an analogical framework. More notably, however, in them the theoretical framework and its demands are much further developed than in 'activist' socialism. They are hence of much more interest to thinking creatures. In some ways, they might seem to roughly analyse what the theoretical implies for society and such necessarily, which is clearly important.

"However, Socrates was limited in some ways. In their portrayal, the fundamental elements were essentially the same, just problematically ordered or tempered. However, Reason is still a 'volatile' element: if the others are predominant in a person, 'Reason' as such does not exist. Hence, the whole thing is ultimately reducible to 'Reason,' not a relation between separate moments. The whole schema rests on the situation of 'Reason,' hence this conditions the whole situation. Hence, all you have is the situation of Reason, or the whole thing becomes reducible to this. The others are hence, in the rule of Reason, reducible to aspects of Reason.

"In a sense, the strictly theoretical was always closer to the socialistic than 'activism' or 'populism' can ever be. In a way, by eschewing the theoretical, activism' is led towards antagonism towards elements of Socrates which also implies antagonism to elements of fascism that we noted - in favour of the stable bourgeois society. Hence, this development of 'activism' is not unexpected. Disgruntled leftists have railed against a capitalistic apathy, stagnancy, false 'two-Party' system, etc., for years, and yet the left is quite content to prop up precisely this order and rage at dissident elements. To desire social change and a clear dynamic is to desire a 'fulcrum' or centre of power, preferably one person - as only a single person is capable of thoughts, ideas and views. Anything else is idle and empty, as a general structure. Hence, ultimately leftists chase their tails, wishing to theorise or have a cause while trying (somehow) not to theorise. To theorise 'against' theory is self-defeating, somewhat silly, and sophistic."

-

As it happens, the next post shall allow commenters a chance to get a post about their comments. Good luck. Others may also be featured as a consolation.

The Fascist

The struggle against 'fascism' - usually just perceived - which takes on a specialised form, is an exclusive preserve of liberalism.

Mainstream capitalist ideology is responsible for and compatible with a high degree of anti-fascism. This has very little to do with 'fascism,' that might not even be present, and more to do with the role of fascism in the self-vindicating mythology of modern liberal democracy.

It belongs to liberalism, or that part of capitalism which merely wishes for 'class-collaborationism' and to safeguard capitalism by ensuring mutual consent of its members. It necessarily serves to 'dilute' or oppose radical political trends that partake of it, or dilute the 'negativity' and 'hate' in a movement, such as to preserve the given social coherence. Positive sentiment and relations are encouraged in the present, a barricade against radical opposition to the present system of relations. Hence, if the movement against 'fascism ' is to be characterised, it is in these terms. However, it can often merely chase shadows, as, like a capitalist corporation that is forced relentlessly to produce new content even without a spur, it tends to 'manufacture' fascism even when it isn't there in order to maintain its empty sense of relevance and urgency. This is because it is selling a product, one that aims to dilute or undermine radical opposition to the system and which hence has to be kept going compulsively after some perceived 'fascism.' Nonetheless, this merely furthers its liberal nature, and gives it no other real basis.

In any case, what about 'fascist' movements? Fascism was not always a simply 'racist' movement. 'Racism' at the time characterised many nations. Further, the desire for a 'racial' nation is not one unique to whites - it is also a property of Judaism, known also for its racial warfare and belief in a 'chosen people,' and exists in many forms. Hence, racial nationalism is not by itself fascist. Fascism is an ill-defined term in some ways restricted to a 'concrete movement' or period, and hence is often reduced to something simplistic like 'racism.' It would be difficult to have a coherent movement against it. 'Anti-fascism' lives on because the capitalist establishment has declared Nazism the ultimate embodiment of its own fears, and so-called 'revolutionaries' have risen to the task of opposing what the system tells them is most evil. Of course, the system also considers revolution to be evil - but then, modern anarcho-communists don't really care about revolution, so long as transsexual people are given the appropriate gender pronoun and nobody seriously criticises Israel.

