The Untethered System

For Hegel, the 'system' or theoretical was a context which was essential to its components. Hence, the system was the standard by which they were measured, the place where they gained a direction, and gave a place to fields such as the political sphere, etc. This, in any case, would mean by implication that the helm of these had at the least to be held by a thinking being, or individual - even if viewed without Hegel's overall perspective. However, other than this Hegel also attempted to place the categories into this schema in transmuted form. In some ways this was merely to 'sanctify' them, and hence the concern over the Hegelian's conservatism. However, at the same time they were rendered 'fluid' or given an action of their own, which was a clear property of the system. As a result of this, they appeared in transmuted form - nonetheless, as the system calls on them, they are also factors that act upon the system. This transmutation hence nonetheless was capable of dealing with these thing as they were, or considering the consequence of their entering the system. Given this, let us look at some of the consequences of Hegel's treatment of things via their system.

Many thinkers, such as Aquinas, dealt with the concept of 'standard.' God was portrayed as the 'standard' of virtues: to have a virtue was to partake of the virtue in itself, which was 'God.' In polytheism, deities were often embodiments and governors of traits; this was then integrated into the Christian view. This could involve the idea that a given quality presupposes a being which embodies or perfects this quality, which forms the 'standard' for this quality. Hence, for a slightly simplified instance, the idea that for something to have a quality, it must partake of this quality in its 'absolute form.' The quality would hence be elevated into a being of its own, an 'absolute' by which all things of this type were measured. Hegel's take was more 'psychological,' if you like. For Hegel, these 'qualities' and forms were 'measured' by their place in the 'Idea' or spirit. Hence, their place in the single Mind, and its overall schema, determined the place of all of these forms. Of course, this 'Mind' was the absolute Idea, which was in for a somewhat rocky journey on its path - moving through several limited forms. Few hindrances were spared it. Nonetheless, the overall portrayal of qualities is hence to locate their place in an overall schema, or a theoretical one, which is a further development of this. Those such as the Cathars had demonstrated how polytheism is inherent in even the strict 'monotheistic' religions, and hence even the more religiously 'conventional' Hegel attempted to move beyond this limitation towards the systematic. This has further, and important, consequences.

The concept of 'design,' or an inherent reason or causa finalis in things, has traditionally been linked to religion. Hegel develops this, by identifying a God with an underlying logic of 'progress' or 'directionality.' Unlike many previous portrayals of a 'Great Chain of Being,' Hegel hence attempts to not only place creatures in a definite place, rather he also attempts to give each of these places a direction and aim in the movement of the schema. Thus, the concept of a 'dialectic' is central: it ensures a sense of 'liveliness' to the schema, or a sense of inherent direction and motion to creatures within it. This is slightly complex, however it gives this 'conceptual' realm a sense of independent motion. Hence, Hegel completes the portrayal of inherent final causes. The problem with this is 'populism': as each member is, by its part in the schema, given a direction and purpose, all of them appear purposeful. Hence, they might even appear 'oppressed' by the schema, which still delimits them; however, outside of this they have no purpose or claims. As the schema is all-embracing, all things that may exist here are attributed a purpose and place in Spirit. This is hence 'positivistic,' as Marx and Kierkegaard would faintly touch on. Kierkegaard, notably, invoked in contrast an image of a 'break' or 'leap of faith' in contrast to the stable progression of the system. Further, he opposed correctly this potential portrayal of a general 'harmony' which ultimately limits its own values. Nonetheless, the 'system' hence draws on and completes several aspects of this perspective of an 'inherent' purpose within creatures and the world.

 Kierkegaard in some ways formed a schema of his own. In contrast to the apparent choice of Either/Or, with its pseudo-Hegelian categories, Kierkegaard then allowed for a further category of 'faith': a break with the previous. Hence, instead of a comfortably developed system, the one category represented 'judgement' over the others. This complemented his Christian portrayal of 'dying (becoming nothing) to the world,' or evacuating that which is 'of the world.' Hence, in a way with Kierkegaard the system was taken to the point of a new 'extremism.' This is allied to an 'individual' in their movement away from the social. Hence, 'inherent' purpose is partially avoided, the purpose is rather seen as a distinct process. Nonetheless, the destination is unclear. The 'break' is not truly a suspension of inherent purpose, but rather the replacement of man's inherent nature with another's: 'God.' Here, one's own movement is converted into that of another. However, this is hence not systematic, rather it relies on scripture and 'faith' to validate it.

Hence, in some ways, Kierkegaard avoids 'inherent purpose,' and rather locates purpose in eschewing this 'inherent' movement generally. However, how is this complete departure to be done? Hence, a God must appear there to allow us to avoid this movement, however the God themselves remains in their 'inherent' nature, and merely replaces the human's 'immediacy' with another's. This complete departure hence culminates in a scripture which gives sufficient license to opposed views. It is artificially limited.

Hence, Hegel claimed development and aim for the conceptual or human realm, Marx in some ways tried to re-capture this element of the 'dialectic' yet did so incompletely. The 'Hegelian' schema is in some ways a necessary concomitant of the dialectic. Movement becomes conceptual, and hence this realm starts to act as animated. While such a 'dialectic' follows from things such as Zeno's arrow, it nonetheless also complements such 'schema,' rather than this 'transformation' of concepts then being restricted to describing other things. Hence, in 'dialectical' forms that shun this kind of schema, the properties that the concepts have taken on are summarily removed from them and attributed elsewhere. However, in general, we can only usually consider things given an apt framework, including even where such things are to be placed - the dialectic is not a type of mosquito, for a simple instance. Nonetheless, for a dialectic, given this framework the consideration that follows occurs naturally. Hence, the major problem is things that might obstruct this inherent progression. Nonetheless, it hence follows that dialectics is something that may be known 'inherently,' or which has an inherently persuasive power to comprehension - when presented intact. Furthermore, without an appropriate framework this understanding cannot happen, so that the factor conditioning this is merely the framework. Hence, the motion in thought which is occurring there must be a property which is 'innate' to thought, or it could not be understood. This dialectic can only be 'applied' in any sense to things derived from a similar process. Nonetheless, it is not always perceived.

