The Accessible Theory (A Book), Chapter 1

This.

The Accessible Theory (A Book)

Preface:

As a common complaint about books like Das Kapital is their length and ensuing inaccessibility, we have decided to publish a book which avoids these problems completely. We hence present the first volume of this highly abridged work. This shall hopefully encourage readers unwilling to explore more 'obscure' books too much. In this book, we seek to convey clearly what the reader is to get from each chapter. Further, this is expressed in clear terms.

Hopefully you shall enjoy this. It is an exciting pathway for literature, and it should not disappoint you.

The Nation, Reprise

A nation is a political entity, not necessarily a geographical one. It is the form taken by a political force, when it has attained political power.

However, the modern nation has no political substance. Its state and politics alters every few years; further, in a capitalistic system the political agenda is avoided in favour of the actions of atomised actors. The state is reduced to tending to private, economic interests. Hence, ultimately, it is forced to fall behind capital, although in practice this is to evade the political in favour of economic interests. However, more decisively, the 'politics' of a nation are hence insubstantial, an empty 'hole' to be filled by foreign content. This nation is ultimately also 'insubstantial.'

Hence, the nation is reduced to arbitrary, 'geographical' boundaries, in lieu of a substantial political entity. Its politics are indefinite, variable,and ultimately empty. Hence, politically the nation means nothing. It is merely an 'obstacle,' an extent of land barred from political forces. It is in contradiction with itself, however, and hence ultimately limited and torn apart.

Hence, although the political is an aspect of humans, it appears in an 'alienated' form - the 'political' plays out in a realm separated from itself, it is torn away from itself. That which it wants and which is a content proper to it, is enacted where it is not. There is a certain level of superstition or 'patriotism' which is inherent to this. It is hence connected to what we have previously referred to as the 'imaginative' element of capitalistic economies. Further, there arises an even more degenerated politics that calls for replacing struggle with 'co-operation' between nations and 'leaving behind differences,' merely indulging in the emptiness which the capitalistic economy reduces politics to. Nonetheless, along with this 'patriotism' is the firmer 'nationalism' - the demand that the political element establish itself in a primary role, and subject the other elements of the nation which have trivialised it. This is still, in some ways, often merely a distortion of the 'patriotism' of nations, expressing yet not decisively expressing the contradictions of the capitalistic nation. It often scavenges among the nations and people there for an identity, it does not like communism aim primarily at a break with this and towards the future. Hence, while a necessary form taken by the continual self-negation of the counterfeit-political, it is nonetheless itself often limited. It often, in any case, plays a generic political role, set out for it by this system - when the nationalistic comes to play a decisive role, as it must, then it will eventually break free of this generic character. However, it might initially be reluctant about this, about lacking a clear 'anchor ' or 'belonging' in a systematic niche. This must nonetheless occur, in such a situation.

However, along with this development, there is also the continuing 'externalisation' of political and substantial movements from themselves, the manufacturing of hollow, 'phantom' versions of these. These artificial forms are still contradictory, and in a way more contradictory. They are also highly 'derivative' and empty. Nonetheless, you hence have a 'realm' which cannot be accessed by the political, or indeed by official and straightforward means, which hence exists at a level of separation from the realm of genuine content. To keep this separate, the 'gateways' to it must be increasingly 'rigged' and targetted towards limiting genuine content from getting through - eventually barring the gates to the field entirely, or consigning it to the 'imaginative.' Nonetheless, these alienated realms must eventually expand into a right leviathan, akin to an informal aristocracy.

Firstly, however, this then starts to 'self-cannibalise' - its participants are obligated to act this way towards each other, as this is how they function. Hence, actors are set apart, again as though by a screen, and act in parallel as though 'self-sufficient'. They ultimately stand together against the genuine content, or in a 'reactionary' sense; nonetheless, they inhabit a form of 'pseudo-capital' that still threatens this division. However, as this 'realm' is self-undermining, or continually absorbs hostile elements, the hierarchy there - given that they are 'cut off' by default - is merely determined by who can continue to stand out despite inimical tendencies. While all elements in this realm relate to the content similarly, they hence are mostly distinguished by their ability to stay a focus despite the others starting to cut them off and subjecting them to their own means. This relates not to their standing out, necessarily, rather to their channeling things in that direction relative to the others. This cannot occur in too complex a form, given their role.

