On The Organisation of Nations in War

In times of present but limited war, especially, it was necessary to calm people and remind them that daily life was to be continued as in other states - to an extent. You could not merely start anew after the war, with people unused to acting in this manner. A long, involved war would get rid of a nation attempting this, who instead requires war to be waged quickly if it is to survive. A situation of passive, lengthened war would generally also lead to alterations that aren't easily revoked, or the necessity of attacking anything else that might seem objectionable.
In general, this repurposing in times of war is especially pronounced when it surrounds war work and the possibility of being used as soldiers. Hence, others - separated from this - were generally necessary if a nation was to survive a war while retaining some explicit continuity, and this would be produced inevitably on the event of a war. In this sense, war was a central event in the life of nations, and of course a nation which was easily attacked would likely be threatened.

However, alongside this, there was also the necessity of keeping continuity elsewhere. In this, states like the USA which were separated from others generally had an advantage, at the expense of being press-ganged into a pattern of continual war which they could not escape. In this sense their interventions since then have been a necessary continuation of their actions in the world wars, and the dynamic shift in this.

In general, over time most of the Western nations - including Russia - have been caught up in this process of continual war. They will not, of course, attack things which they like much - like most of these other Western nations. Of course, for this pattern to be incorporated into a nation generally requires that the people being repurposed assent to it, and hence generally requires support from populist factions in the nation. Hence, nations like Britain only more recently fully committed to this direction, nonetheless this required help from the USA and subservience to their 'conservative' Presidency, which they had to have close relations with and whose view on them was in a sense much more important than that of the British politicians. Britain could not actually form an independent politics, despite its own illusions.

In general, then, there are various areas of a nation that participate in a war. As such, when a nation is attacked, the need will come for these to be detached from the war somehow - this applies for instance to people functioning for the war effort, and in general those where the continuity is highly uncertain. This detached form is unlikely to threaten the rest of the nations, who respond aggressively, or it is ultimately forced into co-operation. 'Rebellious' communities which decry their being attacked by others rather than left there are quite hypocritical - they are effectively declaring a fight against these nations, on some level and perhaps a limited one, and hence of course likely to be attacked and possibly taken out. The overall result of this is that temporary formations which are detached from the nation generally are necessary if it is to be kept on track with the overall system, and shelter it from war. These will generally remain within one nation or other, but if the war comes too close or they are caught in the 'heart of the storm' or the centre of this dynamic, then they will generally detach from both of these to some extent, and try to form isolated communities to assure people of this continuity. This will generally be more likely to occur when the war is milder in nature, or this continuity can be easily drawn upon.

In general, then, nations which are in notable war or caught up in the process are likely to be victimised by elements within them, elements which however will not relate offensively to the others or which are not really 'revolutionary' - sometimes even in intent. Of course, these forces are either not interested in the nation, or take on a 'nationalised' form - in which case their conscious formation around a lack of wartime 'patriotism,' despite their attempting to take on this 'patriotic' or national form, presages their undoing. Such patriotism must in the future be manufactured in a highly artificial manner, so far as such conditions are concerned. However, generally, these break-away elements cannot easily be integrated with the rest of the nation, as this is not their function: it presupposes some opposition between them and the nation, somewhat in spite of itself, which is still to be worked out, and might take the form of their repression until the nation can return to functioning. However, if the nation allies too easily with 'normal' foreign elements, it will undermine its own position in this return to functioning.

However, ultimately this tendency among the nation did not serve to improve it, and sometimes turned against its war effort. This lack of commitment could be fatal. Sometimes, the state would be forced to clear them away, in order to resume its nationhood as something separate and fortified. In addition, because these elements took place at around the point where people might hope to gain entrance to official roles or elsewhere, they could easily forestall any mobility in the state, which it then had to make up for somehow through the replacement of its officials. This tendency, separating itself from the nation's war effort in order to maintain continuity, was one which did not cling to a definite tendency or doctrine. However, it was ultimately characterised by its finitude and hypothetical nature - it was attempting to keep continuity with some hypothetical ending of the war, when it would flow back into the rest of society - and hence was in itself weak and indefinite. In Russia, for instance, this tendency had decisively entered the nation by the time of Tsar Nicholas II, where coronation events could easily turn into stampedes for food, and in general required exposure and addressing. By the time this tendency had overrun a nation on its own part, if such were possible, it would in all likelihood have lost a war - and a nation so divided will either see one side fall, or both. Hence, in general, such nations as were in major war - something quite common in the 19th Century, and taking a significant part in the early 20th Century, but then more sparse and partial as time went by - led to certain functions in them which were realised in accordance with the stage of the war. These could have notable political consequences, but were always in a sense subordinate.

The Organisation of Capitalist Politics

Capitalist politicians are subjected, like all other jobs, to the market. As such, along with capital, they are put into subjection to the people in general, of any tendency. As in the market, they count each voter the same, and the more people pay the price, the more they get paid. Hence, capitalist society in general is organised democratically, across its length - demands pertaining to democracy by itself will not go beyond reformist hopes. However, this also opens up other strictures or dynamics in the political scene.

Firstly, this leads to a necessary populistic trend in politicians of any country. In a sense, the more open the market in a country, the stronger this populistic tendency. However, this trend is highly eclectic and distracts from each nation's particular role in the world economy - hence, it forms a somewhat necessary exhaust in the form of states like Cuba or Bolivia. The US do take some umbrage at these nations, but because their own politicians are in a sense just as subject to populistic trends, that these trends are given some form of expression among the 'league of nations' is found necessary.

Secondly, there is conflict in the political sphere not only between political tendencies - which, so far as they exist in favour of capital, serve the same masters and hence have only trivial distinctions - but also between the political itself and the position of politics as a job where the politician must be subject to every popular whim. Authors and other such ideological functions of capital will generally tend in favour of the latter - they will attempt to steer politics into the form they are familiar with. However, when political movements occur, politicians are forced to adjust to this new political landscape, and hence to prioritise the political on some perhaps limited level. This will usually be met with resistance, as is noticeable in the case of the Labour Party under Corbyn. Nonetheless, this struggle against market intrusions in politics is in a sense the most important duty for politicians under capital, who are otherwise subject to the same forces and ultimately to the economy.

In general, the political realm tends towards the stricter ideas or the hints of them in politics. American politics is often quite hollow in this - many seemingly 'strict' ideas are merely quibbles over words. In British politics, while Corbyn's supporters have raised several highly strict views, they are expected to not only be pleased with but welcome people who have opposed them for months to years to the helm of the Party, and then aid them in propagandising against themselves. This is a highly absurd situation that could not be reached without many concessions. It nonetheless has many of the characteristics of a farce, primarily on the part of the 'Labour Right,' whose essential purpose is to attack even any mention of socialism. As such, it is not a surprise that, in dealing with them, their opponents are attacked as 'unspeakably extreme,' anti-Semitic (a buzz-word used to avoid discussing politics), and so on - as opposed to the 'Labour Party,' which you could hardly recognise as the Party which has contained highly leftist gestures in its campaigning for quite some time. If socialism itself is treated as a 'bad word,' and a movement organised against this, then over time it becomes a slur, like anti-feminism or anti-Semitism, that can usually be dismissed as exploitation of a word for effect. Ultimately, Jeremy Corbyn's supporters as their aims stand only have impetus reasonably to either stay in the Party and campaign for their views, or to be shouted down and leave rather than campaigning against themselves. Otherwise, the Party increasingly refuses to take a political stand on the state - but this is not a problem to the opponents of Corbyn's movement, who often have no concern for politics and merely view it as a target for incursions of the market.

It is to be noted that politicians are aware of the general concept of vested interests. This is the means by which people whose fundamental concern is the market can get an 'in' in politics, by pretending to lack vested interests such that their comments inhabit some sort of fairy 'political' realm. Hence, for instance, they will pretend that their call for a pro-business agenda isn't a result of their present affiliation with these and present identification of their interests with business - it hence becomes a pseudo-political thing. This is, however, merely a question of demographic manipulation rather than political views as such - in order to off-set their appearance of vested interests, they will claim allegiance to charity or some other impoverished sector of society - albeit only nominal - in order to thus appear 'political,' and hence will be plunged into posturing. In general, if they are forced into personal conflict, they will come off looking bad, as it disarms them, but they might be defended or have their image white-washed due to vested interests in the reporting as well - which inevitably gets in where business was in charge of these things. Hence, in politics, there were many who so to speak took a 'back-door,' who were only 'political' or considered politically for politically illegitimate reasons. While their fundamental agenda was to preserve market incursions on politics and hence the laws of the market, as well as politics' inferiority to the market, this mostly personal agenda was given a seemingly political form by drawing on a different demographic, of whatever kind. Politics was merely a name given to the obscuring of a person, and was hence subordinated to the market. This is important to grasp in referring to how precisely this actual hierarchy functioned, or how political actors could assimilate this superiority of the market into political terms.