(Speaking of 'innate' understanding of 'language' is, of course, artificial. Language is not about 'accuracy,' generally, it is a human construct based on preferences and mores. It need not be used in this vein, however its 'innate' nature is pre-determined. Hence, such claims of 'innateness' early on generally concerned other things. Indeed, the validity of these things was not always the question, hence implying that this process hence depends on several factors. Of course, 'demonstrations' of this, such as in Meno, are problematic: they direct focus, and 'correct' certain proclamations, hence the external element is of course important. Of course, people cannot 'impart'  understanding, etc., they can only express viewpoints which the others may agree or disagree on. Here there is a similar confusion to much of the 'religious' - the human essence is given elsewhere, and thus humanity is subject to an external force thoroughly. Their internality is hence externalisd, and reduced to external influence, leading to passivity. This externalisation is hence taken for granted; internality is not enacted.)

The 'dialectic' is therefore a process which cannot be turned freely inside-out. It concerns concepts, and these cannot be freely treated as one likes - and still be dialectic. Indeed, if their own movement is contingent or impeded, then they have no real 'dialectic.' Thought is always thorough, in that people despite their contradictions must nonetheless form a given whole in these - perhaps despite themselves. Hence, these tend to undermine them. An account may be given of a person's thought, where the contradictions are represented in their interaction - although the person can never see them in this way. However, as a result their thought will always have a 'holistic' movement, it is never a blank space to be filled. If a 'dialectic' is granted, then this is a matter of the concepts' own movement. If a 'dialectic' is not granted, then objects cannot be understood as moving or having life, including oneself. Nonetheless, this 'innate' factor can nonetheless be missed, in some cases, when people instead 'externalise' it or take it as a factor not of the concepts themselves - an imparting of animation to them - and instead as merely an external factor that does not impact on the concepts. They might claim that the concepts are given life or a process in this way, only to systematically avoid this occurring. This is also an internal process, however it is problematic. It is ultimately empty, as well.

One can not generally 'intend' to impart 'understanding' - the aim is not understood. One may only express understanding.

Finally, what does Hegel's theory mean for notable 'social systems'? Each, evidently, has an 'eternal' or general part: they play a role in the eternal process. However, in addition to this they have an apparent 'independence' and 'formation.' This independence is, however, 'illusory' - if they actually had an existence apart from this eternal process, they would set themselves up as themselves self-sufficient and eternal forms. Hence, they must ultimately be reducible to this position, as notable systems or socio-political modes. Here, however, we notice a 'limitation' in the Hegelian schema: as social systems involve human interactions, the seeming independence of social systems is a 'part' of these and enacted by some. However, this is ultimately illusory and transient. Hence, an 'imaginative' or fictitious element of society takes a hold, and is perhaps dominant. This is composed of both people and social elements, and these shall pass away. They may be 'replaced,' so long as the process has not yet eschewed them or attained 'self-realisation.' Nonetheless, the 'schema' as such seems to attempt to 'sanctify' them. The actual result is that the positive process cannot generally 'maintain' them forever, due to its own nature realising itself through the process - which is precisely what the process is. Hence, eventually this must be 'founded' in a direct manner upon the world - or 'enforced.' However, 'enforcement' implies judgment, or a perspective that comprehends this. In any case, then, the role of people in this 'historical process' is clear: they relate in some way or other to this aspect of 'Spirit' or the process. 'History' waited on them, and required appropriate processes to develop. Only through this being realised appropriately, and radiating from where this occurs, can the historical process thus 'complete.' Nonetheless, this possibility will inevitably arise.

Hence, none of this should usually be dismissed swiftly. The general consequences of this are notable, and cannot be left alone. Further, it does not resolve into abstract social virtues, such as opposition to things like 'radicalism,' 'hierarchy' or (quite similarly) 'hate,' rather it posits a concrete and focused struggle. It notes that, without the theoretical, one only has a pursuit of such particular  social virtues and aims, which eventually turns on itself. This is hence akin to a 'polytheism,' where each gives their blessings to a certain deity. This is ultimately either cut short by death, or it will turn on itself - for all sides of it will be realised. Nonetheless, the theoretical transcends and orders it, by necessity - it is like a 'stance,' or a grip made by oneself that nonetheless will have a firm hold.

The Fascist

The struggle against 'fascism' - usually just perceived - which takes on a specialised form, is an exclusive preserve of liberalism.

Mainstream capitalist ideology is responsible for and compatible with a high degree of anti-fascism. This has very little to do with 'fascism,' that might not even be present, and more to do with the role of fascism in the self-vindicating mythology of modern liberal democracy.

It belongs to liberalism, or that part of capitalism which merely wishes for 'class-collaborationism' and to safeguard capitalism by ensuring mutual consent of its members. It necessarily serves to 'dilute' or oppose radical political trends that partake of it, or dilute the 'negativity' and 'hate' in a movement, such as to preserve the given social coherence. Positive sentiment and relations are encouraged in the present, a barricade against radical opposition to the present system of relations. Hence, if the movement against 'fascism ' is to be characterised, it is in these terms. However, it can often merely chase shadows, as, like a capitalist corporation that is forced relentlessly to produce new content even without a spur, it tends to 'manufacture' fascism even when it isn't there in order to maintain its empty sense of relevance and urgency. This is because it is selling a product, one that aims to dilute or undermine radical opposition to the system and which hence has to be kept going compulsively after some perceived 'fascism.' Nonetheless, this merely furthers its liberal nature, and gives it no other real basis.

In any case, what about 'fascist' movements? Fascism was not always a simply 'racist' movement. 'Racism' at the time characterised many nations. Further, the desire for a 'racial' nation is not one unique to whites - it is also a property of Judaism, known also for its racial warfare and belief in a 'chosen people,' and exists in many forms. Hence, racial nationalism is not by itself fascist. Fascism is an ill-defined term in some ways restricted to a 'concrete movement' or period, and hence is often reduced to something simplistic like 'racism.' It would be difficult to have a coherent movement against it. 'Anti-fascism' lives on because the capitalist establishment has declared Nazism the ultimate embodiment of its own fears, and so-called 'revolutionaries' have risen to the task of opposing what the system tells them is most evil. Of course, the system also considers revolution to be evil - but then, modern anarcho-communists don't really care about revolution, so long as transsexual people are given the appropriate gender pronoun and nobody seriously criticises Israel.