Hence, among the nations, 'nationalism' draws on conflicts and division. Aggressive modern regimes - Nazi Germany, the USSR, ISIS - have generally arisen in the after-math of war and conflict. Hence, they draw on 'cycles' of conflict and hatred, which are a contradiction that must eventually, dragon-like, explode and tear the world order apart. In some way, these incursions foreshadow its end. As the realm of the national and political is quickly set against the capitalistic form, this aggravation is hence aggressive - while in the cultural realm it is usually only destructive or makes the whole field appear peculiar. Nonetheless, if these nations do not turn against the system itself, they cannot support this division and will be supplanted by those who are less mired in it. The nations which attempt to avoid getting caught up in their division will 'survive,' until the whole system disappears. Likewise, more generally: nations which turn against the system, yet remain branded, by it will have problems with nations more 'consistent' with it. However, the nations that hijack this division do so with a purpose higher than the system, not merely to survive as a 'stable' entity within it. Hence, if they encounter problems with this, this does not impinge on their purpose - which shall eventually be realised. In this progression, 'nationalism' will eventually leave this circumscribed role and take on an independent form.

The Untethered System

For Hegel, the 'system' or theoretical was a context which was essential to its components. Hence, the system was the standard by which they were measured, the place where they gained a direction, and gave a place to fields such as the political sphere, etc. This, in any case, would mean by implication that the helm of these had at the least to be held by a thinking being, or individual - even if viewed without Hegel's overall perspective. However, other than this Hegel also attempted to place the categories into this schema in transmuted form. In some ways this was merely to 'sanctify' them, and hence the concern over the Hegelian's conservatism. However, at the same time they were rendered 'fluid' or given an action of their own, which was a clear property of the system. As a result of this, they appeared in transmuted form - nonetheless, as the system calls on them, they are also factors that act upon the system. This transmutation hence nonetheless was capable of dealing with these thing as they were, or considering the consequence of their entering the system. Given this, let us look at some of the consequences of Hegel's treatment of things via their system.

Many thinkers, such as Aquinas, dealt with the concept of 'standard.' God was portrayed as the 'standard' of virtues: to have a virtue was to partake of the virtue in itself, which was 'God.' In polytheism, deities were often embodiments and governors of traits; this was then integrated into the Christian view. This could involve the idea that a given quality presupposes a being which embodies or perfects this quality, which forms the 'standard' for this quality. Hence, for a slightly simplified instance, the idea that for something to have a quality, it must partake of this quality in its 'absolute form.' The quality would hence be elevated into a being of its own, an 'absolute' by which all things of this type were measured. Hegel's take was more 'psychological,' if you like. For Hegel, these 'qualities' and forms were 'measured' by their place in the 'Idea' or spirit. Hence, their place in the single Mind, and its overall schema, determined the place of all of these forms. Of course, this 'Mind' was the absolute Idea, which was in for a somewhat rocky journey on its path - moving through several limited forms. Few hindrances were spared it. Nonetheless, the overall portrayal of qualities is hence to locate their place in an overall schema, or a theoretical one, which is a further development of this. Those such as the Cathars had demonstrated how polytheism is inherent in even the strict 'monotheistic' religions, and hence even the more religiously 'conventional' Hegel attempted to move beyond this limitation towards the systematic. This has further, and important, consequences.