However, the spectre of 'fascism' nonetheless represents a force resistant to 'liberal democracy' and 'anarcho-communism,' a vision of nation with a sense of direction that unifies it. If one makes a dichotomy of anarchist and 'non-socialist' fascist, there is no room left for the Marxist or for socialism; the socialist aim of a guided society is wholly attributed to the 'non-socialist' fascist, or in any case is ignored structurally. Hence, such 'anarchism' is highly reactionary, in the end, and it is ultimately just a variant of liberalism. The more that liberalism is allowed to proclaim its ultimate emptiness and lack of direction as if this is substantial and benevolent, the more is conceded. The leftist panic over Trump, to which the obvious corollary was supporting Clinton, is one example of 'anti-fascist' panic being obviously used to undermine radicals and incorporate them into liberalism. Nonetheless, fascism is mainstream capitalism's very own vision of the devil, and opposition to it is nothing notably striking - further, this opposition generally cites the same reasons as the capitalist establishment. Mainstream capitalism is responsible for and compatible with a high degree of anti-fascism. This has very little to do with 'fascism,' that might not even be present, and more to do with the role of fascism in the self-vindicating mythology of modern liberal democracy.

Hence, caution is advised around this subject, for, 'the worst product of fascism is anti-fascism.'

A Poem

What lies within

In the wren-like standing grass
where light gathers slowly,
the flowers watch us walk past,
passing quietly.
Your sigh says we rest,
and we sit restlessly,
watching the flowers softly wave
past, the distant trees lapping quietly:
echoing the light.
As we watch, your shadow in light
takes on the shades of evening,
as you lean like a flower.
The path leads like a stem.

On a recently-troubled website

Wanderer Astray

The field in sunlight
whitely embroidered
with flowers,

the field abandoned
shining alone,

guarded by light like fire,
circling in fearsome angelic halo.

The field in celebration,
like a white widow
screaming alone:

The field in sunlight,
whitely embroidered
with flowers.

Real News

Death is all that is real.

The Novel: Some pointers

1. Do not attempt to deal with politics, explicitly. Novels have only the illusion of politics. Their 'people' and 'nations' are merely authorial whim, pretending to be otherwise and hence engaging in illusions.

2. The novelist should always reduce 'situations' to poetry, or diverge from the historical and so on. A great novel will do this on its own momentum.

3. The novelist, qua novelist, does not have people, etc., in their book. They hence should not make points about people, in a psychological sense or such. How much this is a problem varies. In any case, the 'psychological' novel is a fraud.

4. The novel cannot summon up any beings, or things. Yet it must. Hence, it is a problematic form.

5. As we have noted, the historical novel is a forgery. The novelist does not, by virtue of merely being such, have exclusive power over a given historical period. The novel cannot, therefore, be 'historical' without undervaluing itself.

6. The novelist, if a 'character' in a novel, would be positing themselves as a non-entity. This is hence empty. Novels should not have an 'authorial voice.'

7. Hence, novels should not start. If they do, they must seek to approximate the 'poetic,' or reduce their figures to merely means of poetic expression. The historical or 'exact' must be anathema and ostracised.

8. The summary of most novels is ultimately a false realisation.

The Religious Text

You often hear talk of Marxism being like something with religious texts. This is often merely an attempt to disparage any close respect for these authors. However, it might have a point: due to the looseness with which the texts are often taken, the promotion of them often turns into merely a group where the texts merely function as something 'proferring' authority when convenient. In this way, the more extreme, offensive elements can be hemmed in.

However, more pertinently, what is a 'religious' text? It is not merely reducible to an 'important text.' Religious texts are texts taken as common currency within a given section of a community. In this way, they can unite diverse political strands, agendas or theologies. This, however, is problematic. In this way, this community is posited as an absolute while ignoring the overall historical period or situation. As a result, it tends towards 'mystification.'

Hence, generally religions tend to operate or be developed in this manner. This development reaches its peak in many Christian elements, which is often content to 'render unto Caesar' in the most liberal ways imaginable. Christianity is a religion which tends in this direction, a religion which hs been developed - especially in the West - into one about religious journeys that are less stringently connected to social forms than Islam or Judaism. It subverted things such as the 'law ' and for this substituted the particular or personal and a bunch of often conflicting and contradictory religious sayings, thus suiting an atomised capitalism. However, as capitalism often subverts or forms an obstacle to human conduct, it also requires a religion of consolations that weaken or undermine this personal direction. Hence, it ends up reduced and necessarily reducible to vague gestures.

Hence, Marx and so on criticised religions as 'idealistic' or lacking a connection to the overall society, for foisting their deity as a substitute and consolation for the ills of this accepted society. The deity is hence super-imposed on existence, in a categorical and constant manner. This is generally made transhistorical, and hence has no real 'history.' Hence, in this sense the religious text is an apt expression of such a community.