However, the spectre of 'fascism' nonetheless represents a force resistant to 'liberal democracy' and 'anarcho-communism,' a vision of nation with a sense of direction that unifies it. If one makes a dichotomy of anarchist and 'non-socialist' fascist, there is no room left for the Marxist or for socialism; the socialist aim of a guided society is wholly attributed to the 'non-socialist' fascist, or in any case is ignored structurally. Hence, such 'anarchism' is highly reactionary, in the end, and it is ultimately just a variant of liberalism. The more that liberalism is allowed to proclaim its ultimate emptiness and lack of direction as if this is substantial and benevolent, the more is conceded. The leftist panic over Trump, to which the obvious corollary was supporting Clinton, is one example of 'anti-fascist' panic being obviously used to undermine radicals and incorporate them into liberalism. Nonetheless, fascism is mainstream capitalism's very own vision of the devil, and opposition to it is nothing notably striking - further, this opposition generally cites the same reasons as the capitalist establishment. Mainstream capitalism is responsible for and compatible with a high degree of anti-fascism. This has very little to do with 'fascism,' that might not even be present, and more to do with the role of fascism in the self-vindicating mythology of modern liberal democracy.

Hence, caution is advised around this subject, for, 'the worst product of fascism is anti-fascism.'

On The Organisation of Nations in War

In times of present but limited war, especially, it was necessary to calm people and remind them that daily life was to be continued as in other states - to an extent. You could not merely start anew after the war, with people unused to acting in this manner. A long, involved war would get rid of a nation attempting this, who instead requires war to be waged quickly if it is to survive. A situation of passive, lengthened war would generally also lead to alterations that aren't easily revoked, or the necessity of attacking anything else that might seem objectionable.
In general, this repurposing in times of war is especially pronounced when it surrounds war work and the possibility of being used as soldiers. Hence, others - separated from this - were generally necessary if a nation was to survive a war while retaining some explicit continuity, and this would be produced inevitably on the event of a war. In this sense, war was a central event in the life of nations, and of course a nation which was easily attacked would likely be threatened.

However, alongside this, there was also the necessity of keeping continuity elsewhere. In this, states like the USA which were separated from others generally had an advantage, at the expense of being press-ganged into a pattern of continual war which they could not escape. In this sense their interventions since then have been a necessary continuation of their actions in the world wars, and the dynamic shift in this.

In general, over time most of the Western nations - including Russia - have been caught up in this process of continual war. They will not, of course, attack things which they like much - like most of these other Western nations. Of course, for this pattern to be incorporated into a nation generally requires that the people being repurposed assent to it, and hence generally requires support from populist factions in the nation. Hence, nations like Britain only more recently fully committed to this direction, nonetheless this required help from the USA and subservience to their 'conservative' Presidency, which they had to have close relations with and whose view on them was in a sense much more important than that of the British politicians. Britain could not actually form an independent politics, despite its own illusions.

In general, then, there are various areas of a nation that participate in a war. As such, when a nation is attacked, the need will come for these to be detached from the war somehow - this applies for instance to people functioning for the war effort, and in general those where the continuity is highly uncertain. This detached form is unlikely to threaten the rest of the nations, who respond aggressively, or it is ultimately forced into co-operation. 'Rebellious' communities which decry their being attacked by others rather than left there are quite hypocritical - they are effectively declaring a fight against these nations, on some level and perhaps a limited one, and hence of course likely to be attacked and possibly taken out. The overall result of this is that temporary formations which are detached from the nation generally are necessary if it is to be kept on track with the overall system, and shelter it from war. These will generally remain within one nation or other, but if the war comes too close or they are caught in the 'heart of the storm' or the centre of this dynamic, then they will generally detach from both of these to some extent, and try to form isolated communities to assure people of this continuity. This will generally be more likely to occur when the war is milder in nature, or this continuity can be easily drawn upon.

In general, then, nations which are in notable war or caught up in the process are likely to be victimised by elements within them, elements which however will not relate offensively to the others or which are not really 'revolutionary' - sometimes even in intent. Of course, these forces are either not interested in the nation, or take on a 'nationalised' form - in which case their conscious formation around a lack of wartime 'patriotism,' despite their attempting to take on this 'patriotic' or national form, presages their undoing. Such patriotism must in the future be manufactured in a highly artificial manner, so far as such conditions are concerned. However, generally, these break-away elements cannot easily be integrated with the rest of the nation, as this is not their function: it presupposes some opposition between them and the nation, somewhat in spite of itself, which is still to be worked out, and might take the form of their repression until the nation can return to functioning. However, if the nation allies too easily with 'normal' foreign elements, it will undermine its own position in this return to functioning.

However, ultimately this tendency among the nation did not serve to improve it, and sometimes turned against its war effort. This lack of commitment could be fatal. Sometimes, the state would be forced to clear them away, in order to resume its nationhood as something separate and fortified. In addition, because these elements took place at around the point where people might hope to gain entrance to official roles or elsewhere, they could easily forestall any mobility in the state, which it then had to make up for somehow through the replacement of its officials. This tendency, separating itself from the nation's war effort in order to maintain continuity, was one which did not cling to a definite tendency or doctrine. However, it was ultimately characterised by its finitude and hypothetical nature - it was attempting to keep continuity with some hypothetical ending of the war, when it would flow back into the rest of society - and hence was in itself weak and indefinite. In Russia, for instance, this tendency had decisively entered the nation by the time of Tsar Nicholas II, where coronation events could easily turn into stampedes for food, and in general required exposure and addressing. By the time this tendency had overrun a nation on its own part, if such were possible, it would in all likelihood have lost a war - and a nation so divided will either see one side fall, or both. Hence, in general, such nations as were in major war - something quite common in the 19th Century, and taking a significant part in the early 20th Century, but then more sparse and partial as time went by - led to certain functions in them which were realised in accordance with the stage of the war. These could have notable political consequences, but were always in a sense subordinate.