In general, capital was organised in such a way that the political was integrated into the economic, and could not escape. In this context, who was to quibble over whether politicians were 'corrupt'? If it's a job, under capital, it's corrupt. In any case, however, resistance to this in the political sphere or the realm of government over society was always present, in the circumstances. The general circumstance was that due to the general reduction of people to voters or to money by abstract labour, conflicting views necessarily appeared or were opposed to each other, and yet had to be treated as somehow uniform at the expense of abstracting from their inherent nature. This force of artificial uniformity of various forms may be called capital, and obviously had a certain bias against ideas which were more concrete in nature, found certain things more evil than others. In any case, the general struggle in the political sphere was one which could not under capitalism be kept within one state, where in general too many demands and atomised political careers existed in one state for it to form any form of political coherence or coherent existence in a nation, and this kept these politicians in place, such that they had to be exported partially to other nations in order to keep some limited sense of national differentiation. Outside that, political forces which could not be fit elsewhere would necessarily take state form, a weakness of this multifarious political form. In general, politics in this situation was for most participants about the atomised economic actor, and traits of theirs which could be abstracted, and hence was ultimately an identity politics centred around the traits which, as an atomised and economic, or physical, entity, they have. For the most part, politics structured around the abstract actor in whichever guise ultimately had to attack any opposed forces as incoherent if it was to be maintained at all, because it could not deal with them concretely without drawing on random, brief phrases which ultimately amounted to the same thing.