However, religious texts must go beyond this simple unity, and formalised it in the shape of a deity. Hence, this unity is stamped 'by' the mark of a deity, and hence people are forced to listen to this deity. As a result, this abstraction from particular human traits may only be made possible by 'religion,' here, by a mark of authority to it which can allow this to be official. This is generally 'superstitious,' or religious. Hence, they not only 'go beyond' this unity, but attempt to formalise it in the shape of a 'religious figure.' Otherwise, they are not positively religious.

Hence, their religious character is easily bound up with this social role. This element of society requires the 'religious' form, and habitually takes it. However, 'holy writ' has another aspect. It also serves as a sort of 'currency,' or turns the religious into a standardised object. The content of holy writ hence appears as an embodiment of the religious community, and hence as 'divine.' This can occur even if it were of human hand, and hence not by or involving a creature channeling God directly. In this sense, Christianity is a further development of this, by claiming a person who directly expresses God and hence culminates and completes the circle of finite creatures attempting from a 'limited' perspective to express the divine infinity. To dilute the latter would problematises the whole endeavour. Hence, the 'holy text' of organised religion represents a community's imagined sufficiency. The ghettoisation that Jews are accused of can also be found in the other major Judaic religions. In a sense, Marx is more critical of Judaism than Christianity and most others, and in the process also confronts the other major religions. He is not satisfied with merely leaving Christianity be, and then criticising its basis in Judaism. Hence, he substitutes for the conservatism of Hegel, and similar accounts of a transition from Judaism to Christianity, the hope for a radical change.

In the transition from Judaism to Christianity, a theological transformation, we can see clear parallels with the Hegelian schema. Hence, Marx again defends 'humanism' of a sort, or the progression beyond religion towards human empowerment. This is notably represented in his early writings on Prometheus. In this sense, Marx's critique of Hegel for religious belief is probably valid, although they were not alone in this. Hence, humanity does not set fictitious limits to themselves, such as God or the Idea. Rather, Marx diverges from Ecclesiastes to offer a more hopeful perspective of the human, one that is not utterly degrading to the self. Hegel also tries to do this, in a way. Nonetheless, in rejecting this transition, and characterising it as essentially the internalisation of alienated man - the Judaic replacement of humanity with alienated man - the early Marx touches on a profound point. Further, he associates this in part with a capitalistic society, a hedonistic and barren one, rather than the 'strictness' it might expect. Why? This internalized alienation leads not to less, but actually to more interaction with the world - indeed, to being lost in it, to rejecting things of human note. Hence, the introduction of 'idol worship' into Judaism, via Christ, is in some ways an inevitable concomitant of this dynamic. People eventually dissipate and become nothing, due to a belief, which hence is actually quite harmonious - religiously - with tendencies which might seem its negation.

Marx hence does not view such a straightforward progress, a raising to a higher level, as a model. If the 'historical materialism' of the Christian is their transition from Judaism, Marx seeks to avoid this foundation. And this attempt was clearly of interest, in his earlier works. Hence, his 'anti-Semitic' language is merely a part of his strenuous attempt to shed the Hegelian-Christian context and its concomitants. In this, he associated Christianity with the internalised form of an alienation and worldliness bred by the Jew, that as a result succumbs to illusions and is confronted by personal traits. As a result, Marx views as necessary the destruction of this general form, and of its ultimate basis and Judaic and racial foundations.

Religion is the absorption of the human into external forces, which are then raised above him. Hence, an organised religion - one which is assimilated into the social structure - requires also the systematic organisation of these external factors. This takes place in the form of the religious community.

However, a text is also cut off from the religious community in which it is 'currency' - it is a specific book, that faces the reader on its own, not a  communal form. Hence, religious texts are usually divergent from the communities which they give rise to. They are also often slightly incoherent - the Bible's contradictions are famous - due to this need to function in divergent forms. This appears as a 'religious' difference, as it is not reducible to this community and stands alone. It hence 'diverges' from the religion. However, this is not necessarily a difference which is purely 'religious,' rather one which is personal and concrete. It is, ultimately, a form of separation from this community, in favour of the concrete - expressed, as it must be, in the form of a personal separation. Hence, the religious tends to boil down to merely the attempt to weaken the stricter elements of a text, which however already weakens itself. To seek ultimate fulfillment from organised religion is an exercise in futility.