The Organisation of Capitalist Politics

Capitalist politicians are subjected, like all other jobs, to the market. As such, along with capital, they are put into subjection to the people in general, of any tendency. As in the market, they count each voter the same, and the more people pay the price, the more they get paid. Hence, capitalist society in general is organised democratically, across its length - demands pertaining to democracy by itself will not go beyond reformist hopes. However, this also opens up other strictures or dynamics in the political scene.

Firstly, this leads to a necessary populistic trend in politicians of any country. In a sense, the more open the market in a country, the stronger this populistic tendency. However, this trend is highly eclectic and distracts from each nation's particular role in the world economy - hence, it forms a somewhat necessary exhaust in the form of states like Cuba or Bolivia. The US do take some umbrage at these nations, but because their own politicians are in a sense just as subject to populistic trends, that these trends are given some form of expression among the 'league of nations' is found necessary.

Secondly, there is conflict in the political sphere not only between political tendencies - which, so far as they exist in favour of capital, serve the same masters and hence have only trivial distinctions - but also between the political itself and the position of politics as a job where the politician must be subject to every popular whim. Authors and other such ideological functions of capital will generally tend in favour of the latter - they will attempt to steer politics into the form they are familiar with. However, when political movements occur, politicians are forced to adjust to this new political landscape, and hence to prioritise the political on some perhaps limited level. This will usually be met with resistance, as is noticeable in the case of the Labour Party under Corbyn. Nonetheless, this struggle against market intrusions in politics is in a sense the most important duty for politicians under capital, who are otherwise subject to the same forces and ultimately to the economy.

In general, the political realm tends towards the stricter ideas or the hints of them in politics. American politics is often quite hollow in this - many seemingly 'strict' ideas are merely quibbles over words. In British politics, while Corbyn's supporters have raised several highly strict views, they are expected to not only be pleased with but welcome people who have opposed them for months to years to the helm of the Party, and then aid them in propagandising against themselves. This is a highly absurd situation that could not be reached without many concessions. It nonetheless has many of the characteristics of a farce, primarily on the part of the 'Labour Right,' whose essential purpose is to attack even any mention of socialism. As such, it is not a surprise that, in dealing with them, their opponents are attacked as 'unspeakably extreme,' anti-Semitic (a buzz-word used to avoid discussing politics), and so on - as opposed to the 'Labour Party,' which you could hardly recognise as the Party which has contained highly leftist gestures in its campaigning for quite some time. If socialism itself is treated as a 'bad word,' and a movement organised against this, then over time it becomes a slur, like anti-feminism or anti-Semitism, that can usually be dismissed as exploitation of a word for effect. Ultimately, Jeremy Corbyn's supporters as their aims stand only have impetus reasonably to either stay in the Party and campaign for their views, or to be shouted down and leave rather than campaigning against themselves. Otherwise, the Party increasingly refuses to take a political stand on the state - but this is not a problem to the opponents of Corbyn's movement, who often have no concern for politics and merely view it as a target for incursions of the market.

It is to be noted that politicians are aware of the general concept of vested interests. This is the means by which people whose fundamental concern is the market can get an 'in' in politics, by pretending to lack vested interests such that their comments inhabit some sort of fairy 'political' realm. Hence, for instance, they will pretend that their call for a pro-business agenda isn't a result of their present affiliation with these and present identification of their interests with business - it hence becomes a pseudo-political thing. This is, however, merely a question of demographic manipulation rather than political views as such - in order to off-set their appearance of vested interests, they will claim allegiance to charity or some other impoverished sector of society - albeit only nominal - in order to thus appear 'political,' and hence will be plunged into posturing. In general, if they are forced into personal conflict, they will come off looking bad, as it disarms them, but they might be defended or have their image white-washed due to vested interests in the reporting as well - which inevitably gets in where business was in charge of these things. Hence, in politics, there were many who so to speak took a 'back-door,' who were only 'political' or considered politically for politically illegitimate reasons. While their fundamental agenda was to preserve market incursions on politics and hence the laws of the market, as well as politics' inferiority to the market, this mostly personal agenda was given a seemingly political form by drawing on a different demographic, of whatever kind. Politics was merely a name given to the obscuring of a person, and was hence subordinated to the market. This is important to grasp in referring to how precisely this actual hierarchy functioned, or how political actors could assimilate this superiority of the market into political terms.

In general, capital was organised in such a way that the political was integrated into the economic, and could not escape. In this context, who was to quibble over whether politicians were 'corrupt'? If it's a job, under capital, it's corrupt. In any case, however, resistance to this in the political sphere or the realm of government over society was always present, in the circumstances. The general circumstance was that due to the general reduction of people to voters or to money by abstract labour, conflicting views necessarily appeared or were opposed to each other, and yet had to be treated as somehow uniform at the expense of abstracting from their inherent nature. This force of artificial uniformity of various forms may be called capital, and obviously had a certain bias against ideas which were more concrete in nature, found certain things more evil than others. In any case, the general struggle in the political sphere was one which could not under capitalism be kept within one state, where in general too many demands and atomised political careers existed in one state for it to form any form of political coherence or coherent existence in a nation, and this kept these politicians in place, such that they had to be exported partially to other nations in order to keep some limited sense of national differentiation. Outside that, political forces which could not be fit elsewhere would necessarily take state form, a weakness of this multifarious political form. In general, politics in this situation was for most participants about the atomised economic actor, and traits of theirs which could be abstracted, and hence was ultimately an identity politics centred around the traits which, as an atomised and economic, or physical, entity, they have. For the most part, politics structured around the abstract actor in whichever guise ultimately had to attack any opposed forces as incoherent if it was to be maintained at all, because it could not deal with them concretely without drawing on random, brief phrases which ultimately amounted to the same thing.