On Genre: Details

Genre is a matter of taking sounds and fitting them into a certain pattern. They don't admit people who stay outside of this.
People who don't might just fit into 'progressive' or 'country' niches.
Hence, genres subordinate sounds to a certain pattern or sound.
A work which remains in one genre is by nature partial, as it excludes other sounds and their meaning.
Some genres may be excluded as illegitimate, but few posit only one legitimate genre. Genres are types, not inherently views.
Genres hence presuppose sounds to be subordinated or arranged. These must exist outside of the genre.
These are independent pieces of music, not actually raw materials. They must be their own sounds, which can then be used, if their aim were to be genre music then they could not attain this because their whole point is to form music without this formation into patterns. If their direction were these patterns, they could not be formed.
This non-genre music should generally be looked at as the basis for the formation of every genre.
Genre is generally an early question when music is to be made. If it is made without genre, then it is in a progressive or obscure country niche. Hence, this is not how most music is made.
The two general, and opposed, directions of music, are: progressive music, or music which is sounds without a clear harness, and pop music, which merely subjugates sounds to the will of others or divests it of its internal existence, which is music made without concern for the musical content. Between these lies genre music, which modifies sounds instead by patterns, along with whatever else. Progressive music, however, can still have pop tendencies, especially if it is to be used for such: these, however, are not merely musical, but social resonances or a question of the musician's relation to social institutions like pop music filtering into the music. The pop music elements must enter in pseudo-organically, or through the musician's experience of that genre.
Politics has several different 'genres,' or aesthetics. Liberalism is not a political theory, generally, but an aesthetic. Of course, even being based on theoretical works need not make something a political theory, as this requires that the political view be thoroughly integrated into this, but it is at least an attempt.
From where does politics derive? Ultimately, from people's interaction with the society they are in, at whatever level and in whatever institutional context is offered. This forms so to speak the raw material of politics. Political 'genres' merely subjugate this to a certain 'sound,' as it were.
It is only political because they are in some way distanced from this society. This also includes its political forces. Hence, political 'genres' are all in a sense hollow. There are no tribes, there are only different people.
Politics in a sense creates an isolated realm, however, where this division does not exist in usual conduct. Politics implies an overall perspective on this society, and not just being a part of it of whichever kind, and hence requires this isolation. However, elsewhere these people do not have an automatic immunity from interaction with people who are not 'political' as such, and hence could face a more hostile atmosphere.
As all political genres are in a sense united, and also in a sense detached from the political, the suggestion arises of a way of evading these. They are all possibly hostile - if devoid of course of their general dynamic which means that they have some elements which relate positively to the political - to all political actors.
When the political is directly welded to the politics of genre, to form a new political current alongside the others, it will generally be inconsistent. Nonetheless, it will generally appear as some sort of 'third way,' but is really just a form of politics identified with a person, which they allow to be diluted into the politics of some current and Party.
Political currents diverge due to demands from the world from their 'founders.' This applies in essence and in specific points. Those which are named after a person should therefore not be assumed to have any correspondence to them.
However, this eventually congeals into systematic, promulgated divergence, or continual disagreement with these people. In general, then, as indifference to their own claimed political beliefs, which indifference is made programmatic. People interacting with this political belief therefore need some sort of excuse as to why these people are so indifferent to their own views. As providing these excuses would involve more honest political polemic against the current than its own people are usually able to provide, the task of furnishing these excuses is given to people of some other current, who then are listed as their official 'nemeses.'
Hence, opponents of Marxism contain those who oppose it on principle, and another current which merely claim some distance from it - those who claim disenfranchisement after the fall of Russia, for instance, or which merely claim that some aspect of it will be difficult. These are often inconsistent - they take Marxism and a Marxist perspective for granted in some way, and then seek to oppose it, as they are ultimately merely external elements forced into detailed engagement with it of some, albeit highly qualified form, and hence closer to it than most Marxists, and trying to weasel their way out of this to discourse with Marxists. Hence, what they tend to come out with from there is highly simplified, because it is merely an attempt at an excuse for others.
The presentation of Das Kapital is in a sense inherently likely to be knocked down - it has the generosity to look at their system and present it as a general existent, and yet they are left free to just clean a couple of stains and then seem free of Marxism. Hence, the modus operandi of just taking slight issue with small things in the hopes of taking down the whole Marxist system has a sanction within Marxism.
In a way, Marxists will join in on this when they need to dilute Marxism by swathing it in their uncertainty so that they can use it for whatever they are doing, but this is derived from currents who stand apart from it and can as such do this unremittingly. They hence rely on these currents to allow them to twist Marxism to suit their own ends - and when texts are clearly presented, diverging from them casually and without reference to it would usually be difficult - and hence these currents are in a sense merely performing the double service of a) providing excuses for divergence, b) providing means for further divergence. This is important in grasping why often irrelevant currents come to take on a seeming importance in these political circles which is more than their fairly meagre divergences would seem to suggest.
If these currents interact in detail with Marxism, their popularity is unlikely to be major - the general operation of the system can't allow for continually considering such problems it might perhaps have. However, this implies that while they will take issue with such small aspects of Marxism, their affinity with Marx on more notable issues of sociology and so on was more notable than that of most Marxists. This is required for the sustained engagement with Marxism. Hence, they are notably inconsistent, mostly, and often need to twist definitions of Marxism in order to have this function at all - as such, they can usually be disputed with on this basis first and foremost. Nonetheless, if amongst this noise made about something quite different their objections seem relevant to Marxism, despite being objections to something else, in all likelihood Marxism guided them there itself.
Hence, someone who took objections with Marxism from saying for instance that Das Kapital didn't list every commodity existing at the time, from which it made derivations, or that Kapitalizmus didn't actually involve capitalist mice, would generally remain quite immune to it or would be unlikely to be convinced by it. These examples are somewhat facetious, nonetheless they are accurate. The problem with these is that they cannot safely assimilate Marxist imagery and dialogue, and hence are so to speak cut off from many things expected of people. Most politicians or citizens generally tended to assimilate Marxist imagery of unity, etc., easily, and hence could all easily pretend that there was no threat from this external force. Still, this method was generally appropriate to dissuade Marxism, .
However, the problem is that Marxist critiques of capital are also generally partial in this manner. For instance, it takes up Proudhonist critiques, but jettisons the adherence to the law of value as the strict principle of criticism, and likewise takes up some criticism of conditions of capitalism or with its formation which does not draw on its fundamental traits or contrast this with those it wished to establish. It often merely alludes to a problem, or throws out imagery suggesting a problem, but does not go beyond this. In this sense, Marxism is ultimately identical to this opposing force, and raises the same issues, often quite explicitly. They are hence found in identity, as with the Soviet Union, Britain and the USA, standing only against this stream of disparaged and disliked imagery. The Soviet Union was, however, forced into fairly strict opposition to these, which in a way Marxism did not prepare for - it was still quite passive and not that strict or oppositional. Hence, the Soviet Union had to draw on a different force.
The Soviet Union knew that it would have to engage in serious opposition in some form early on in order to form any kind of state, but Marxists were often sensitive to this especially because it was so important to their critique of capitalism that it did this - hence it found itself abandoned from the off by Marxism as such, and had to look elsewhere. Many Marxists had been urged to just look at this section, the one that would condemn any new 'Marxist' state or nation, etc. Nonetheless, it still had a nominal adherence to Marxism, which didn't differentiate it from Marxism generally.
While politics proper is substance, genre is in essence form. Genres of politics, like liberalism, are so to speak only so many experiences for those who interact with them, or a template for viewer interaction with them. Hence, they can as it were be generated automatically when viewers interact with them. You might hence wish to avoid them. Otherwise, they can spin out in defiance of the political and the viewer, as an independent community that will soon turn against them.
Liberalism is capital's attempt to appeal to people's emotions, while conservatism knowingly presents a harsher face although it can also pander to them. Hence, more 'major' conservative politicians historically have, in recent times, generally existed in either a Cold War scenario, where they can be contrasted with the Soviet Union to the point where liberalism and conservatism were essentially identical, or through appealing to liberal but apolitical aesthetics like 'feminism,' as occurred in part in Britain. Others have only emerged in more recent times, and are known for expressing in part the disdain of the organic political realm for liberalism. These elements have hence faced much opposition in the Republican Party, and eventually been derided and knocked aside in the form of Ted Cruz, etc. Britain was a thoroughly liberal state which had little political life, compared to the USA. They were hence leaning on the USA. The more liberalism allows for money to signify various additional activities which can be carried out freely, the more capital has an incentive to invest in money as such rather than consumption of particular things - however, the more that capital consumes, the more it tends back towards liberalism. Money, though it might not mind hemming in conservatives, ultimately does not wish to continue going up to them - with all of its possibilities open - and saying, 'hit me.'
The Soviet Union gained a modicum of stability as a force of opposition by not going in a liberal direction primarily. This is important, as otherwise it would have easily collapsed into this comfortable liberalism and fallen into a regular capitalist state. Instead it remained somewhat disciplined and distant from these, rather than just allowing for them and falling into line immediately.
Religion deals, instead of with a specific group of people, with a generic mass of them. It is hence often more vague than politics. Nonetheless, it does attempt to look towards a certain group or type, which is exalted, and in this it can overlap with the political. When it is too distant from a political view, as in most Christianity, it tends to reduce to a merely nominal 'religion' where nobody can cast aspersions on the religion of others so long as they call themselves a 'Christian,' which ultimately renders it meaningless.
As said, genres tend to derive from organic music of some kind, which generally makes it recognisable. The opening of Paramore's 'Misery Business,' indeed a miserable track, resembles Alder-era Fates Warning if they were rather awful. Curiously, it sounds somewhat akin to 'Parallels,' which is aptly named in this sense.  Admittedly, earlier tracks like 'Silent Cries' are seemingly sidetracked by this kind of thing. Likewise, 'The Road Goes on Forever' is based on a similar theme and vocal sound to Blue's 'Breathe Easy.' However, these are all made uniform by genre, which trivialises any worth of the original sound, usually.
Genre music has a limited number of possibilities. If music weren't an established thing, you couldn't have pop music - hence, genre music has to be produced so to speak arbtrarily. However, pop music cannot generally risk basing its claims for appeal on putting itself above these other forms of music or vaunting about being different and not as abrasive, because this risks cutting out this ground beneath it. Bands that do this often will tend to rely on an image which revolves comparatively less around musical factors, as occurs with bands like Paramore or occasional transitions between acting (usually for children) and music. Seemingly people think it apt that pop music and children's films be closely associated.
Often, genres will tend to run into each other. To differentiate, they will hence need to be highly one-track, or keep to one very particular sound in order to remain even seemingly distinct. This applies to many sub-genres and smaller, similar genres. The problem is that many bands within these will vary from the other form of music only as much as one form of track, like an anthem, will vary from another form of track, like a ballad or interlude, on another band's album.
Christianity generally latches itself onto other things, like musical genres or reality TV shows, and pretends to be a different type of them. Of course, it is not so just because they enter the genre. A 'Christian' reality TV show like Duck Dynasty is just an ordinary reality TV show assimilating religious themes. There is unlikely to be any serious interaction with religious themes. It hence requires some pseudo-conservative sentiments, which are however tamed and damped-down by interacting with the show, but also Sadie Robertsons and the like to dilute the show generally. Obviously, 'Keeping Up With the Kardashians' violates many religious tenets or at least sensibilities, and hence requires some form of 'religious' reality TV show to arise at some point to excuse this active flouting of religious and most other standards. Christianity is beholden to the same standards as most other genres, who are filled with religious people whose music will hence inevitably reflect their religious views if these are notable at all. Of course, if actual Christians made music in such contexts, they would come into conflict with Christian bands and listeners generally, who would like their Christianity diluted at this point and would not appreciate attempts to disturb their pseudo-Christian harmony by asserting early Christian strictness.
Other religions, like Islam or Sikhism, are more rarely associated with this use. Islam is a political religion, and hence can look at this world 'with sober senses' and without having to set up 'genres' of each form of music to interact with it - it can also be far more critical of them, because it does not simply colonise each of them.
The category of 'musical genre' is ultimately a highly limiting one, because it does not describe the organic content of the music. Nonetheless, it is how art is categorised. Any further categorisation requires drawing on other realms, and is not found merely within art.
Political genre is in many ways reducible to art or to hollow 'banners and sounds,' but nonetheless contains some interaction with the political or is not merely restricted to the artistic. Nonetheless, it is at a distance from the political as such, and hence ultimately reduces to a foreign intrusion into politics. In this sense, while artistic genre at least expresses an aspect of art, politics cannot be treated in the same way without being cheapened. Popular politics was no more of interest than the Teen Choice Awards.
Genres like Alternative were substantial entities, like 'nu metal' in a way, nonetheless they were mostly defined with reference to the listener's experience and associations with it, rather than being musically wholly cut off from popular rock tendencies. This was nonetheless distorted to the point of being a different genre, but this was in a sense more a template for listeners than otherwise. In this, it filled a certain niche which was not specifically musical in nature, though it was aesthetic - it took the tropes of popular music, etc., and then distorted them to fit a mood more of depression, lowliness and sadness. In the process, their musical tendencies were distorted to something quite different, nonetheless despite trying to cut itself off it never went further than attempting to do so, it was not really cut off from popular music per se.
This sort of distorting niche is something which tends to arise at certain points in time, in various forms. In general, it is merely a single motion irrespective of the specifically artistic form and revolving instead around moods and social situations (or isolation), and hence this niche could usually only be filled once in terms of pop cultural or political categories. It takes the form of a genre.
This form of music, etc., exists to accommodate situations where the popular forms of music are played, but the situation and such does not at all suit this. The resulting distortions are hence set down as a genre.
There are similar political tendencies, which can take on the same characteristics as normal politics, but then play them back from a different location in a similar way. While ultimately quite similar, they nonetheless will tend to be an available niche. However, when they are active, they will obstruct the progress of alternative music, and so on. If they are active, they generally imply sources which are more radical than them, as well as situations, which hence interact with things from a position further than merely distorting them. Generally, these are less radical than Alt in terms of interaction with the world around them or the perspective implied on them, but nonetheless imply some sort of difference in this somewhere or they would not arise. In general, this niche can only be filled by one field, but that can be aesthetic, political, or otherwise.
Fields can hence at times distort into other things, and in a sense these other fields are then created to accommodate these distortions. Hence, there are many genres of things which involve a lot of display and processing rather than actual focus, because they don't have much point.
In politics, for people to be said to be charismatic or to have a 'way with words' essentially implies as the latter term explicitly acknowledges that they take words from elsewhere and put them together in an artificial and inorganic way. If they were saying something of political substance that they understood, they would not have a 'way with words,' as they would not be manipulating words from elsewhere into a pattern. This can easily be seen instead, if they attempt to put forward any real politics, as awkwardly trying to shout out things that they 'read somewhere,' taking credit for them in some underhanded way, and hence they would be both awkward and called out on it. This would not be seen as a 'way with words.' Instead, they would have to be saying little of political substance, and hence could not have a consistent and focussed opposition, rather merely taking words already accepted and spewing them out. They hence attempt to take some political genre, such as socialism or and then further subjugate it to genre, which however is not in actuality possible. These figures are accommodated by the pseudo-genre of identity politics as well as, in a limited way, liberalism, and hence tend towards these. Generally, they can be associated with some such identity political trend.
A form of politics was usually not defined primarily by its relation to identity politics, but elsewise, by political criteria. This is the only accurate way of considering matters. Identity politics is a matter of identifying with a certain demographic, as if this matters. It obscures the person and their politics. Nonetheless, often political genres could co-exist with identity politics in particular authors, who would in a sense attempt to differentiate themselves by their own aesthetic, which results from this occasional interruption of identity political elements. This hence takes the political genre they have subjugated the content to, and further distorts it into something they can claim their own. However, this is misleading, as political genre is inherently a distortion of the organic and individualised categories of organic political material, into something which obscures this, and hence at this point they have moved away from individuality rather than towards it.
If a political system or form of beliefs encompasses all of these levels of politics - having elements of the organic, elements of genre, and elements of identity politics - then it will in all likelihood involve dual authorship, but nonetheless can be taken quite far in almost any direction, and can be taken more or less in the same direction so far as substance is concerned as can any other political system which involves these three levels. This is limited, somewhat strictly in a way, by the identity politics aspect, which while it might seem accessible creates a certain barrier to any individual attempting to take this form of politics further, and ultimately is merely a restriction to be left behind and which otherwise limits how far this new direction can be taken. Certain communities sympathetic to these ideas may be more or less exclusive, at a given time period. This hence means that all of these forms - those which involve all three levels - can be taken in similar directions, but with different phrasing.
As the levels are in some ways inimical, dual authorship is necessary to these forms, in various ways.
Reality TV shows are a question of taking some form of situation that the audience is used to, and then forming it into a genre. It hence represents the category of genre quite well. Genre texts usually rest on the impact of such sections. Reality TV shows are all about imposed patterns. If they need to impose patterns over Christianity to sell it as a reality TV product, then they will do that, which is a tendency at odds with the religion. Likewise, the use of pop music alongside politics will generally overshadow it, unless the politicians are accepted as essentially conduits of this industry and what it represents, as a mode of politics whose only distinction is selling it. As conservatism is too strict for its politics to be 'sold' in the usual mode, unless they are also sacrificed in the process, this will usually tend towards liberalism.
In general, genre hence relies on musical content, but in some ways departs from it. As such, genres of it like 'pop music,' which are only distinguished as pseudo-genres by their departure being to attempt to subjugate this musical content wholly to others, will ultimately end up unstable or subjugated to these content. This, however, relies on the specific nature of the content, of whichever sort. In general, politics is an ethical pursuit, and hence you should not expect actual political content to be accessible to people, or understood, regardless of this. The point is not that the reader can claim to something just because they have claimed to read the text, but that their reading of it and what they can understand so far is important - otherwise, you have the general situation where a text is merely a means for others to steal credibility. A person's credibility is their own. In any case, certain political tendencies are highly vulnerable, and will generally meet with immediate objections, so you don't want these people to be able to claim also to have read it and be able to dismiss a whole form of politics because of it. While Platforms and such are generally immune to this because they speak on behalf of some Party rather than on behalf of a specific politics, they are not always so if they claim to any more than this. As such, political works without genre would usually exist in interaction and not merely serve people up instant gratification as if the politics were some form of drug injection, and hence would appear quite difficult to read comparatively.