Nonetheless, what this ultimately leads to is the divergent and concrete elements having to be treated as a part of the religious. Hence, they must be religiously formalised, treated as a religion. This is somewhat inorganic. Marxism resembles this function. Hence, the apparent form of 'religious texts' in Marxism - the secular elements are given a religious format. Nonetheless, this is not native to them. It is valid that Marxism is often unsure about, well, itself and its theoretical structure, and hence reduces to merely a community with certain texts. This is, however, not necessarily its aim. It can, nonetheless, approach a 'religious' tone, and this should be avoided.

As a result, a 'religious text' is one which performs a complex yet problematic role. In religions, it might seem to be defiled, yet it partakes of this in some measure itself. Hence, caution about it is advised. A community around a belief must centre around the belief or theory, or it is reduced to a religion with texts as communal currency. This must always be avoided.

The Law

When people are involved in a capitalistic economy, they should never be expected to be generous to others while the others are engaging in economic activity.

In general, struggle against prominent people is not something that capitalism's economy can fully discourage. It is encouraged. If the opposite is to be primary, it is not only to substitute an imagined economy for the real one, but also must accompany some forgery in the economy. It is to have the image or airs of these people, without any actual need for such people. Indeed, capital sets all people a given task, there is no reason why any should 'succeed.' To posit capitalists a priori as a part of the economy, is to have a fictitious economy.

The economic hence seems in some ways a treacherous terrain, and often reduces 'religions' and so on to subservience. They often veer into liberal or 'reformist' terrain, the most absurd element in capitalism and indeed fitting to them.

Regardless of building a church on a 'firm' foundation, it is important that such a formation toe the line of capitalism. If not, mutual animosity would harm and undermine a group foreign to it. Their unified 'cause' could not be maintained.

While people are in a capitalistic economy, they should not be expected to have any necessary pity for or aversion to others' death. Insofar as they are economic actors, this may benefit them in a competitive atmosphere of mutual animosity. Given the 'bellum omn

A capitalistic situation is averse to many. They will therefore stay at a slight distance from it. Hence, part of people's relation to capitalism is always imaginative. As Christian conservatism and liberalism can attest. This is also a part of capitalism. To relate in this manner is to vacillate, to claim to 'enter' and then immediately recant this for milder terrain when called upon. It is hence to 'enter,' or engage with, then vacillate to an opposite thing due to mildness. In the end, it is 'imaginative,' or strays from its apparent place so much that it is barely there. Nonetheless, this kind of activity is also a necessary part of 'capitalism.'

It cannot truly invalidate that which you have heard of old.

Reptilian Poetry

Prefect

Like the autumn season
the stars light us,
as we walk, alone,
apart,
and the stars will not guide us
together in their dark quiet.

The weeping willow
turns its face upwards
in the cold wind.

For a change

Beneath the buried skull,
a quiet snake lies
ringed around it,
fangs to its tail.

There is no hope
without the snake
of death.

Death guides hope,
there is no other way.

Cry

In the dark hours,

the moon is the earth,

the light is the sea

that is now on earth,

like the tides that sweep

like the repose of air.

In the solitude

of the dark hours,

the moon is the earth,

the light repeats

like a circle,

the earth repeats

like a circle,

the sea is a circle,

the air reposes.

The sound of flutters

is like the birds,

the sound of birdcall

is like the gecko.

From earth, to sky,

the gecko moves like a stream,

and calls.

There are whispers on the air and walls,

symbols like the gecko.

From earth, to sky,

the air we see

is scaled.

The land, the gecko climbs,

to grasp at the air

it cannot reach.

Light

Air climbs

the building

like the gecko.

Quietly it calls,

quietly abates.

The gecko screams

in the lonely room,

the dark room,

like an archetypal fear.

In the dark,

with cries like laughter,

the reptile hides.

Mistflower

Lying in silence
as if to speak,
softly,
in some way.

Lying in silence,
as if to speak,
softly,
in some way.

Lying in silence,
as if to speak,
softly,
in some way.

Smoke

In the cracking light
tired, yet silent,
the spider finds his way.

Path

In this broken road,
on the outskirts of town,
the lights in the air
are misty.

Like a hologram,
the wind blows softly as if listening,
the wind blows, though none
ask where.

Silenes

The silene in your silence,
what is its call?
Does it speak
if you do not?