The concept of 'design,' or an inherent reason or causa finalis in things, has traditionally been linked to religion. Hegel develops this, by identifying a God with an underlying logic of 'progress' or 'directionality.' Unlike many previous portrayals of a 'Great Chain of Being,' Hegel hence attempts to not only place creatures in a definite place, rather he also attempts to give each of these places a direction and aim in the movement of the schema. Thus, the concept of a 'dialectic' is central: it ensures a sense of 'liveliness' to the schema, or a sense of inherent direction and motion to creatures within it. This is slightly complex, however it gives this 'conceptual' realm a sense of independent motion. Hence, Hegel completes the portrayal of inherent final causes. The problem with this is 'populism': as each member is, by its part in the schema, given a direction and purpose, all of them appear purposeful. Hence, they might even appear 'oppressed' by the schema, which still delimits them; however, outside of this they have no purpose or claims. As the schema is all-embracing, all things that may exist here are attributed a purpose and place in Spirit. This is hence 'positivistic,' as Marx and Kierkegaard would faintly touch on. Kierkegaard, notably, invoked in contrast an image of a 'break' or 'leap of faith' in contrast to the stable progression of the system. Further, he opposed correctly this potential portrayal of a general 'harmony' which ultimately limits its own values. Nonetheless, the 'system' hence draws on and completes several aspects of this perspective of an 'inherent' purpose within creatures and the world.

 Kierkegaard in some ways formed a schema of his own. In contrast to the apparent choice of Either/Or, with its pseudo-Hegelian categories, Kierkegaard then allowed for a further category of 'faith': a break with the previous. Hence, instead of a comfortably developed system, the one category represented 'judgement' over the others. This complemented his Christian portrayal of 'dying (becoming nothing) to the world,' or evacuating that which is 'of the world.' Hence, in a way with Kierkegaard the system was taken to the point of a new 'extremism.' This is allied to an 'individual' in their movement away from the social. Hence, 'inherent' purpose is partially avoided, the purpose is rather seen as a distinct process. Nonetheless, the destination is unclear. The 'break' is not truly a suspension of inherent purpose, but rather the replacement of man's inherent nature with another's: 'God.' Here, one's own movement is converted into that of another. However, this is hence not systematic, rather it relies on scripture and 'faith' to validate it.

Hence, in some ways, Kierkegaard avoids 'inherent purpose,' and rather locates purpose in eschewing this 'inherent' movement generally. However, how is this complete departure to be done? Hence, a God must appear there to allow us to avoid this movement, however the God themselves remains in their 'inherent' nature, and merely replaces the human's 'immediacy' with another's. This complete departure hence culminates in a scripture which gives sufficient license to opposed views. It is artificially limited.

Hence, Hegel claimed development and aim for the conceptual or human realm, Marx in some ways tried to re-capture this element of the 'dialectic' yet did so incompletely. The 'Hegelian' schema is in some ways a necessary concomitant of the dialectic. Movement becomes conceptual, and hence this realm starts to act as animated. While such a 'dialectic' follows from things such as Zeno's arrow, it nonetheless also complements such 'schema,' rather than this 'transformation' of concepts then being restricted to describing other things. Hence, in 'dialectical' forms that shun this kind of schema, the properties that the concepts have taken on are summarily removed from them and attributed elsewhere. However, in general, we can only usually consider things given an apt framework, including even where such things are to be placed - the dialectic is not a type of mosquito, for a simple instance. Nonetheless, for a dialectic, given this framework the consideration that follows occurs naturally. Hence, the major problem is things that might obstruct this inherent progression. Nonetheless, it hence follows that dialectics is something that may be known 'inherently,' or which has an inherently persuasive power to comprehension - when presented intact. Furthermore, without an appropriate framework this understanding cannot happen, so that the factor conditioning this is merely the framework. Hence, the motion in thought which is occurring there must be a property which is 'innate' to thought, or it could not be understood. This dialectic can only be 'applied' in any sense to things derived from a similar process. Nonetheless, it is not always perceived.