'Finding Jerry'

People generally were expected to proclaim strongly their own superiority, intellectually and generally, to one Adolf Hitler, who was leader of Germany in the 1940s and wrote books and speeches of generally more political depth than most modern politicians. Notably, their Party also declared war on the British Empire and Soviet Union. They were frequently expected to read Mein Kampf and be revolted immediately by how much better they were than it, how much it was below them. This was how they treated Hitler. However, Hitler was leader of Germany and a powerful statesman - and, guess what, the next day these same people would have to return to the ordinary life which compels this reaction to Hitler as under a knife, yet where they would willingly submit and show obeisance to any authority figure or person of wealth and stature. One might ask how they continue, when this contradiction seems manifest - although in a sense it merely follows that these people of whatever type are in no position to criticise Hitler for anything, or that Hitler has a partial immunity here. In general, it would seem to follow that for these things to be clearly harmonised and allowed for, it requires general incorporation into their lives. Hence, it isn't actually sufficient that they disapprove of Hitler completely - and can brush him off cheaply - and then go into an environment where this can be applied to anyone, but rather the authority figures must be validated in some way, must be automatically set apart from and against Hitler. This would only have been the case in the British (or, technically, the French - but they got not very far) army of the 1940s war. There, it was a group of people with an administrative set-up which was automatically and directly part of the struggle against Hitler, almost by proxy, and hence which offered - at least - a partial resolution of this conflict. As such, these people had to treat their workplace as so to speak the British Army against Hitler, as the continuance of this in modern times, where each member is a soldier serving the anti-Hitler cause and any member dissenting of this cause is likely to be cast aspersion upon and thrown out - which could not be done arbitrarily or as if Hitler were not somewhere present here.

This was only a partial security for these people, however. Of course, it was still inconsistent, given the capitalistic system that the British Army were fighting for and on behalf of, or in brief given the British nation of the time, and hence the only at all consistent solution was that of Gandhi - that Britain should submit and Nazi targets commit suicide like lemmings are often portrayed as doing. To be fair, Gandhi's cause was given significant momentum by Hitler's war, and as their primary cause benefitted from this side they had to have a certain sense of indifference to the war. While Nazism was an attempt to avenge German treatment and their apparently unfair loss of the war, Russia conversely was a state formed in retreat from opposing forces and hence which took refuge in the pre-existent template of 'socialist' politics, which however ultimately collapsed under opposition as was the inevitable result - due to the 'internationalism' of Second International socialism (Engels offered some contrast and had highly nationalistic tendencies at times), the Soviet Union exercised international  influence, but because of this it was gridlocked into the format of 'peaceful co-existence' and integrated into this international system, which made it idle as a point of opposition to this. A political system which is denationalised or has no clear link to a concrete representation is one which is idle or merely an existent economic category turned into a pseudo-political system; that is, unless it is merely an expression of an individual's temperament and thus cut off from others, but then it is in a way exclusive to this individual and people's evaluation of them. The natural form of realisation of a political system or viewpoint is the nation, or its demesne, and with no realisation of this a political system is idle or does not by itself have any viewpoint. A state forged in promises of retreat from this kind of assertion on the world is always likely to turn into something like the Soviet Union, as in a sense it is a mere shelter from war rather than a politically significant entity. As a state, it must call upon some political ideology - however, because it is formed through promises of retreat, this cannot be a mode of expression of the state, and hence must be denationalised and abstract. Nonetheless, Marxism must be one of the only systems to get essentially one chance to prove itself, while in conflict of course with the rest of the world and tendencies in a nation which want to co-operate with this - which is somewhat like saying that the lack of monarchs (or effective idleness of monarchs as a governing force, which is just a variation) failed de facto with Cromwell.

Socialism has many forms, and it might seem strange that everyone instantly accepts that Marxism is the only one which counts and the earlier and similar forms can be dismissed if it has problems, and likewise that after about half a century we could draw the conclusion that it could be thrown aside rather than amended or improved in any way - in brief, that even capitalism's supporters are Bordigists. You might suggest that there were many people during that time who did not want to give it a chance, and hence it had an uphill struggle.

In general, popular recent novels for instance have either originated in Britain or drawn upon British archetypes - the Hunger Games for instance drew upon the image of active resistance to some random 'totalitarian' forces, which is ultimately a British archetype, as well as grabbing and relying upon the archetypes of British authors like George Orwell. Hence, this sense of a British context was fairly inherent to them, because it means that people who dislike them can be safely dismissed rather than given increasing ground and allowed or encouraged. If you wanted to make noise about something, noise against it had to be hidden away or attacked, or it would just be a meaningless cacophany - which in a way it is anyway. The classics are not dry for no reason, they are dry so that they would not inspire strong negative feelings or aimless enthusiasm about the work of art in their case, and hence could take some sort of message forwards and last. Marx set themselves the task of not fading away like the fragile utopians, and as time went by had to take on an increasingly detached tone to avoid this at all costs. Recent British popular novels are just fake classics.

There may have been poetry after Auschwitz, but increasingly people did not read it. This is because poetry includes several mechanisms which lead to a somewhat dry approach to things, and this was eventually ruled out in the form of Nazism. It might be said that 'Bordiga's' approach to the Nazis was found offensive not because he said anything actually offensive for most of it - his generally attributed comments about the worst effects of fascism being anti-fascism are highly offensive to people, realistically, but they can still pretend to like him somehow - but because he wished to analyse it rather than merely give way to possibly opposed sentiments. Of course, if any analysis were to be made, however flawed - and Bordiga's analysis was highly flawed, in its attempt to assimilate the Nazis to Marxist categories which were least appropriate to them -, this required avoiding this sentimental mode for a moment. Hence, Bordiga was a victim of a social agenda of sorts that applied after the Nazis - everything had to be poetry after the Nazis. Poetry as an art form is simply the locking up of a person in the form of a poem, for other people to inspect, although it can view other things as higher than poetry and not accept this schema. People could no longer write things and expect instant reactions - it had to be vetted before anyone could react to it, and if people disagreed they would jettison it in shock. This didn't stop the Marxists, who if they read Marx generally only thought it of note to note down that they disagreed. But it could be said that, after Marx and Engels, the Marxist movement was pure poetry.

Admittedly, Mitchell Abidor's introduction to 'Auschwitz, the great Alibi' was somewhat strange, and read like a person who had no idea what they were intending to read (an analysis of the Holocaust in socio-historical terms) or indeed what Marxism involved. Perhaps they believed the academic reduction of Marxism to a bunch of phrases like 'class struggle,' and so were shocked when the Marxists started actually talking about things. They just wandered into this and then panicked. Still, Marxism by this point is like a sieve that people can move into and out of as they please, it is an art and not a determinate entity. People can disagree with Marx persistently and take a generally negative attitude towards their works, and yet still be Marxists, so long as they are discussing Marxism. It's a question of handling an aesthetic, not of anything particularly determinate. Now, this makes it almost inevitable that such texts are going to be attacked - they might assume that they have safety and can claim a certain obscure viewpoint, but if something is objectionable to society generally, just about anybody could just drop in and attack it, and the Bordigist text is hence a barely-moving target.