The whisper in the cave,
in the darkness of caves
it hides itself
in the wind,
and few would tread there.

Stars

Why is the light of stars
quiet in sunlight?
The wisps of air
flutter by,
the wisps of fire
flutter by,
the butterflies
flutter by.

All the world waits
for a sound
that cannot shine out,
except it disappears elsewhere.

The cry of the gecko
hides in your heart,
does it not?

Process

In the welcoming
candlelight,
the jackal flickers
like shadows.

The mechanical star
whispers softly,
then fades out,
to nothing,

as the process of art
should.

Tail

Pretentiously (?), the tail
is left.

The reptile moves away,
you find this.

Like a starlit crucifix, like Rome in years BC,
the tail is left here,
quietly.

Wanderlust

A man walked into the desert, tired and miserable.

In the desert, there were tantalising silhouettes.

In the desert, there were relaxing sand dunes.

In the desert, the shape of sand dunes turned into tantalising silhouettes.

The man could not tell one from the other. He surmised, perhaps the silhouettes lead to rest. The rest, too, leads to silhouettes. Yet he could not then rest nor pursue, but had to voyage on for truth.

In the desert, there were silhouettes by day and night, yet it did not seem to sate this. To tame the desert and its heat, people would give up their need or give themselves up and die.

He turned back, and looked at the city.

All he saw was rest, and the silhouettes. The one melded into the other, as darkness is also license.

In the darkness, he saw the next progression: license.

In the darkness, he saw what this progression conveyed: loneliness, hiddenness.

He accepted these things, and so the darkness.

The city lights faded by evening. They formed a sunset dusk, like a pang. It felt like blood before a death.

He watched a distant lizard in the desert, and drew it in deep, black ink.

The silver cord unbroken

A discussion recently came up with Zanthorus, involving Böhm-Bawerck's contentions about Marx. Zanthorus issued the following summary of Böhm-Bawerck:

Hopefully this clarifies to a certain extent where Böhm-Bawerk goes wrong in suggesting that the common property of commodities could just as well be that they are products of nature, or something absurd like the fact that gravity acts on them

We would like to examine this in more depth.

Marx contends that, when commodities are considered in an abstract manner, then the only common property can be that they are products of labour. However, Zanthorus notes a possible and opposed viewpoint, that commodities are also a product of other forces. Hence, that Marx might be hasty in this circumstance.

However, in doing this we must not ignore what becomes of 'labour' in this process. Otherwise, the commodity itself is lost sight of. The labour is action upon and involving the commodity. It is not cleanly cut apart from this object. If the commodity disappears, so does the labour upon it. The labour is specified by the commodity and interaction with it, hence when the commodity is removed you cannot properly speak of a labour process behind it - nor is it differentiated from a 'natural' object. Hence, to speak of 'being products of labour' is misguided. Once the abstraction removing all traits from the commodity occurs, we cannot speak of labour upon it instead. That vanishes with the traits. Marx essentially follows capitalism's 'logic' for a way, stripping commodities of all traits, and hence of all physical specifications and interactions, however they then wish to turn around and introduce the category of 'labour' as still remaining. This is an unjustified summoning. Marx wishes to derive the category of 'labour' or physical interaction from these commodities without physical traits. This is problematic.

We want to derive 'labour' from the commodity itself, however labour like all physical interactions is evacuated in the commodity without physical traits. To speak of labour on a commodity, we must speak of the physical commodity and the interaction with its traits. Otherwise there is nothing for labour to interact with, nor can we derive that labour could ever do so.

While Marx observes later how labour alters under capital, however this serves only to partially correct the earlier problems. The abstraction of capitalism does, indeed, mean that other forces that act upon commodities are hidden. To refer to capital being a 'mode of production' would be sleight of hand, like merely contending that despite the commodities being abstracted from they have traits and these determine value. Of course, Marx is correct from this basis to diverge from economics that after this abstraction wishes to make the fundamental economic form depend on people's evaluation of these void commodities. Nonetheless, if the physical traits are abstracted from, then labour and so on are also casualties. The only possible near-exception would be to a 'divine' or 'psychic' labour, that is to one which produced the commodity without participating in it at all or needing to. This would mean that the commodity could exist without such interaction. However, otherwise labour is abstracted from when we mention an abstract commodity.

To abstract from the commodity is also to abstract from the things touching it.