Puritans in the USA

The Puritans were a facet of US society, if we may call it that retroactively, that quickly gave way and often in modern musical parlance 'sold out' in favour of more open religions. Nonetheless, they have a symbolic reference in the USA - the modern USA was in a sense constructed as against the Puritans, and many of its images are quite empty and only have impact due to being contrasted to something considered 'more objectionable.' A state identity which is based only on feeling slightly less of something than another, is one which resembled this USA: highly dynamic or contested politically, if only in appearance, and at the same time reliant on posturing and perhaps expansionism to remain in this mode. In lieu of strict adherence to anything, this America has only a lack of political strictness as a state - to allow for the economy to run freely, and interact with the people freely on the market - compared to for instance dictatorial nations, and a place which only seems 'better' than other places and by itself is a void without determinate character. It was hence inevitable that capital would eventually gravitate towards the centrality of such a democratic state with such emphases, and just as much that dictatorial states trying to keep up would have to turn increasingly to anti-capitalist ideas of the time, with whatever results.

But the Puritans have a reputation which could be misleading. Many nations, indeed most of the major ones, have a tradition of earlier communities and ideas which are branded in much the same ways as Puritanism: strictly governed, 'prudish,' strict about adultery (although marital vows are still quite 'strict' about forbidding this - if people want society to marry them, why do they want it to pretend that it never did this and what it says means nothing?), religious, handing out punishment easily, and so on. In this sense, the Puritans merely represented, and in a sense constructed, an image of earlier communities regularly attacked in many nations from India to Britain.

However, if nations are able to use this as against things like the USSR, and indeed all threats that come against it, to make it its watchword of sorts as a bastion against new political threats, then it is clear that what is feared about the Puritans is actually whatever they might represent about a future society, albeit to a limited extent and on a past basis. Hence, pointing out that the Puritans were attempting to cleave to tradition is a double-edged sword - it still leaves the persistent threat of the Puritans in stark display, and hence may be taken as threatening. America has over the years smeared its enemies almost mechanically with the same epithets, and expected to derive enthusiasm from this - whether they were the Nazis, the Soviet Union, the Middle Eastern nations, and if perhaps they were aliens, the same old line would be drawn out. This is deceptive longevity: it ultimately derives its seeming enthusiasm from saying to its people, 'go on with whatever you are doing, and we will support this as a state' - a rather embarrassing juxtaposition, given the cultural traits its people are renowned for - or in brief because of people's interest in their own temporary pleasures and interests, and the seeming renewal provided by this which is actually irrelevant to the political statement itself, but as soon as the statement and propaganda is put into stark relief as a political statement it becomes empty. It is in a sense a mere mirage. Politically, it does not appear substantial - cynicism about America ran rampant elsewhere. It in a sense requires the increasing subjection of political to 'economic,' of the overall social regulation to anyone's lives and actions, and this to ever-heightening levels.

Nonetheless, if the Puritans express something common to most nations' official histories, why are they here concentrated or codifying this in one society? In a sense, they are constructing the history of a major nation, a nation which would be central to the world system, if primarily despite themselves. They are contributors to this new nation. To claim a direct implantation of a 'Puritan work ethic' on American society would be misleading: to 'work for God' and to 'work for money' are highly different things and highly different ideological statements. Even when it is used loosely, to refer to 'strict work which isn't enjoyable,' Americans are not expected to work except because it has 'enjoyment' attached in the form of money, which is quite different. In a way, the Puritans had their work and society expropriated and twisted into something wholly opposed to their intent, something which America in its identity felt quite comfortable positioning itself against continually and leaning on to define their nation by inversion. The USA could very much promote its whole populace - but it couldn't for all of its 'pluralism' do anything else but rail against the Puritans. It hence in a sense dug its own grave - it couldn't go beyond the 'Cold War,' and always had some conflict over positions in the Middle East, because trying to take a firm hold would reduce it to the robotic repetition of the same things as if to gain new enthusiasm each time, without any real basis for this enthusiasm. It was a parasite.

The Puritans hence invite the problem of a society where actions are not only inverted to foreign purposes, but taken away by forces that shall later constitute themselves as 'America.' The Puritans wished to form a religious state, but then were rendered unable to because this was too 'strict.' Lack of power corrupts absolutely, and the USA is a tribute to this.

However, the Puritans flowed quite smoothly into future societies, and hence were in a sense quite compromised. They also connected Britain to the USA - both their histories shared the Puritans as major 'antagonists' in the official retelling, and hence they were closely linked in terms of what they could easily oppose. A country's ideological enemies generally speaking need a historical basis, or the country has gone its whole time not being defined against this, and has to remake itself to face an enemy which isn't even its enemy as it is so far, which seems implausible for most notable nations. Hence, the link between the USA and Britain, despite being frayed earlier, dovetailed in the 1900s. As the Puritans started giving way to opposed tendencies, which they had always accommodated, and became in a way 'Americanised' as opposed to the religions they had sought to bring from Britain, so also Britain started to serve the less strict USA. This is misleading: Britain is in many ways laissez-faire, as its highest state position has little legislative power. Still, this is not something they can build an image around. The British state was too swathed in illusions to stand for anything, it could only stand still and cast these illusions if it was supported from elsewhere.


So then, were the Puritans that unique? In a way, yes: they were concentrated and modern. As an American historical figure, however, they have been surrounded by a certain mysticism. They were in many ways not that distinct in the traits usually pointed out. However, they were from the beginning compromised - they attempted to form a new society, without any detailed social theory, pretty much as they had experienced 'society' in previous states, with whoever was eligible (which could be anyone), but they also tried to take a stance against this form of society in various if limited ways. Hence, it involved conflicting elements. It could not do what it was trying at a given time. It constructed something that fought it, but that fought it with its own help. Their conflict was hence that between positivism - the acceptance of how things were in the general society, and its accepted implementation - and the ability to implement political and religious ideas of their own, or social regulation. This conflict continued to be major through the years. The Puritans were very much a question of observation - people saw things they disliked, and acted against this or on an opposed principle, but did not however have legislative power to initiate a direction fundamentally opposed to this. Yet, for these Puritans, the ensuing history of the state was in political terms something of a nightmare.