Evil is something relevant to all determinate action - that which is excluded is 'evil.' Hence, Nazism was relevant to almost all determinate action in capitalism: people either judged an evil or opposed thing by the standard of Nazism, or they just didn't get it. The latter is their problem, and not a problem with the text. Now, if people object to a text because they don't understand it, they will take issue with the next text to the same extent, because it will surprise them and they will be perturbed by it - this is a dynamic which becomes tiring quickly, and one might as well just offend them and get it over with. Because we know that this Bordiga has some claws at least, or can be offensive, if people don't get Bordiga then we can accept that they would be distanced from these people - they don't continually go into their texts with expectations that they will be catering to them and their interests and view, whatever these are. If this is not presented explicitly, then it gets tiring - although of course they might well get shunned for it.

In leftist groups, certain terms are buzz-words which can lead to rejection, but these are all that people get passionate about discussing. Continually discussing topics which have the threat of expulsion tied to them on some level is not something that people should continue with, or have to. But why would they do this? Multiple reasons. Firstly, non-Marxists weren't necessarily interested in Marxism, which is both offensive to what they believe and value, and also dry and involved; but they were fine with people who just wanted to take Marxism and make it a hardly different flavour of what they already did. Marxism was based on Hegel in some ways, and he was not one for presenting 'results' emptied out by eschewing the reasons and process behind them - and when this process was supposed to be an involved examination of interconnected economic categories, then, well, this could raise problems if it isn't to be abandoned completely. And when it's abandoned, you don't have Marxism, just phrases stolen from it and used without the same reasons, mere appearance and imagery without substance. People generally preferred that Marxism be a flavour of something compatible with capital, and hence when 'Marxism' was to be discussed - and in leftist groups or discussion generally this was an alleged focus, but it would be misleading to say that anybody cared about it - it was in this form and hence in a sense a foray out, where Marxism was not to be allowed to return without a threat of expulsion for whatever reason. While Marxist theory is a somewhat open field, Marxist discussion is like being walled in on various sides until discussing Marxism is no longer an option - they have a notably problem with discussing Marx, and relating other things back to Marxism is a bridge too far for them. Relating things back to them is essentially giving them a direction which draws the things which they like and find accessible off into the distance and far from where most people were comfortable. In addition, Marxism is something which is generally excluded from actual social life, or somewhat distanced from it, and hence in a sense if it is put into interaction with this social life then it is simply a question of querying the strange creatures who call themselves 'Marxists,' and from there on the terrain becomes hostile. A 'Marxist' Party or discussion group is vulnerable to this unless it's pretty much just you and Jesus, or in general people more detached from such interaction and enthusiasm, if hypothetically they happened to have an interest in discussing these things.

Neo-Nazism, while it might seem disturbing, can take on strange forms - for instance, people who believe that British history stopped in the 1940s, and hence are fervent British nationalists trumpeting Britain's heritage. Stormfront are moderate - you could call them black nationalists, as they do want a black nation. They're just another case of 'poetry' or 'art' in lieu of politics - a certain aesthetic is what interests them, and what they pretend distinguishes them from other views. The Nazis lost over 50 years ago, but they want to pretend that their side can hardly stop winning; they pretend to be radical, but their support of Trump places them at around the same level as the CPUSA, except with no doctrinal concerns or even political views to give them even the appearance of an association with radicalism. Stormfront is, on the one hand, rich people and pretend-rich people congratulating themselves on how rich they are (though they may, as Hitler was, be poor), and living vicariously through others, and on the other hand it is a conduit for more radical political tendencies inspired by the Nazis that however have no explicit sanction there for image reasons and otherwise. In a way, you'd have to be quite radical to go to Stormfront for political reasons, when Stormfront is just about as hostile a place to political views generally as possible - but politics and seriousness there isn't the main trend, and alongside this comes things like praising 'beautiful white Amazonian' females in a way that might resemble a lyre if its player were an annoyed cat enmeshed in it. In general, Neo-Nazism rarely interacts with Nazism, so you might suspect they don't figure there's much of worth there. Without Neo-Nazis, the Nazis would just be this ever-present force of opposition, that could be realised in any way and suddenly, but Neo-Nazis served to neutralise this so far as they could do so. At least, when it was an accusation thrown at Neo-Nazis - otherwise it might still scare and disturb them.

In general, Nazism isn't quite coherent enough to constitute something exactly outside of the opposing workplace or society, and other things might oppose it. These are all seen through the lens of Nazism, but do not like Nazism try to integrate into European society as closely, and hence cannot have the same dramatic potential because they are just generally divergent rather than diverging in only certain particular and striking ways. Nazism was something which the system saw fit to associate with all that it opposed and hated, and in general all that it considered evil - that which was not incorporated into it. The Bordigists represented Auschwitz as a new and pernicious alibi in the fight against socialism, but it would seem unlikely that Auschwitz would formulate any new alibis against socialism unless socialism were somehow involved, such that this seems problematic unless we are to surmise that these Bordigists considered the Nazis to be socialists. Nonetheless, it did furnish a new alibi of sorts - an image of evil which could easily be opposed to an image of Western capitalism as good. The war hence becomes a fight against the 'real enemy,' and hence the other sides are allies - this cannot be avoided, if you would ally with them. If you take this image of evil too seriously, but hardly care about people praising capitalism or not doing so (many anarchists are like this), then ultimately capitalism's image is the only beneficiary of this. Hence, this was a clear political move - the more evil something is, the better everything else is, the more praised.