Marx hence wishes to abstract from the physical traits of commodities, then phoenix-like to resurrect them as if they presented a solution. It is like wandering into a desert, as Jesus did, and then promptly wandering out rather than surveying the area. The physical traits of commodities are extinguished, then return covertly in the form of the category of 'physical interactions with these traits.' It is a contradiction of such 'communism,' not of capitalism.

As a result, to criticise it as ignoring the overall interactions of the commodity and world around it is not that misleading. These also play a part in the commodity, and specify its place. Hence, they are also important. However, one might wish to examine the question of production in more depth. If we have an image of production without an object, we of course do not have an image of 'production' in any strict economic sense. It cannot be derived from commodities as such. Nonetheless, we hence have an image of 'production' as an action which might seem to have an object, which is actually objectless. This could be profound in some ways. Hence, production becomes reducible to private motions. While this cannot be acknowledged economically, it is nonetheless a general situation. Hence, people act, albeit without an object, and this process constitutes 'production.' What is the precise nature of this process? In any case, it presents a level of detachment from the external which can easily be decisive. Hence, instead of acting on an external object, production becomes something that constitutes merely actions. Due to the actions being ultimately directed in a void direction, the outcome is hence not the object in a straightforward way, but rather internal stimulation or the stimulating experience of the action. From this, an object or external thing must arise or be ejaculated. Hence, in the midst of this exploration of the commodity, we also happen upon a different or less clearly economic conception of 'production,' which is devoid of its object. Is this confined to capitalism? While the particular form might be,

A given form of labour is familiar and known despite the object not always yet being present, then it is carried out. Hence, it is a process repeatable without a specific object. One could hammer in a nail, or hammer a thousand. The specific nail is not intrinsic to such an occupation. Hence, in a way you still have a generic action or format, followed by this encountering 'objects' and stimuli. In this sense, such labour always has in part the character of labour devoid of a specific object. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily posited socially as abstract labour, as labour without properties. It hence is instead close to this other form of labour which is without a direct object, yet not posited as abstract. Hence, on the other side is posited a human form of action, of which the 'commodity' is merely a result of the stimulation of the action. The commodity hence represents here simply the general emission of this human action. Marx occasionally seemed to draw on such things, positing that labour should be its own end and focussing on the fulfillment of labour. However, this was usually not posited as an aspect of labour independent from the commodity, which springs incidentally from it. As a result, we have instead the possibility - though one which capital discounts - of labour carried on for its own sake and with the commodity merely a result of the stimulation of labour. Hence, the form taken by it and the direction of it is decisive. This is of interest.

Nonetheless, we may also finish the central points with a copy of a comment on their blog:

Böhm-Bawerck deals with Marx's logical exposition, however this is in any case the main part which is relevant later on. As a result, the rest is mostly optional, or follows. If it didn't follow from an analysis of capital, then it would be irrelevant to it specifically. It would be a dishonest association. Hence, Böhm-Bawerck would merely be highlighting the heart of Marx's work.

In general, it is valid to note that other factors go into the commodity. This is a basic factor of capitalism, that other things are subordinated to commodities, and to act as appendages of them. Hence, other factors are also important, because they contribute to the commodity. However, this is a limitation, as these factors cannot be economically integrated or given a notable status. This was somewhat relevant in times of Luddism and so on, where people were forced to sacrifice machinery and so on in order to demand more of a place for themselves. In any case, it forms a limitation in an economy which wishes to centre around something, yet cannot generally do so.

As a result, we may also note the inability of the economy to truly revolve around the 'commodity,' rather than being limited in this by human social relations. Conversely, by abstracting from these human aspects it can easily lead humans to death - the more humans participate, the more they eviscerate themselves. It is like entering a chamber of toxic gas, which is fatal to humans. Nonetheless, the commodity cannot be simply transfigured into human categories, once it is given. It persistently shuns this, as if to maintain this toxicity. In this it deserves some respect.

While the commodity is a fragile thing, being shattered as soon as it is formed, it remains through that a stubborn creature which shrinks from human society. Perhaps it may turn out just as reluctant, in its own manner, to participate. Like Gandhi, it is disobedient though civil, and occasionally beckons humans to throw themselves 'lemming-like' to their deaths, and strips them of their existence. From this perspective, the commodity was like a virus, not merely a stable and acquiescent social commonplace.

