The Untethered System

For Hegel, the 'system' or theoretical was a context which was essential to its components. Hence, the system was the standard by which they were measured, the place where they gained a direction, and gave a place to fields such as the political sphere, etc. This, in any case, would mean by implication that the helm of these had at the least to be held by a thinking being, or individual - even if viewed without Hegel's overall perspective. However, other than this Hegel also attempted to place the categories into this schema in transmuted form. In some ways this was merely to 'sanctify' them, and hence the concern over the Hegelian's conservatism. However, at the same time they were rendered 'fluid' or given an action of their own, which was a clear property of the system. As a result of this, they appeared in transmuted form - nonetheless, as the system calls on them, they are also factors that act upon the system. This transmutation hence nonetheless was capable of dealing with these thing as they were, or considering the consequence of their entering the system. Given this, let us look at some of the consequences of Hegel's treatment of things via their system.

Many thinkers, such as Aquinas, dealt with the concept of 'standard.' God was portrayed as the 'standard' of virtues: to have a virtue was to partake of the virtue in itself, which was 'God.' In polytheism, deities were often embodiments and governors of traits; this was then integrated into the Christian view. This could involve the idea that a given quality presupposes a being which embodies or perfects this quality, which forms the 'standard' for this quality. Hence, for a slightly simplified instance, the idea that for something to have a quality, it must partake of this quality in its 'absolute form.' The quality would hence be elevated into a being of its own, an 'absolute' by which all things of this type were measured. Hegel's take was more 'psychological,' if you like. For Hegel, these 'qualities' and forms were 'measured' by their place in the 'Idea' or spirit. Hence, their place in the single Mind, and its overall schema, determined the place of all of these forms. Of course, this 'Mind' was the absolute Idea, which was in for a somewhat rocky journey on its path - moving through several limited forms. Few hindrances were spared it. Nonetheless, the overall portrayal of qualities is hence to locate their place in an overall schema, or a theoretical one, which is a further development of this. Those such as the Cathars had demonstrated how polytheism is inherent in even the strict 'monotheistic' religions, and hence even the more religiously 'conventional' Hegel attempted to move beyond this limitation towards the systematic. This has further, and important, consequences.

The concept of 'design,' or an inherent reason or causa finalis in things, has traditionally been linked to religion. Hegel develops this, by identifying a God with an underlying logic of 'progress' or 'directionality.' Unlike many previous portrayals of a 'Great Chain of Being,' Hegel hence attempts to not only place creatures in a definite place, rather he also attempts to give each of these places a direction and aim in the movement of the schema. Thus, the concept of a 'dialectic' is central: it ensures a sense of 'liveliness' to the schema, or a sense of inherent direction and motion to creatures within it. This is slightly complex, however it gives this 'conceptual' realm a sense of independent motion. Hence, Hegel completes the portrayal of inherent final causes. The problem with this is 'populism': as each member is, by its part in the schema, given a direction and purpose, all of them appear purposeful. Hence, they might even appear 'oppressed' by the schema, which still delimits them; however, outside of this they have no purpose or claims. As the schema is all-embracing, all things that may exist here are attributed a purpose and place in Spirit. This is hence 'positivistic,' as Marx and Kierkegaard would faintly touch on. Kierkegaard, notably, invoked in contrast an image of a 'break' or 'leap of faith' in contrast to the stable progression of the system. Further, he opposed correctly this potential portrayal of a general 'harmony' which ultimately limits its own values. Nonetheless, the 'system' hence draws on and completes several aspects of this perspective of an 'inherent' purpose within creatures and the world.

 Kierkegaard in some ways formed a schema of his own. In contrast to the apparent choice of Either/Or, with its pseudo-Hegelian categories, Kierkegaard then allowed for a further category of 'faith': a break with the previous. Hence, instead of a comfortably developed system, the one category represented 'judgement' over the others. This complemented his Christian portrayal of 'dying (becoming nothing) to the world,' or evacuating that which is 'of the world.' Hence, in a way with Kierkegaard the system was taken to the point of a new 'extremism.' This is allied to an 'individual' in their movement away from the social. Hence, 'inherent' purpose is partially avoided, the purpose is rather seen as a distinct process. Nonetheless, the destination is unclear. The 'break' is not truly a suspension of inherent purpose, but rather the replacement of man's inherent nature with another's: 'God.' Here, one's own movement is converted into that of another. However, this is hence not systematic, rather it relies on scripture and 'faith' to validate it.

Hence, in some ways, Kierkegaard avoids 'inherent purpose,' and rather locates purpose in eschewing this 'inherent' movement generally. However, how is this complete departure to be done? Hence, a God must appear there to allow us to avoid this movement, however the God themselves remains in their 'inherent' nature, and merely replaces the human's 'immediacy' with another's. This complete departure hence culminates in a scripture which gives sufficient license to opposed views. It is artificially limited.