'Finding Jerry'

People generally were expected to proclaim strongly their own superiority, intellectually and generally, to one Adolf Hitler, who was leader of Germany in the 1940s and wrote books and speeches of generally more political depth than most modern politicians. Notably, their Party also declared war on the British Empire and Soviet Union. They were frequently expected to read Mein Kampf and be revolted immediately by how much better they were than it, how much it was below them. This was how they treated Hitler. However, Hitler was leader of Germany and a powerful statesman - and, guess what, the next day these same people would have to return to the ordinary life which compels this reaction to Hitler as under a knife, yet where they would willingly submit and show obeisance to any authority figure or person of wealth and stature. One might ask how they continue, when this contradiction seems manifest - although in a sense it merely follows that these people of whatever type are in no position to criticise Hitler for anything, or that Hitler has a partial immunity here. In general, it would seem to follow that for these things to be clearly harmonised and allowed for, it requires general incorporation into their lives. Hence, it isn't actually sufficient that they disapprove of Hitler completely - and can brush him off cheaply - and then go into an environment where this can be applied to anyone, but rather the authority figures must be validated in some way, must be automatically set apart from and against Hitler. This would only have been the case in the British (or, technically, the French - but they got not very far) army of the 1940s war. There, it was a group of people with an administrative set-up which was automatically and directly part of the struggle against Hitler, almost by proxy, and hence which offered - at least - a partial resolution of this conflict. As such, these people had to treat their workplace as so to speak the British Army against Hitler, as the continuance of this in modern times, where each member is a soldier serving the anti-Hitler cause and any member dissenting of this cause is likely to be cast aspersion upon and thrown out - which could not be done arbitrarily or as if Hitler were not somewhere present here.

This was only a partial security for these people, however. Of course, it was still inconsistent, given the capitalistic system that the British Army were fighting for and on behalf of, or in brief given the British nation of the time, and hence the only at all consistent solution was that of Gandhi - that Britain should submit and Nazi targets commit suicide like lemmings are often portrayed as doing. To be fair, Gandhi's cause was given significant momentum by Hitler's war, and as their primary cause benefitted from this side they had to have a certain sense of indifference to the war. While Nazism was an attempt to avenge German treatment and their apparently unfair loss of the war, Russia conversely was a state formed in retreat from opposing forces and hence which took refuge in the pre-existent template of 'socialist' politics, which however ultimately collapsed under opposition as was the inevitable result - due to the 'internationalism' of Second International socialism (Engels offered some contrast and had highly nationalistic tendencies at times), the Soviet Union exercised international  influence, but because of this it was gridlocked into the format of 'peaceful co-existence' and integrated into this international system, which made it idle as a point of opposition to this. A political system which is denationalised or has no clear link to a concrete representation is one which is idle or merely an existent economic category turned into a pseudo-political system; that is, unless it is merely an expression of an individual's temperament and thus cut off from others, but then it is in a way exclusive to this individual and people's evaluation of them. The natural form of realisation of a political system or viewpoint is the nation, or its demesne, and with no realisation of this a political system is idle or does not by itself have any viewpoint. A state forged in promises of retreat from this kind of assertion on the world is always likely to turn into something like the Soviet Union, as in a sense it is a mere shelter from war rather than a politically significant entity. As a state, it must call upon some political ideology - however, because it is formed through promises of retreat, this cannot be a mode of expression of the state, and hence must be denationalised and abstract. Nonetheless, Marxism must be one of the only systems to get essentially one chance to prove itself, while in conflict of course with the rest of the world and tendencies in a nation which want to co-operate with this - which is somewhat like saying that the lack of monarchs (or effective idleness of monarchs as a governing force, which is just a variation) failed de facto with Cromwell.

Socialism has many forms, and it might seem strange that everyone instantly accepts that Marxism is the only one which counts and the earlier and similar forms can be dismissed if it has problems, and likewise that after about half a century we could draw the conclusion that it could be thrown aside rather than amended or improved in any way - in brief, that even capitalism's supporters are Bordigists. You might suggest that there were many people during that time who did not want to give it a chance, and hence it had an uphill struggle.

In general, popular recent novels for instance have either originated in Britain or drawn upon British archetypes - the Hunger Games for instance drew upon the image of active resistance to some random 'totalitarian' forces, which is ultimately a British archetype, as well as grabbing and relying upon the archetypes of British authors like George Orwell. Hence, this sense of a British context was fairly inherent to them, because it means that people who dislike them can be safely dismissed rather than given increasing ground and allowed or encouraged. If you wanted to make noise about something, noise against it had to be hidden away or attacked, or it would just be a meaningless cacophany - which in a way it is anyway. The classics are not dry for no reason, they are dry so that they would not inspire strong negative feelings or aimless enthusiasm about the work of art in their case, and hence could take some sort of message forwards and last. Marx set themselves the task of not fading away like the fragile utopians, and as time went by had to take on an increasingly detached tone to avoid this at all costs. Recent British popular novels are just fake classics.

There may have been poetry after Auschwitz, but increasingly people did not read it. This is because poetry includes several mechanisms which lead to a somewhat dry approach to things, and this was eventually ruled out in the form of Nazism. It might be said that 'Bordiga's' approach to the Nazis was found offensive not because he said anything actually offensive for most of it - his generally attributed comments about the worst effects of fascism being anti-fascism are highly offensive to people, realistically, but they can still pretend to like him somehow - but because he wished to analyse it rather than merely give way to possibly opposed sentiments. Of course, if any analysis were to be made, however flawed - and Bordiga's analysis was highly flawed, in its attempt to assimilate the Nazis to Marxist categories which were least appropriate to them -, this required avoiding this sentimental mode for a moment. Hence, Bordiga was a victim of a social agenda of sorts that applied after the Nazis - everything had to be poetry after the Nazis. Poetry as an art form is simply the locking up of a person in the form of a poem, for other people to inspect, although it can view other things as higher than poetry and not accept this schema. People could no longer write things and expect instant reactions - it had to be vetted before anyone could react to it, and if people disagreed they would jettison it in shock. This didn't stop the Marxists, who if they read Marx generally only thought it of note to note down that they disagreed. But it could be said that, after Marx and Engels, the Marxist movement was pure poetry.

Admittedly, Mitchell Abidor's introduction to 'Auschwitz, the great Alibi' was somewhat strange, and read like a person who had no idea what they were intending to read (an analysis of the Holocaust in socio-historical terms) or indeed what Marxism involved. Perhaps they believed the academic reduction of Marxism to a bunch of phrases like 'class struggle,' and so were shocked when the Marxists started actually talking about things. They just wandered into this and then panicked. Still, Marxism by this point is like a sieve that people can move into and out of as they please, it is an art and not a determinate entity. People can disagree with Marx persistently and take a generally negative attitude towards their works, and yet still be Marxists, so long as they are discussing Marxism. It's a question of handling an aesthetic, not of anything particularly determinate. Now, this makes it almost inevitable that such texts are going to be attacked - they might assume that they have safety and can claim a certain obscure viewpoint, but if something is objectionable to society generally, just about anybody could just drop in and attack it, and the Bordigist text is hence a barely-moving target.

Evil is something relevant to all determinate action - that which is excluded is 'evil.' Hence, Nazism was relevant to almost all determinate action in capitalism: people either judged an evil or opposed thing by the standard of Nazism, or they just didn't get it. The latter is their problem, and not a problem with the text. Now, if people object to a text because they don't understand it, they will take issue with the next text to the same extent, because it will surprise them and they will be perturbed by it - this is a dynamic which becomes tiring quickly, and one might as well just offend them and get it over with. Because we know that this Bordiga has some claws at least, or can be offensive, if people don't get Bordiga then we can accept that they would be distanced from these people - they don't continually go into their texts with expectations that they will be catering to them and their interests and view, whatever these are. If this is not presented explicitly, then it gets tiring - although of course they might well get shunned for it.