From The Black World

If God is good, he cannot partake of or directly motivate evil.

If Satan is an independent being, then what is present is actually polytheism. 'God' comes to merely mean 'good,' rather than a deity.

If Satan is not independent, but a part of God, then evil is also a part of God. Hence, God is also an ultimate evil. This applies whenever Satan, or any such creature, is considered the paragon or representative of evil.

If this applies, you generally have not theism proper but pantheism. At the least you have 'deism' - a 'God' who is cut off from the rest of the universe, and merely one being within it. They could be more accurately referred to as an 'alien' or strange being.

Problems similar to this arise due to evil, regardless of whether a paragon is posited.

To refer to an 'alien' being as a 'God' by default is 'superstition.' Or to hypostatise hyperbole upon a given being. This is conventionally done, and generally capitalistic Christianity could not escape this fate. We must 'spread the hyperbole' around, and if hyperbole occurs in capital it must also taint our take on a God who collects it. The Christian God is a suicidal God precisely because it is contradicted by the same hyperbole attributed to it, and a society which is contradictory in itself, and hence it is forced to tear itself apart. As an object of religious devotion, or the 'Christian' God, it undermines itself. This must then only be rubber-stamped.

Evil is necessarily noted if what is good is to be determinate. To do something in a particular way is to likewise avoid other things. Further, if God separates himself away from finitude, and is not wholly accountable for it, then finitude is limitation for God - just as evil wards off a benevolent God. Hence, there is truth in the contention of Gnostics and such that the transition from God to finitude hence implies evil. However, it also implies that this God is a 'demiurge' or posits themselves as a false God, one who is not complete.

In the Trinity, a polytheism enters into an often already polytheistic religion. It hence throws up a multitude of at least four deities, with uncertain relations. Hence, in most cases this religion must remain a venomous blur. In a sense, the truth is this: to separate off God from other things is to turn God into a 'normal' being, or in this case a human. However, they are not then 'God' in this sense. A task of some sort, with a theological basis, is posited but not completed. It must be carried through.

What we are contending here is not reducible merely to a 'problem of evil,' although it does involve this category. In a way, problems of 'pain' or rather non-fulfillment lead to a similar result in this context. They nonetheless set the world in dichotomy. We are dealing with this problem in terms of an old conflict involving the nature of Satanic or evil beings, which was also disputed by the Cathars, as well as the nature of a God postulated as a result. This is more theological in orientation.

In order to arrive at a 'divine' person, we cannot hence start from a pseudo-divine being who faces externally things like evil or the finite. Hence, we cannot start from an abstract being. We must rather start from a being who is so divided, and is set apart. Hence, Cathars were often more religiously demanding, because they engaged with this division or noticed it, and hence could accept the demands that religion made upon them as they were. The tendency towards 'immanent eschatology' is also similar at times. There is always something disconcerting about the mention, in a religion which is in any case just loud noises, that the Cathars like Christ were killed. Further, by those proclaiming that they were heretics. Perhaps it will turn out that 'Christ' is summarised and completed in the Cathars, too Christian to belong in Christianity. After them, we may look further.

In general, then, a Satanic being is a problematic postulate, however it only manifests general flaws with such religions. In this, Satan becomes a serious source of concern about these religions, although these concerns are always there. This much we must credit the devil with.

Addendum:

However, if we are to deal with God as hence rendered a separated being, or a human, we must hence also deal with Satan as a separated being. Formulated in this manner, Satan is figured formally as a tempter who directs people to 'evil' via divine statements. However, in using divine diction, how does Satan twist it? They hence become akin to a filter which states 'divine' things, however is then as a result impelled to go to the opposite extreme. This is how Satan is identified, and often also the biblical 'snake.' They are hence a process of vacillation which is strictly but naturally followed. While this may be located in the inversion of 'faith' and hence in the human heart, it is a process natural to and characteristic of this 'Satan.' As a result, this 'Satan' would be at first a 'Christian,' however this only sets up for vacillations. However, to get away from the divine if mentioning it, the Satanic being would have to seek refuge in any available non-divine areas, including cultural outlets. Hence, spider-like it would spread out. However, eventually it would be forced to 'die,' because a spider must have its feet firmly set or it will tie itself up in knots. The more 'legs' it has, the less freely it can vacillate. One must build a 'church' on firm foundations, or it cannot keep going onwards - if it needs to, yet it cannot, then it will tear itself apart or undermine itself. Especially if, like 'Satan,' it is to be substantive. However, in the process a trail of blurring would be left behind by the vacillations. As this vacillation is essentially a display rather than something substantive, they would be a pop cultural or artistic figure. And, indeed, a 'Christian.' The more common rendering of Satan, as simply an 'evil' being who hates God, and is hence divided off from them, is slightly different. They may be related to the end of the pagan religions, and the ensuing 'massacre' of 'gods.' They face the 'divine' in a human form, and attack it. However, in this the 'divinity' might only be perceived. Hence, they are a murderer of apparent 'gods.' Finally, the portrayal of 'Satan' as Lucifer or a 'light-bringer,' while seemingly related to the first, is different. They set out to channel the forces around them to bring about a certain, religious agenda. In doing this, they channel forces opposed to God in a coherent way, not via vacillation. Hence, these archetypes may be seen as also having a certain meaning even without the form of a deity or orthodox religious figure. Hence, they may reflect certain historical concerns.