(Speaking of 'innate' understanding of 'language' is, of course, artificial. Language is not about 'accuracy,' generally, it is a human construct based on preferences and mores. It need not be used in this vein, however its 'innate' nature is pre-determined. Hence, such claims of 'innateness' early on generally concerned other things. Indeed, the validity of these things was not always the question, hence implying that this process hence depends on several factors. Of course, 'demonstrations' of this, such as in Meno, are problematic: they direct focus, and 'correct' certain proclamations, hence the external element is of course important. Of course, people cannot 'impart'  understanding, etc., they can only express viewpoints which the others may agree or disagree on. Here there is a similar confusion to much of the 'religious' - the human essence is given elsewhere, and thus humanity is subject to an external force thoroughly. Their internality is hence externalisd, and reduced to external influence, leading to passivity. This externalisation is hence taken for granted; internality is not enacted.)

The 'dialectic' is therefore a process which cannot be turned freely inside-out. It concerns concepts, and these cannot be freely treated as one likes - and still be dialectic. Indeed, if their own movement is contingent or impeded, then they have no real 'dialectic.' Thought is always thorough, in that people despite their contradictions must nonetheless form a given whole in these - perhaps despite themselves. Hence, these tend to undermine them. An account may be given of a person's thought, where the contradictions are represented in their interaction - although the person can never see them in this way. However, as a result their thought will always have a 'holistic' movement, it is never a blank space to be filled. If a 'dialectic' is granted, then this is a matter of the concepts' own movement. If a 'dialectic' is not granted, then objects cannot be understood as moving or having life, including oneself. Nonetheless, this 'innate' factor can nonetheless be missed, in some cases, when people instead 'externalise' it or take it as a factor not of the concepts themselves - an imparting of animation to them - and instead as merely an external factor that does not impact on the concepts. They might claim that the concepts are given life or a process in this way, only to systematically avoid this occurring. This is also an internal process, however it is problematic. It is ultimately empty, as well.

One can not generally 'intend' to impart 'understanding' - the aim is not understood. One may only express understanding.

Finally, what does Hegel's theory mean for notable 'social systems'? Each, evidently, has an 'eternal' or general part: they play a role in the eternal process. However, in addition to this they have an apparent 'independence' and 'formation.' This independence is, however, 'illusory' - if they actually had an existence apart from this eternal process, they would set themselves up as themselves self-sufficient and eternal forms. Hence, they must ultimately be reducible to this position, as notable systems or socio-political modes. Here, however, we notice a 'limitation' in the Hegelian schema: as social systems involve human interactions, the seeming independence of social systems is a 'part' of these and enacted by some. However, this is ultimately illusory and transient. Hence, an 'imaginative' or fictitious element of society takes a hold, and is perhaps dominant. This is composed of both people and social elements, and these shall pass away. They may be 'replaced,' so long as the process has not yet eschewed them or attained 'self-realisation.' Nonetheless, the 'schema' as such seems to attempt to 'sanctify' them. The actual result is that the positive process cannot generally 'maintain' them forever, due to its own nature realising itself through the process - which is precisely what the process is. Hence, eventually this must be 'founded' in a direct manner upon the world - or 'enforced.' However, 'enforcement' implies judgment, or a perspective that comprehends this. In any case, then, the role of people in this 'historical process' is clear: they relate in some way or other to this aspect of 'Spirit' or the process. 'History' waited on them, and required appropriate processes to develop. Only through this being realised appropriately, and radiating from where this occurs, can the historical process thus 'complete.' Nonetheless, this possibility will inevitably arise.

Hence, none of this should usually be dismissed swiftly. The general consequences of this are notable, and cannot be left alone. Further, it does not resolve into abstract social virtues, such as opposition to things like 'radicalism,' 'hierarchy' or (quite similarly) 'hate,' rather it posits a concrete and focused struggle. It notes that, without the theoretical, one only has a pursuit of such particular  social virtues and aims, which eventually turns on itself. This is hence akin to a 'polytheism,' where each gives their blessings to a certain deity. This is ultimately either cut short by death, or it will turn on itself - for all sides of it will be realised. Nonetheless, the theoretical transcends and orders it, by necessity - it is like a 'stance,' or a grip made by oneself that nonetheless will have a firm hold.