Hence, Hegel claimed development and aim for the conceptual or human realm, Marx in some ways tried to re-capture this element of the 'dialectic' yet did so incompletely. The 'Hegelian' schema is in some ways a necessary concomitant of the dialectic. Movement becomes conceptual, and hence this realm starts to act as animated. While such a 'dialectic' follows from things such as Zeno's arrow, it nonetheless also complements such 'schema,' rather than this 'transformation' of concepts then being restricted to describing other things. Hence, in 'dialectical' forms that shun this kind of schema, the properties that the concepts have taken on are summarily removed from them and attributed elsewhere. However, in general, we can only usually consider things given an apt framework, including even where such things are to be placed - the dialectic is not a type of mosquito, for a simple instance. Nonetheless, for a dialectic, given this framework the consideration that follows occurs naturally. Hence, the major problem is things that might obstruct this inherent progression. Nonetheless, it hence follows that dialectics is something that may be known 'inherently,' or which has an inherently persuasive power to comprehension - when presented intact. Furthermore, without an appropriate framework this understanding cannot happen, so that the factor conditioning this is merely the framework. Hence, the motion in thought which is occurring there must be a property which is 'innate' to thought, or it could not be understood. This dialectic can only be 'applied' in any sense to things derived from a similar process. Nonetheless, it is not always perceived.

(Speaking of 'innate' understanding of 'language' is, of course, artificial. Language is not about 'accuracy,' generally, it is a human construct based on preferences and mores. It need not be used in this vein, however its 'innate' nature is pre-determined. Hence, such claims of 'innateness' early on generally concerned other things. Indeed, the validity of these things was not always the question, hence implying that this process hence depends on several factors. Of course, 'demonstrations' of this, such as in Meno, are problematic: they direct focus, and 'correct' certain proclamations, hence the external element is of course important. Of course, people cannot 'impart'  understanding, etc., they can only express viewpoints which the others may agree or disagree on. Here there is a similar confusion to much of the 'religious' - the human essence is given elsewhere, and thus humanity is subject to an external force thoroughly. Their internality is hence externalisd, and reduced to external influence, leading to passivity. This externalisation is hence taken for granted; internality is not enacted.)

The 'dialectic' is therefore a process which cannot be turned freely inside-out. It concerns concepts, and these cannot be freely treated as one likes - and still be dialectic. Indeed, if their own movement is contingent or impeded, then they have no real 'dialectic.' Thought is always thorough, in that people despite their contradictions must nonetheless form a given whole in these - perhaps despite themselves. Hence, these tend to undermine them. An account may be given of a person's thought, where the contradictions are represented in their interaction - although the person can never see them in this way. However, as a result their thought will always have a 'holistic' movement, it is never a blank space to be filled. If a 'dialectic' is granted, then this is a matter of the concepts' own movement. If a 'dialectic' is not granted, then objects cannot be understood as moving or having life, including oneself. Nonetheless, this 'innate' factor can nonetheless be missed, in some cases, when people instead 'externalise' it or take it as a factor not of the concepts themselves - an imparting of animation to them - and instead as merely an external factor that does not impact on the concepts. They might claim that the concepts are given life or a process in this way, only to systematically avoid this occurring. This is also an internal process, however it is problematic. It is ultimately empty, as well.

One can not generally 'intend' to impart 'understanding' - the aim is not understood. One may only express understanding.

Finally, what does Hegel's theory mean for notable 'social systems'? Each, evidently, has an 'eternal' or general part: they play a role in the eternal process. However, in addition to this they have an apparent 'independence' and 'formation.' This independence is, however, 'illusory' - if they actually had an existence apart from this eternal process, they would set themselves up as themselves self-sufficient and eternal forms. Hence, they must ultimately be reducible to this position, as notable systems or socio-political modes. Here, however, we notice a 'limitation' in the Hegelian schema: as social systems involve human interactions, the seeming independence of social systems is a 'part' of these and enacted by some. However, this is ultimately illusory and transient. Hence, an 'imaginative' or fictitious element of society takes a hold, and is perhaps dominant. This is composed of both people and social elements, and these shall pass away. They may be 'replaced,' so long as the process has not yet eschewed them or attained 'self-realisation.' Nonetheless, the 'schema' as such seems to attempt to 'sanctify' them. The actual result is that the positive process cannot generally 'maintain' them forever, due to its own nature realising itself through the process - which is precisely what the process is. Hence, eventually this must be 'founded' in a direct manner upon the world - or 'enforced.' However, 'enforcement' implies judgment, or a perspective that comprehends this. In any case, then, the role of people in this 'historical process' is clear: they relate in some way or other to this aspect of 'Spirit' or the process. 'History' waited on them, and required appropriate processes to develop. Only through this being realised appropriately, and radiating from where this occurs, can the historical process thus 'complete.' Nonetheless, this possibility will inevitably arise.

Hence, none of this should usually be dismissed swiftly. The general consequences of this are notable, and cannot be left alone. Further, it does not resolve into abstract social virtues, such as opposition to things like 'radicalism,' 'hierarchy' or (quite similarly) 'hate,' rather it posits a concrete and focused struggle. It notes that, without the theoretical, one only has a pursuit of such particular  social virtues and aims, which eventually turns on itself. This is hence akin to a 'polytheism,' where each gives their blessings to a certain deity. This is ultimately either cut short by death, or it will turn on itself - for all sides of it will be realised. Nonetheless, the theoretical transcends and orders it, by necessity - it is like a 'stance,' or a grip made by oneself that nonetheless will have a firm hold.