But this is in some ways a literary move. The British Empire - of course, Britain only shed some parts of its Empire, rather than changing itself completely - and for that matter the Soviet Union was hardly spotless. But when people talk about Britain during the war, they talk of course about Britain as seen through contrast with Nazism - where the objectionable elements are cleaned away. At the least, there is some capitalistic aspect which is a force for pure good in an era where socialism was established, which is really enough to make socialism dismissed. Socialism was for many years obscured precisely because all of this shine was enough to mean that it was merely a vague exception. It could easily be conflated with reformism - all it did was pick partial holes in something which was basically and clearly good. Capitalism could not be clearly attacked by forces that were not co-operative with it. Nonetheless, the main tropes of anti-socialism in the following years grew out of this war, which created a world which in any case seemed to require little alteration. Capital took recourse to a sense of 'conservatism' if you like that promoted capital because it was there, and to do this you needed to whitewash all of this to form a basis on which discussion could be promoted. This was only allowed for after the war, after capital had finally found a force firmly in opposition to it and not serving it. Discussion begun on this basis promised little for socialism, for the main point had already been conceded and any incidental dents were unlikely to make a notable impact, but attempting to eschew this basis led to instant attack and rejection.

Socialism had little headway because it had no place in that socio-political landscape. With the fall of the Soviet Union, it hence fell away generally and became irrelevant. It lost a nation which co-operated with the West, but after this brief seeming incursion in the present world situation fell away, it was left with a completely clean slate. Socialism was no longer a radical force - instead, dividing up and invading the Middle East became a Western focus and opposition to the international system was concentrated there. The left, however, was a Western creature that had made many Western norms into issues of automatic exclusion when people diverged from them, and hence became mere slaves benefitting the West in its actual issues, and quite willingly. They could not put forward a coherent and different political platform, because most of what was important to them was, strangely, things that were common.

The Nazis were an image of evil because of their domestic politics, making their nation into an image of sorts - Britain was excluded from this because they focussed on 'foreign' politics, or oppressing and fighting Indians, and so on. The British domestic policy hence became merely a mirror of Nazis' to ideology, and Nazi foreign policy focussed around their domestic area. Due to their whitewashing as states, their 'alibi,' they felt quite comfortable just throwing states up and trying to displace the nations of a given area. Hence, the Middle East were effectively confronted with the ghost of anti-Nazi forces in every way, and with expansionism in many forms. Conversely, they faced little resistance from what the West finds most offensive, namely things which seemed 'Nazi'-like, and hence the qualification that all other things were far less offensive than this would merely be an external hindrance to their struggle. It was not merely a British Empire, but instead a global capitalistic Empire, one where the major capitalist states could just take on various forms spreading like a cancer over the globe. Hence, it was a financial Empire, and had to find suitable forms of expressing this. For all the hype about the USA, after the 20th Century the world had changed dramatically, and the USA was old and its image practically ancient. This all hearkened back to a time when none of these conflicts yet existed, to a different world order, and hence such patriotism could not adequately express the new world order, if we may use this phrase in a more generic sense. Instead, new nations had to arise to do this, such as Israel. Without these, all of the new elements of the world order and so on found no expression, and hence they were necessarily forged by these powers, through whatever means. The alternative to this was 'leftism,' which also expressed this, but rather than in the form of enthusiasm for a given state through the form of Israel and so on, through taking nearly any popular movement in capitalism and excluding anything else. This served to link all of these different places together. As we are now still seeing, all nations had to be harmonised artificially through things like the Olympics to allow for the impression that all of these things were also made new by these new states and were not reducible to the old things which they themselves were chained to.

Nonetheless, the Nazis created a problem - if they were taken as a picture, how could this picture not be tampered with in the process of a war, remain focussed on a domestic, 'totalitarian' perspective rather than getting caught up in patriotic fervour and other such things which colour portraits of for instance the Spanish Armada? How, likewise, could they be secured as a source of feeling from history, where things like gladiators, colonialism and suchlike are commonplace - and often would have gone much further if they were capable of it - and might reduce their impact? Britain could in a sense add no more to the Nazis as such than they found, and hence had to draw on Nazi patterns - belligerent elected leaders, with imperial hopes, drawing on themes like blood and land and using similar gestures. If they didn't portray things in these terms, from early on, they would be speaking of a conflict, and not get immediate sanction to talk about domestic policies and what 'everyone' accepted as an exemplary evil.

How could a tendency be accepted as something outside of the system, something that was not merely reformist? A 'revolution' could mean anything, and is used to describe any loud political movement - it means nothing by itself. It could rearrange social relations, or it could just rearrange objects. A socialist often wished to be outside this or to appear so, but this was less straightforward than it might appear, they usually would just deal up a bunch of ideals that were mild enough to mean anything. This was hardly that critical. Changes to political form were commonly proposed, changes to organisation of economic units without any particular consideration of the economic context or what they were doing were common, but changes to the overall economy which changed it to something else were not common. So 'revolution' didn't really mean much. This was suspect. Still, after over a century, socialism was something of a damp squib - a movement that meant nothing, a word that meant little, a revolution that meant less than Ron Paul's, and the hope that some group might take them somewhere. Obviously, whether they wanted this depended on where they wanted to go. But this neutralisation benefitted the 'socialists,' and meant they were not distanced from the system - so why would they complain? The socialist movement was primarily a mirage, where buzz-words were everything and politics and such almost nothing.

Being outside of reformism was not as easy as saying so. A cosmetic change is cosmetic - although it can be presented in various ways, it need not be so. Ultimately, if you start from a given social system, and are plausibly locked in discourse with it, everything you're dealing with is actually capitalist. You could propose things which are compatible with socialism, such as, 'Birds can still fly,' or, 'People could still fall down ladders,' but these could be possible under other systems. These are merely illustrative, but are just as valid as most of the more 'sophisticated' portrayals of socialism. Most traits of 'socialism' are reducible to these. Socialism, of course, was what was to be contrasted to capitalist reality, and in this sense was an ideal or if you like an aim. If an ideal was fundamental to capitalism, it would be present and fully realised somewhere in capitalism, as Marx often noted in some way, unless socialism or some other external system were getting in the way. Otherwise it could hardly be that fundamental, if it may be eschewed and capitalism remain what it is at all. Many words which Marx used are mere tautologies when used outside of their specific context - all conflicts involve 'contradictions,' and as Hegel observed in dealing with motion only a contradiction with something essentially outside of a moment could dissolve it, while things like the 'law of value' in some form or other were common before Marx, and other things in the book even in context are merely vague generalities that could mean anything. In addition to this, he repeatedly calls on Hegelian concepts without giving the reader any clear suggestion of what they are to mean here, which might work in shorthand as with Marx's comments on calculus, but in a longer work just means that he's persistently relying on Hegel to gratuitously fill in the gaps in his own work. We are to just assume that the author has a similar take on Hegel, if people are to read Marx in these sections, when of course these small phrases can permit of interpretation.