Further Reptilian Poetry

Here, I present a recently released reptilian poem.

The Deeps

In depths untamed, the salamander
weaves their mysterious path
upon a raiment of fire.
In the flickering light, the reptilian
takes on many strange forms,
yet is hidden in this.
The reptilian hides, in arcane fire, then strikes
savagely.

The komodo dragon's languid, merciless stare is steely.

In the desert, the lizard
slithers seamlessly across the sand.
The way of the reptilian is hidden,
and barren, yet in this land
he may move most freely.

Commenters may give feed-back or reviews on this excellent poem, however only by keeping strictly to the following format:

The following paragraph copied exactly, although you may choose from one of the options in brackets:

This poem is a stellar piece of poetry, for all (reptilians/time.) Its depiction of the world is as (enlightening/exciting/exquisite) as its use of the sonnet form is (immaculate/classically Petrarchan). From the (opening image of the salamander/imagery of fire upon a lizard), it never looks back, and continues with exotic and (mysterious/sensitive) imagery. Hence, the pathos of the (reptilian/earthly order/subversive) is most fully brought out.

The title (aptly presages the poem with its reference to 'depth'/is slightly New Romantic, however this is quickly redeemed by assimilating this back into terms of contemporary ie. reptilian poetry). The poem itself opens with a reference to the salamander, a peculiar creature; this compounds a sense of the mysterious and exotic developed by the title. It is (incredible/deep/characteristic of the ingenuity of the reptilian mind). Hence, the ('occult'/'eccentric'/'opinionated') character rumoured of the salamander is most clearly exploited. This foregrounds the (poem/masterpiece). The mention of 'depths untamed' and the 'mysterious' salamander compound the sense of (the virtues of obscurity/the reptilian mystique). The poem further examines the salamander's setting: a 'raiment of fire.' Hence, an inconstant element safeguards the salamander's mystery. Hence, the salamander becomes almost an (elemental/incarnation of fire/fire god), its fire lighting the way for the following points.

The reptilian is hence similar to (rumours of cultural Marxism, which rumoured form in fact is merely a skewed interpretation of actual reptilian influence/the 'flickering light,' in its ability to take on 'many strange forms,' and hence also to 'flicker'). Nonetheless, retaining the mystique of the oblique salamander, it remains peculiar in this peculiar form. However, others may not truly comprehend it, at least not (as much as I, the esteemed critic, appreciate the depth of the poem's eternal message and the true wisdom of the reptilian/fully/without complex meditative techniques). Hence, to many this ancient and modern wisdom is a 'closed book.' Yet the author acknowledges this, with their reference to 'arcane' fire. Hence, they are aware of these possibilities.

Their reference to the reptile 'striking' foreshadows the later reference to the aggressive komodo. Hence, the hidden-ness of reptilians is also a threat to others. They are hence 'conspiratorial' in some way, which arises innately. Along with the fire, we have also the image of the (barren desert/desert/exquisitely described desert/barren desert). In this isolation, the reptilian moves freely and in tune with the area. Hence, the reptilian movement is cleverly distilled into a series of (vivid/evocative/perfect) images. 

To summarise, this piece of reptilian poetry (does a credit to its kind/is, as is typical for the reptilian in this field, astounding). It gives a fresh, exciting and (reptilian/exquisite/marvellous) take on the elements, one which they should be proud of. While the peculiar choice of rhyming 'freely' with 'steely,' in the final couplet of the sonnnet, might seem out-of-place, they aptly juxtapose these traits of the reptilian in a (striking/careful/vivid) manner. Nonetheless, this is not characteristic, in this poem. It has so few problems, that (a whole genre of poetry could arise around praise of it/reptilians everywhere must celebrate it/it is not for an age, but for all time/its very sight will harm the anti-reptilian hordes/it will be accounted as a historic treatment of the sonnet). Hence, this poem is worth any reader's time. I hope to have illustrated the poem, both in its flaws and its virtues, as clearly as any could.