These may contrast in some way.

Nonetheless, while Satan is in a sense a 'foreign' element by default, or could directly reflect concrete phenomena, a God need not be treated in the same way. In addition, as Satan is closer to an affinity with this division, unless they are too vacillating, they are in a way closer to realising this as an overall complex.




 

A list of things that appear along the Nile River

• Uganda.
• Lake Tana.
• Madagascar.
• Luxor.
• The Hagia Sophia.
• Burundi.
• The Tomb of Seleucid I.
• The Blue Nile Falls.
• Cape Peninsula.
• The Isle of Man.
• The Taj Mahal.
• Austria.
• The Holocaust Museum of Israel.
• Jebel Bakal mountain.
• The Stonehenge.
• Ayers Rock.
• The Blue Nile Gorge.
• Galata Tower.
• California.
• Weiyang Palace.
• Mar del Plata.
• Dachau.
• Johannesburg.
• Anhalter Bahnhof.
• South Sudan.
• Sudbury.
• Capitol Hill.
• The Andes.
• Ordensburg Vogelsang.
• London.
• Thüringen.
• South London.
• Magog.
• Galway East.
• Pontus.
• Gethsemane.

Hopefully this list, covering an important area, has been around exhaustive. There is also Eritrea nearby, however it is less notable than the items which are explicitly included on this particular list. One might as well list Wales.

lonely0 - The lonelyIdol0 contestants: 1

After our recent mention of JFK and the occult, we felt compelled to mention this related song by the Lamp of Thoth.

As such, we shall also include them in a contest which we shall call lonelyIdol0, similar to American Idol and so on. It is judged stringently by the following categories:

Meditative - Is the music meditative?
Calm - Is it calm, and free from disturbing influences to this?
Atmospheric - Is it atmospheric in an effective way?
Inside job - Does it say that 9/11 was an inside job?
Threatening - Do they have an intimidating glare?
Respectable Diction - Does it use good, respectable diction?
0 - We give it a 0 in this, to furnish our harsh judging credentials.
French - Does it understand French?
Does it explain what the DUP is? - Self-explanatory, yet important. Does it answer the all-important question: What is the Democratic Unionist Party?

Each is out of 10. Here is our rating for this song. Commenters can chat about this freely.

Meditative - 5. While the music is repetitive, and introspective, it lacks true meditative poise.
Calm - 3. Despite reporting their condition as quite different, they then in some ways negate this by transitioning to an aggressive 'chorus,' hence balancing that slightly.
Atmospheric - 2. The atmosphere conflicts. Nonetheless, it does try. Give it a hand for effort.
Inside job - 4. It stops just short of declaring that the cause of freedom compels them to destroy the WTC.
Threatening - 4. It is aggressive, however it doesn't always further this. It often takes steps backwards.
Respectable Diction - 10. It says 'whore.' Good enough, here.
0 - 0. Unimpressed.
French - 3. They invert 'fleurir' effectively, however they are limited in this.
Does it explain what the DUP is? - 4. No, it mostly explains what a whore is. A useful supplement to the Spermbirds song on what a bitch is. However, while it explains this trait of the DUP, it stops short of explaining what they are. We shall have to look further into this question.

Hence, around 35, out of a possible total of 90. Not bad for this stage.

If they keep going, they could improve rapidly - especially with the advice of our comments section and our own feedback. Discuss their fortunes here!