In leftist groups, certain terms are buzz-words which can lead to rejection, but these are all that people get passionate about discussing. Continually discussing topics which have the threat of expulsion tied to them on some level is not something that people should continue with, or have to. But why would they do this? Multiple reasons. Firstly, non-Marxists weren't necessarily interested in Marxism, which is both offensive to what they believe and value, and also dry and involved; but they were fine with people who just wanted to take Marxism and make it a hardly different flavour of what they already did. Marxism was based on Hegel in some ways, and he was not one for presenting 'results' emptied out by eschewing the reasons and process behind them - and when this process was supposed to be an involved examination of interconnected economic categories, then, well, this could raise problems if it isn't to be abandoned completely. And when it's abandoned, you don't have Marxism, just phrases stolen from it and used without the same reasons, mere appearance and imagery without substance. People generally preferred that Marxism be a flavour of something compatible with capital, and hence when 'Marxism' was to be discussed - and in leftist groups or discussion generally this was an alleged focus, but it would be misleading to say that anybody cared about it - it was in this form and hence in a sense a foray out, where Marxism was not to be allowed to return without a threat of expulsion for whatever reason. While Marxist theory is a somewhat open field, Marxist discussion is like being walled in on various sides until discussing Marxism is no longer an option - they have a notably problem with discussing Marx, and relating other things back to Marxism is a bridge too far for them. Relating things back to them is essentially giving them a direction which draws the things which they like and find accessible off into the distance and far from where most people were comfortable. In addition, Marxism is something which is generally excluded from actual social life, or somewhat distanced from it, and hence in a sense if it is put into interaction with this social life then it is simply a question of querying the strange creatures who call themselves 'Marxists,' and from there on the terrain becomes hostile. A 'Marxist' Party or discussion group is vulnerable to this unless it's pretty much just you and Jesus, or in general people more detached from such interaction and enthusiasm, if hypothetically they happened to have an interest in discussing these things.

Neo-Nazism, while it might seem disturbing, can take on strange forms - for instance, people who believe that British history stopped in the 1940s, and hence are fervent British nationalists trumpeting Britain's heritage. Stormfront are moderate - you could call them black nationalists, as they do want a black nation. They're just another case of 'poetry' or 'art' in lieu of politics - a certain aesthetic is what interests them, and what they pretend distinguishes them from other views. The Nazis lost over 50 years ago, but they want to pretend that their side can hardly stop winning; they pretend to be radical, but their support of Trump places them at around the same level as the CPUSA, except with no doctrinal concerns or even political views to give them even the appearance of an association with radicalism. Stormfront is, on the one hand, rich people and pretend-rich people congratulating themselves on how rich they are (though they may, as Hitler was, be poor), and living vicariously through others, and on the other hand it is a conduit for more radical political tendencies inspired by the Nazis that however have no explicit sanction there for image reasons and otherwise. In a way, you'd have to be quite radical to go to Stormfront for political reasons, when Stormfront is just about as hostile a place to political views generally as possible - but politics and seriousness there isn't the main trend, and alongside this comes things like praising 'beautiful white Amazonian' females in a way that might resemble a lyre if its player were an annoyed cat enmeshed in it. In general, Neo-Nazism rarely interacts with Nazism, so you might suspect they don't figure there's much of worth there. Without Neo-Nazis, the Nazis would just be this ever-present force of opposition, that could be realised in any way and suddenly, but Neo-Nazis served to neutralise this so far as they could do so. At least, when it was an accusation thrown at Neo-Nazis - otherwise it might still scare and disturb them.

In general, Nazism isn't quite coherent enough to constitute something exactly outside of the opposing workplace or society, and other things might oppose it. These are all seen through the lens of Nazism, but do not like Nazism try to integrate into European society as closely, and hence cannot have the same dramatic potential because they are just generally divergent rather than diverging in only certain particular and striking ways. Nazism was something which the system saw fit to associate with all that it opposed and hated, and in general all that it considered evil - that which was not incorporated into it. The Bordigists represented Auschwitz as a new and pernicious alibi in the fight against socialism, but it would seem unlikely that Auschwitz would formulate any new alibis against socialism unless socialism were somehow involved, such that this seems problematic unless we are to surmise that these Bordigists considered the Nazis to be socialists. Nonetheless, it did furnish a new alibi of sorts - an image of evil which could easily be opposed to an image of Western capitalism as good. The war hence becomes a fight against the 'real enemy,' and hence the other sides are allies - this cannot be avoided, if you would ally with them. If you take this image of evil too seriously, but hardly care about people praising capitalism or not doing so (many anarchists are like this), then ultimately capitalism's image is the only beneficiary of this. Hence, this was a clear political move - the more evil something is, the better everything else is, the more praised.

But this is in some ways a literary move. The British Empire - of course, Britain only shed some parts of its Empire, rather than changing itself completely - and for that matter the Soviet Union was hardly spotless. But when people talk about Britain during the war, they talk of course about Britain as seen through contrast with Nazism - where the objectionable elements are cleaned away. At the least, there is some capitalistic aspect which is a force for pure good in an era where socialism was established, which is really enough to make socialism dismissed. Socialism was for many years obscured precisely because all of this shine was enough to mean that it was merely a vague exception. It could easily be conflated with reformism - all it did was pick partial holes in something which was basically and clearly good. Capitalism could not be clearly attacked by forces that were not co-operative with it. Nonetheless, the main tropes of anti-socialism in the following years grew out of this war, which created a world which in any case seemed to require little alteration. Capital took recourse to a sense of 'conservatism' if you like that promoted capital because it was there, and to do this you needed to whitewash all of this to form a basis on which discussion could be promoted. This was only allowed for after the war, after capital had finally found a force firmly in opposition to it and not serving it. Discussion begun on this basis promised little for socialism, for the main point had already been conceded and any incidental dents were unlikely to make a notable impact, but attempting to eschew this basis led to instant attack and rejection.

Socialism had little headway because it had no place in that socio-political landscape. With the fall of the Soviet Union, it hence fell away generally and became irrelevant. It lost a nation which co-operated with the West, but after this brief seeming incursion in the present world situation fell away, it was left with a completely clean slate. Socialism was no longer a radical force - instead, dividing up and invading the Middle East became a Western focus and opposition to the international system was concentrated there. The left, however, was a Western creature that had made many Western norms into issues of automatic exclusion when people diverged from them, and hence became mere slaves benefitting the West in its actual issues, and quite willingly. They could not put forward a coherent and different political platform, because most of what was important to them was, strangely, things that were common.

The Nazis were an image of evil because of their domestic politics, making their nation into an image of sorts - Britain was excluded from this because they focussed on 'foreign' politics, or oppressing and fighting Indians, and so on. The British domestic policy hence became merely a mirror of Nazis' to ideology, and Nazi foreign policy focussed around their domestic area. Due to their whitewashing as states, their 'alibi,' they felt quite comfortable just throwing states up and trying to displace the nations of a given area. Hence, the Middle East were effectively confronted with the ghost of anti-Nazi forces in every way, and with expansionism in many forms. Conversely, they faced little resistance from what the West finds most offensive, namely things which seemed 'Nazi'-like, and hence the qualification that all other things were far less offensive than this would merely be an external hindrance to their struggle. It was not merely a British Empire, but instead a global capitalistic Empire, one where the major capitalist states could just take on various forms spreading like a cancer over the globe. Hence, it was a financial Empire, and had to find suitable forms of expressing this. For all the hype about the USA, after the 20th Century the world had changed dramatically, and the USA was old and its image practically ancient. This all hearkened back to a time when none of these conflicts yet existed, to a different world order, and hence such patriotism could not adequately express the new world order, if we may use this phrase in a more generic sense. Instead, new nations had to arise to do this, such as Israel. Without these, all of the new elements of the world order and so on found no expression, and hence they were necessarily forged by these powers, through whatever means. The alternative to this was 'leftism,' which also expressed this, but rather than in the form of enthusiasm for a given state through the form of Israel and so on, through taking nearly any popular movement in capitalism and excluding anything else. This served to link all of these different places together. As we are now still seeing, all nations had to be harmonised artificially through things like the Olympics to allow for the impression that all of these things were also made new by these new states and were not reducible to the old things which they themselves were chained to.

Nonetheless, the Nazis created a problem - if they were taken as a picture, how could this picture not be tampered with in the process of a war, remain focussed on a domestic, 'totalitarian' perspective rather than getting caught up in patriotic fervour and other such things which colour portraits of for instance the Spanish Armada? How, likewise, could they be secured as a source of feeling from history, where things like gladiators, colonialism and suchlike are commonplace - and often would have gone much further if they were capable of it - and might reduce their impact? Britain could in a sense add no more to the Nazis as such than they found, and hence had to draw on Nazi patterns - belligerent elected leaders, with imperial hopes, drawing on themes like blood and land and using similar gestures. If they didn't portray things in these terms, from early on, they would be speaking of a conflict, and not get immediate sanction to talk about domestic policies and what 'everyone' accepted as an exemplary evil.