This may be altered only by choosing one of the phrases or words in red brackets, separated by strikes, and removing the others. Hence, for an example:

To summarise, this piece of reptilian poetry is, as is typical for the reptilian in this field, astounding. It gives a fresh, exciting and reptilian take on the elements, one which they should be proud of.

  
Do this for the whole review, and you will have a review of your own to post! Thank you, readers. You may post it in the comments here.

The commenter with the most highly judged answer will get a post featuring their comment. Others may also get a mention as a compensation. If the top commenter likes (we don't want to, however it is the standard for these things) we will post alongside this a reptilian poem or dispatch of their own. However, due to among other things sensivity to criticism (LEAVE REPTILIANS ALONE), reviews must follow the above format and be generally positive. Anything else will be disqualified as 'hate speech.'  We shall only reply to note how offended we were and how much you hurt our feelings, in as liberal a tone as possible.

Hence, we open the door to your reviews. Good luck, readers.

Follow-up: FA Socrates and social organisation, or, Wehrmacht our way to Wembley

We'd like to draw attention to this excellent comment by Socratic fascist and commenter Zanthorus:

Occasionally when I'm bored I scroll through the reddit front page, and sometimes I see posts from the subreddit r/LateStageCapitalism. There was one recently that was an explanation of Popper's view that a 'tolerant' society was justified in using 'intolerant' means to fight against advocates of 'intolerance', and another attempting to critique white nationalism and related nationalist groupings on the basis of the threat they pose to civil society. Of course, one of the principle enemies of the open, civil society advocated by Popper and all liberals is Marxism, yet this tends to go completely unnoticed, even by apparent 'anti-capitalists'.

I remember a few years back when I first started getting into politics, the BNP was gaining some political ground, and so opposing them was all the rage politically. At the time it seemed like the whole of the British left was caught in some kind of 'anti-Nazi' hysteria. We even had the wonderful spectacle of the SWP calling on the British state to censor Nick Griffin's appearance on question time. Yet not even a few months later they almost seemed to evaporate from the political scene. So much for the fascist danger.

I feel like anti-fascism is pretty closely tied with activism. Anti-fascists get a sense of gratification from having 'achieved' something when they're successful in their confrontation with whatever tiny grouplet they're confronting. This has a diverting effect since it's easy for them to continue producing such achievements by focusing on a relatively small fish, and especially one which is already swimming upstream, whereas if they tried focusing their efforts on the flow of the stream itself they would have to confront their own impotence.

 We gave the following response to these points:

"As far as 'activism,' while activism can occur without clear commitment, you're correct that it can be connected to a kind of 'active-ism' - people want to see 'results' and 'action,' and hence a spectacle, and as a result these things are sold to them in cheap ways. Hence, an emphasis on 'getting something now,' in the De Leonite phrase - De Leon, of course, also made a connection between politics of 'activism' alongside anti-electoralism and 'getting something now,' although undeveloped and slightly misleading. This 'active-ism' is often evident in the category of 'activity' itself, as socialists use it - or of activity as a 'separate realm' generally. Hence, you have a general point. However, on a more general note, 'activism' where a form of action is inherently valuable reduces to theory - it is only carried out for its theoretical validity, and is reducible to the theoretical advocacy of it. The action has no existence apart from theory, and derives from it, if it is carried out in this way. Hence, for 'activism' separate from theory, the emphasis has to be on 'results' - which hence leads to this manufacturing of a spectacle. However, as 'results' are contingent, this ultimately reduces to passivity, and is far from revolutionary, coherent or substantive.