Ultimately, precisely because it put too much emphasis on use-values, the law of value would disappear from the field - people did not want too much focus on specific things and how they are valued, which would disturb the act of creating values irrespective to content. Hence, this section of Marx remained unpopular among most social strata, often proclaimed something that people should avoid despite Marx using it to put forward the framework of his system. Inviting people to just throw themselves at the rest of a book without knowing what it means specifically is literally just asking for the kinds of objections commonly given to the book. A fair few people read Das Kapital - but they ultimately rejected it. For a bible, Marxism had only the Manifesto, which is a short work that at least shares with the Bible that it veers from its initial direction to something quite different. This is a short work written on request, which is not an attempt at anything too dramatic or developed, but merely a short presentation. People don't read Marx for explanations, they read it so that they can see what his problem is with everything they do. In general, then, the illusion of sides - socialism and capitalism - is imputed onto Marx's texts, in the manner of foreign imposition and for the entertainment of the viewer, in general vulgarised or hostile readings of it such that Marx is neatly placed into their own drama. These then seem clear, when they are not. A similar thing happens to the Bordigist text, except in a more modern context.

The general orientation of such a movement against the capitalist social system would be clear: it would be in constant and persistent conflict with them, within and without its own territory. It is a movement against this, that cannot simply let it standing without becoming a movement for something else. But then, national conflict can itself be amorphous, so the angle from which it did this would be important. In this, people don't like to talk about the politics of a nation (a political entity), but instead about atomised social units, which definition cannot of course be led to socialism by the 'anarchy of the market.' As such, there are so to speak multiple barriers to this being clear, and it is quite a difficult path. There is a firm contrast between statements of the form, 'Socialism is compatible with...' which could still have socialism itself be anything, and actually delineating socialism. Socialism is hence made to stand for something which is vaguely seen as good, as sharing the positive traits that other things also display, rather than divided from these things or aggressive about opposed systems. It is hence in the context of 'socialist unity' not a political movement at all, but instead a vague positive association, free to be conferred upon other things as well. A side fighting only in self-defence do not want to fight particularly, so they are weak - but only if the opposing side is particularly different in agenda, or has a notable motivation of some sort, as otherwise they will not be able to force the issue. Socialism might try in some way to attack the established order over a prolonged time, but will usually hence after any initial inroads be forced onto the defensive repeatedly, as a result of its being too similar.

In general, then, the boundaries between something which was and was not a part of the system was not clearly set forward by the word 'socialism,' or by common views on it. It could mean almost anything, depending on the personal quirks of the person whose socialism it was. On might hence derive, however, that socialism generally involved a limited interest in escaping from the society it was in. We mean this, of course, not in the sense of 'escapism,' which is idle - nobody wants to escape, and then doesn't enact this -, but instead in the general sense of a fundamental alteration. But socialism of all forms had certain common characteristics - it was associated with 'goodness' of various sorts, with happiness, with alleviation of 'ills,' with servants rather than masters, and so on from there. After the Second World War, all of this was in a sense discredited, so with the passing of the Soviet Union the few remaining stalwarts such as an obscure clause in the Labour Party's constitution which seemingly didn't make a socialist impression and others became idle and faded away. These traits could occur either in partial gains or be restricted to a pseudo-radical political change. Stalinists or 'Marxists-Leninists' associated socialism with traits attributed to the domestic association of the Soviet Union, such as efficient and strict labour, which made them able to show up in places where other currents often didn't, but also with some of the classic traits. Stalinism is hence mostly taking the traits of Western capitalism, such as wages, and then trying to show how exalted they are by taking on a Stalinist Russian form. It is the ideology of peaceful co-existence. Stalinism generally shuns anything too radical for it, albeit gradually and after the tacit acceptance that they give to 'socialists' and people who seem appropriate to this movement.

The sun sets and rises, but does the threat feared in Nazism remain through this, is this basis of evil present throughout? It generally only seems to arise when social conduct or alternatively human expression is concerned. Outside of this, how do people reassure themselves that they have a sense of good and evil? Their whole frame of reference shatters. Mostly, to people, good and evil were things that spur feelings, which hence have to be encountered in some form. But what happens when the link to this becomes missing? And this could be a problem for conservatism of the traditional sort, as time went on - people increasingly faded out and became amoral, unconcerned about their values. Yet this threat is always present, because social interaction and the presence of these ideas of evil is only experienced in the form of some particular, limited community or neighbourhood, yet this has always the danger of external elements which wish to enter - which are defined by their externality and being outside of this - and which threaten it. Hence, the movement against immigration was in a sense always likely. But this only occurs in a time when the major political currents have become idle - one is merely a vehicle for identity and dynastic politics, and the other has been replaced in its own Party. There are no more firm boundaries, and what does a nation mean when a significant proportion of it want someone elected essentially for their surname? Is it that different from the others? Still, if Nazism frightens them, it also lets them all into contact with it. It has a notable element which is not political, which hence undermines the political element. But then, so does most 'socialism.'

Hence, as we said, a denationalised and depersonalised ideology is necessarily in some ways a part of the system, hypostatised elsewhere. This describes most of socialism. But it can barely escape the halo that capitalism gained over time, a halo being something which it had often relied on. It hence became idle. To separate from the system, and posit a goal outside of it, meant to depart from this system briefly. But socialism rarely wished to do this - people joined socialism if they did mostly only because it made them happy already, when their goals were not yet set outside of the system socialism was their favoured of such goals. No difficulty was suggested. It was more like an expedition or road trip than a serious interest. But over time it became a very brief road trip. Ultimately, when 'evil' was ever-present, something that flaunted its credentials as such only to continually reduce to some warped exercise in being 'good' was a mere mirage, leading in directions which led nowhere. It could affect some people, but mostly it was not political; the left was just a way of doing penance to the UN.