How could a tendency be accepted as something outside of the system, something that was not merely reformist? A 'revolution' could mean anything, and is used to describe any loud political movement - it means nothing by itself. It could rearrange social relations, or it could just rearrange objects. A socialist often wished to be outside this or to appear so, but this was less straightforward than it might appear, they usually would just deal up a bunch of ideals that were mild enough to mean anything. This was hardly that critical. Changes to political form were commonly proposed, changes to organisation of economic units without any particular consideration of the economic context or what they were doing were common, but changes to the overall economy which changed it to something else were not common. So 'revolution' didn't really mean much. This was suspect. Still, after over a century, socialism was something of a damp squib - a movement that meant nothing, a word that meant little, a revolution that meant less than Ron Paul's, and the hope that some group might take them somewhere. Obviously, whether they wanted this depended on where they wanted to go. But this neutralisation benefitted the 'socialists,' and meant they were not distanced from the system - so why would they complain? The socialist movement was primarily a mirage, where buzz-words were everything and politics and such almost nothing.

Being outside of reformism was not as easy as saying so. A cosmetic change is cosmetic - although it can be presented in various ways, it need not be so. Ultimately, if you start from a given social system, and are plausibly locked in discourse with it, everything you're dealing with is actually capitalist. You could propose things which are compatible with socialism, such as, 'Birds can still fly,' or, 'People could still fall down ladders,' but these could be possible under other systems. These are merely illustrative, but are just as valid as most of the more 'sophisticated' portrayals of socialism. Most traits of 'socialism' are reducible to these. Socialism, of course, was what was to be contrasted to capitalist reality, and in this sense was an ideal or if you like an aim. If an ideal was fundamental to capitalism, it would be present and fully realised somewhere in capitalism, as Marx often noted in some way, unless socialism or some other external system were getting in the way. Otherwise it could hardly be that fundamental, if it may be eschewed and capitalism remain what it is at all. Many words which Marx used are mere tautologies when used outside of their specific context - all conflicts involve 'contradictions,' and as Hegel observed in dealing with motion only a contradiction with something essentially outside of a moment could dissolve it, while things like the 'law of value' in some form or other were common before Marx, and other things in the book even in context are merely vague generalities that could mean anything. In addition to this, he repeatedly calls on Hegelian concepts without giving the reader any clear suggestion of what they are to mean here, which might work in shorthand as with Marx's comments on calculus, but in a longer work just means that he's persistently relying on Hegel to gratuitously fill in the gaps in his own work. We are to just assume that the author has a similar take on Hegel, if people are to read Marx in these sections, when of course these small phrases can permit of interpretation.

Ultimately, precisely because it put too much emphasis on use-values, the law of value would disappear from the field - people did not want too much focus on specific things and how they are valued, which would disturb the act of creating values irrespective to content. Hence, this section of Marx remained unpopular among most social strata, often proclaimed something that people should avoid despite Marx using it to put forward the framework of his system. Inviting people to just throw themselves at the rest of a book without knowing what it means specifically is literally just asking for the kinds of objections commonly given to the book. A fair few people read Das Kapital - but they ultimately rejected it. For a bible, Marxism had only the Manifesto, which is a short work that at least shares with the Bible that it veers from its initial direction to something quite different. This is a short work written on request, which is not an attempt at anything too dramatic or developed, but merely a short presentation. People don't read Marx for explanations, they read it so that they can see what his problem is with everything they do. In general, then, the illusion of sides - socialism and capitalism - is imputed onto Marx's texts, in the manner of foreign imposition and for the entertainment of the viewer, in general vulgarised or hostile readings of it such that Marx is neatly placed into their own drama. These then seem clear, when they are not. A similar thing happens to the Bordigist text, except in a more modern context.

The general orientation of such a movement against the capitalist social system would be clear: it would be in constant and persistent conflict with them, within and without its own territory. It is a movement against this, that cannot simply let it standing without becoming a movement for something else. But then, national conflict can itself be amorphous, so the angle from which it did this would be important. In this, people don't like to talk about the politics of a nation (a political entity), but instead about atomised social units, which definition cannot of course be led to socialism by the 'anarchy of the market.' As such, there are so to speak multiple barriers to this being clear, and it is quite a difficult path. There is a firm contrast between statements of the form, 'Socialism is compatible with...' which could still have socialism itself be anything, and actually delineating socialism. Socialism is hence made to stand for something which is vaguely seen as good, as sharing the positive traits that other things also display, rather than divided from these things or aggressive about opposed systems. It is hence in the context of 'socialist unity' not a political movement at all, but instead a vague positive association, free to be conferred upon other things as well. A side fighting only in self-defence do not want to fight particularly, so they are weak - but only if the opposing side is particularly different in agenda, or has a notable motivation of some sort, as otherwise they will not be able to force the issue. Socialism might try in some way to attack the established order over a prolonged time, but will usually hence after any initial inroads be forced onto the defensive repeatedly, as a result of its being too similar.

In general, then, the boundaries between something which was and was not a part of the system was not clearly set forward by the word 'socialism,' or by common views on it. It could mean almost anything, depending on the personal quirks of the person whose socialism it was. On might hence derive, however, that socialism generally involved a limited interest in escaping from the society it was in. We mean this, of course, not in the sense of 'escapism,' which is idle - nobody wants to escape, and then doesn't enact this -, but instead in the general sense of a fundamental alteration. But socialism of all forms had certain common characteristics - it was associated with 'goodness' of various sorts, with happiness, with alleviation of 'ills,' with servants rather than masters, and so on from there. After the Second World War, all of this was in a sense discredited, so with the passing of the Soviet Union the few remaining stalwarts such as an obscure clause in the Labour Party's constitution which seemingly didn't make a socialist impression and others became idle and faded away. These traits could occur either in partial gains or be restricted to a pseudo-radical political change. Stalinists or 'Marxists-Leninists' associated socialism with traits attributed to the domestic association of the Soviet Union, such as efficient and strict labour, which made them able to show up in places where other currents often didn't, but also with some of the classic traits. Stalinism is hence mostly taking the traits of Western capitalism, such as wages, and then trying to show how exalted they are by taking on a Stalinist Russian form. It is the ideology of peaceful co-existence. Stalinism generally shuns anything too radical for it, albeit gradually and after the tacit acceptance that they give to 'socialists' and people who seem appropriate to this movement.

The sun sets and rises, but does the threat feared in Nazism remain through this, is this basis of evil present throughout? It generally only seems to arise when social conduct or alternatively human expression is concerned. Outside of this, how do people reassure themselves that they have a sense of good and evil? Their whole frame of reference shatters. Mostly, to people, good and evil were things that spur feelings, which hence have to be encountered in some form. But what happens when the link to this becomes missing? And this could be a problem for conservatism of the traditional sort, as time went on - people increasingly faded out and became amoral, unconcerned about their values. Yet this threat is always present, because social interaction and the presence of these ideas of evil is only experienced in the form of some particular, limited community or neighbourhood, yet this has always the danger of external elements which wish to enter - which are defined by their externality and being outside of this - and which threaten it. Hence, the movement against immigration was in a sense always likely. But this only occurs in a time when the major political currents have become idle - one is merely a vehicle for identity and dynastic politics, and the other has been replaced in its own Party. There are no more firm boundaries, and what does a nation mean when a significant proportion of it want someone elected essentially for their surname? Is it that different from the others? Still, if Nazism frightens them, it also lets them all into contact with it. It has a notable element which is not political, which hence undermines the political element. But then, so does most 'socialism.'

Hence, as we said, a denationalised and depersonalised ideology is necessarily in some ways a part of the system, hypostatised elsewhere. This describes most of socialism. But it can barely escape the halo that capitalism gained over time, a halo being something which it had often relied on. It hence became idle. To separate from the system, and posit a goal outside of it, meant to depart from this system briefly. But socialism rarely wished to do this - people joined socialism if they did mostly only because it made them happy already, when their goals were not yet set outside of the system socialism was their favoured of such goals. No difficulty was suggested. It was more like an expedition or road trip than a serious interest. But over time it became a very brief road trip. Ultimately, when 'evil' was ever-present, something that flaunted its credentials as such only to continually reduce to some warped exercise in being 'good' was a mere mirage, leading in directions which led nowhere. It could affect some people, but mostly it was not political; the left was just a way of doing penance to the UN.

Ideological Expropriation

You are probably familiar on some level with how capital employed the working class to produce surplus-value for itself, in the form of their product and its value on the market.

However, also notable in Marx's account is how capital ideologically expropriated the properties of its labourers, a central part of capitalist ideology.

For example, one such instance drawn upon by Marx is capitalist claims that money, or capital, is directly productive in the capitalist labour process. This hence takes the labour's property of productivity, and instead appropriates it to capital, quite as capital is said to expropriate them generally. It is partially true, however: money is the productive force because it is the spur of working class production, and hence the animating force of production. Of course, people can and have produced for many reasons unrelated to money, and hence this only applies to a highly specific form of society - it was true of the working class under capitalism, but the defiant schoolboy does not throw paper-planes they make at a teacher for such reasons. This is generally conceded, however.