"With 'anti-fascism,' this sense of gratification is also tied up with the 'activist' eschewing or emptying of political viewpoints - you also ally with the more 'active' bourgeois forces, against a 'pantomime villain' that they also find most evil. Hence, this seems like a 'generally' good action, as even most capitalism recognises this struggle. Of course, even fascism itself is perhaps too noble for such a movement to comprehend or align with. A movement without clear commitments, or a 'tolerant' or even 'multicultural' one, is still unable to align with strict and substantial movements. We sort of experienced this ourselves on places like RM, where things which had content were criticised for this in favour of a crass formalism, which reduced to: let the bourgeois and its apologists determine how we operate. Hence, the 'arguments' you refer to in the first paragraph are specious, and merely sophistic promotion of what is in actuality a limitation: that even such an apparent 'openness' is actually a 'closing' to, well, anything with determination. Hence, likewise, the critique of Hegel is empty drama - 'look at how EVIL this guy was, and the disturbing implications of' - rather than having a theoretical nature."

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I also added this on Socrates, who is vaguely relevant. Zanthorus had a post elsewhere involving Socrates recently, which was immediately received with criticism as too 'conceptual' or with criticism of Socrates. We have placed it here for the moment, so that you may view it at ease: https://pastebin.com/L1S84jA9. Anyway, my comment:

"Socrates expressed, in his time, an advanced perspective that gave the rule of Reason an explicit and developed form in society. This is, as you note, something ultimately socialistic. They accompanied other notable martyrs of the time, such as Jesus. Of course, a Socrates is someone advanced beyond most, and to kill him is to presume too much. As he likely noted, the democratic authorities had little basis for the authority to do this, outside of people-pleasing (not regarding the fundamental qualities such as Reason lying within these): hence, it was an ultimately specious decision. According to the relevant records, he rightly noted that history at the time required the spur of a coherent central power (as with the Roman Imperium, which displaced a broken 'republic' that in any case the people themselves dissented against: a general reductio of the project), not the multiplicity and people-pleasing of democracy. Further, he criticised capitalistic tendencies and money-centricity, as well as 'oligarchy.' Hence, his viewpoint is ultimately quite coherent, even given that the criticism of capitalistic tendencies is more absolute because it is not restricted to an analogical framework. More notably, however, in them the theoretical framework and its demands are much further developed than in 'activist' socialism. They are hence of much more interest to thinking creatures. In some ways, they might seem to roughly analyse what the theoretical implies for society and such necessarily, which is clearly important.

"However, Socrates was limited in some ways. In their portrayal, the fundamental elements were essentially the same, just problematically ordered or tempered. However, Reason is still a 'volatile' element: if the others are predominant in a person, 'Reason' as such does not exist. Hence, the whole thing is ultimately reducible to 'Reason,' not a relation between separate moments. The whole schema rests on the situation of 'Reason,' hence this conditions the whole situation. Hence, all you have is the situation of Reason, or the whole thing becomes reducible to this. The others are hence, in the rule of Reason, reducible to aspects of Reason.

"In a sense, the strictly theoretical was always closer to the socialistic than 'activism' or 'populism' can ever be. In a way, by eschewing the theoretical, activism' is led towards antagonism towards elements of Socrates which also implies antagonism to elements of fascism that we noted - in favour of the stable bourgeois society. Hence, this development of 'activism' is not unexpected. Disgruntled leftists have railed against a capitalistic apathy, stagnancy, false 'two-Party' system, etc., for years, and yet the left is quite content to prop up precisely this order and rage at dissident elements. To desire social change and a clear dynamic is to desire a 'fulcrum' or centre of power, preferably one person - as only a single person is capable of thoughts, ideas and views. Anything else is idle and empty, as a general structure. Hence, ultimately leftists chase their tails, wishing to theorise or have a cause while trying (somehow) not to theorise. To theorise 'against' theory is self-defeating, somewhat silly, and sophistic."

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As it happens, the next post shall allow commenters a chance to get a post about their comments. Good luck. Others may also be featured as a consolation.