Just as the working class is that sector of society hired to serve the interests of capital, as a whole, and procuring unto it surplus-value, so ideologically capital relies on the working class and description of it is relied upon to furnish the attributes of capital. Money capital must, in its own functioning, realise in some manner the division between itself and the 'working class.'  Hence, developing the category of the 'working class' and trying to explain its attributes is implicit in the interests of the capitalist class, and in this sense quite safe because it is done under capital's guidance. It is unlikely to be able to lead any further than this.

The working class is a social force of capitalist production, and not a strata of people, insofar as it is not a fixed attribute but requires constantly to be refurnished and redefined by the process of employment and atomised signing of contracts. People cannot start 'working class' - they become working class because they are hired to do things, which then has to be repeated continually. The working class is hence not comparable to the aristocracy, which was slightly more stable at least due to not having to go through the same process: the working class is not a stable social strata of people, with whatever traits, but a certain role in capital's process of production.

The 'working class' is hence composed in a highly atomised process which occurs periodically, and not by identification with a group. This derives in some manner from capital, which is similarly amorphous and therefore forms the working class in this manner. In this sense, the traits of the working class are also derived from that of capital, which actively forms them as such.

Attempts at avoiding this identification with capital, or dissociating the working class from capital, have generally sought to avoid referencing this formation. Nonetheless, it is true, and does great violence to such attempts at a working class 'identity' and so on.

In any case, it should be clear that the traits which capital promotes itself as having in the production process, are generally rendered up by the working class, and this ideological function on behalf of capital is a part of their function. While it is generally recognised that ideological jobs have the clear function of pandering to capital, and require people of such disposition, due to the law of value other forms of labour are not qualitatively distinguished, and hence have similarly an ideological component. If this is neglected, people will not be offered jobs, though they can still perform human labour. Where production for the market is to assimilate also the intellectual fields significantly, all other forms of labour must take on such an ideological character, as the law of market production is the law of value. This hence requires the possibility of an 'ideology' of the market, or that the market has taken the form of a partisan, social force, or formed a society around it, hence capital. It was hence in this sense inevitable that the promulgation of market labour would result in a society structured around the market.

When we say 'ideological,' however, we mean of course not honestly or independently so, but instead in terms of how the 'ideological' functions were carried out - pandering.

Promotion became an increasingly effective force as the means of producing it expanded, and capital would not promote things that did not favour it. As such, anything else was excluded from such. As all economic actors, apart from communists of whatever place, functioned in all of their economic activities with a prospect of monetary gain, therefore none of these could organise an alternative to this form of promotion by this point, as it would inevitably fall into monetary and hence business schema within the economy. This is important, as it concerns the cultural life of a nation, as well as what causes and such were promoted within it.

In general, then, capitalist ideology is founded on expropriation of the traits of the working class. This means that merely accusing them of expropriation needn't mean much, as after all this is the purpose of capitalistic production, and a higher development of the law of value than producers' property. They are both ideologically and in reality inoculated against this charge, they take on the properties of labour and drive it. The labour is carried out for monetary return from the capitalists, which is in a sense more immediately assured than from sale, and therefore money capital is not in actual fact excluded from the production process. One could hypothesise a communistic situation where production is not carried out under these lines, or this abstraction from its traits as labour, but this would not describe the act of production under capitalism, where capital cannot be extricated from it. To equate them would merely be to attempt to portray things as already communist, which is problematic although it might make apologetics easier.

In general, then, ideological defences of capital appropriate the traits of the 'working class' to capital. The production of this is necessary, as it helps in the appropriation of ideological labour. Hence, any attacks on this system, to be publicised among a group directly involved in capitalist production, had to in some way link into or complement this systematic. To make up for this, 'leftist' groups were apt to configure artificial categories like 'far-right,' generally inconsistent with their own portrayal of the economic spectrum, where these involved obvious tendencies towards social regulation and often the turning of society towards a common, consciously specified end. In this, such a 'left' will of course oppose them The left is so used to apologetic that anything likely to be inaccessible among capital's supporters is likely to offend it. From there, negotiation with labour is negotiation over a common fund, it is in a sense despite its bitterness something finite. Its organisations are organisations of negotiation with capital, and hence limited in their radical intent. They can easily come into enmity to this, once it reaches beyond where this cannot go, if it cares about bringing the unions along with it. In a society of abstract labour, it seems reasonable that affluence would ultimately flow to some extent to people of various kinds that did not work. That's not wholly down to them. While Marx begun from the notable position that the mode of production, and class, is constructed on the basis of a certain type of production or is an inevitable result of it rather than an active impulse, this slightly unpopular view wasn't significantly represented later on, leaving Das Kapital to be taken as a bunch of rousing but amorphous slogans. People like to be cheered on, but one might question what their purpose is.

As such, this general expropriation cannot be seen as confined to economic questions. It is not only the means by which capital happens to defend itself, but also the means by which it was forced to do so. However, capital is not content with 'defence' - it wants people to fall in line, and to serve it, in whatever capacity. This leaves it actually quite shorn of defences, as it has no interest in such stasis - it is vulnerable. Hence, capital thrives on expropriation, which implies that capital must by itself lead to some differentiation of the classes, and investigation of another class. When the capitalist mode of labour, so far as it was developed by capitalist and labourer, grew past a certain threshold, it became incompatible with previous systems, and hence had to absorb their subjects into its thrall. Capitalist production involves a relation in which this expropriation is systematic and hence something dealt with from the beginning, this is hence a feature of capital which isn't wholly foreign to it. Likewise, whether or not the husband is 'bourgeois' and the wife 'proletarian,' as the famed analogy goes, the latter still has sex - of whatever type - with the former and marries them, often due to their own passion, and is hence in a marital or close union with them. Their relation to the rest of society is hence left out of the original account, nonetheless their relatively closer relation would thus seem to exclude the rest of society, who are outside of this relation, and hence perhaps by implication communism. Of course, the rest of society cannot usually relate to them in this way, and rather seek to participate in their relationship, support them and bring them closer together, which hence relegates them from this. In general, in order to retain their relationship at an artificial distance, they would have to appropriate the categories of society outside of this to it in a domesticised way which is hence ideological promotion and immersion.

A relation of expropriation cannot be stable, unless the system is itself based on expropriation. If people are producing or acting with the intent of being expropriated from, then they cannot actually produce content of their own, because they are trying to produce for another. This is hence highly problematic, and requires content to be expropriated from outside of this relation. However, this means that the task of both expropriation and, inherently, confrontation and attacking is given to the 'lower' class, while the other class pretends that this external element, apart from and probably against the system, does not exist. This means that both are hostile to forces outside of this system, and will go out of their way to undermine it. This is especially the case where such sentiments in favour of the system are deep-rooted. Nonetheless, it hence means that neither is to be trusted, at least as a group, with doctrine.

To conclude, capital's ideological apparatus hence clearly also shows signs of 'appropriation,' suggesting that this is not a merely economic mechanism. This has direct consequences for its mode of engaging with 'other views,' or even those which are nominally so, which can disturb this if they are not hemmed into it again.

Looking in (II)

III.

"Vyasa continued, Oh Yudhishthira, now I understand that your wisdom is far from sufficient. Realize though, no one can accomplish virtuous deeds on their own. The deity moved one, both for the better and for worse, oh donors of blessing."

An almost Protestant sentiment, namely that because good deeds are by nature divine, the gods  therefore must be turned to. Of course, people must do this on their own, usually, and saying that the gods must treat them robotically and turn them to virtue somehow, or that virtue has no relation to the person's intentional actions or themselves generally, raises more problematic questions usually associated with Protestantism that they presumably don't wish to explore here. In general, they perhaps do not wish to go so far in that essentially amoral direction. This is hence perhaps more to be understood as a loose phrasing, rather than otherwise, with reference to the specific context where divine intervention is a valid claim.

The reference hence seems to be that the deed would not be accomplished, the word 'Jaya' not spoken, without divine aid, rather than that the virtue itself must be imputed. It requires this divine or spiritual aid for its realisation in deeds.

In a sense, in causing Yudhistira to turn towards a religious perspective, it actually aids his point, or implies that they should be able to consider such divine aspects as aren't usually associated with their position, despite having it. Whether they are in any position to do so, is another question.

As such, in dealing with continuance, or stability, reference must be made to alterations in the divine order, and not just to the earth. The divine order hence sets limits to men and their actions.

"Where is there room for this repentance? But since you think you have very even sinful acts committed, so listen to the agents how sin may be adjusted. Oh Yudhishthira, he who sinned, can free himself of them always by abstinence, sacrifices and offerings."

 Hence, things are strictly limited. The sense that Duryodhana was in sin as well, and this led to the collapse of their side, means that there is still a prevailing threat against Yudhistira. This threat is treated lightly, but is implicit. Hence, he must win over the gods again, in order to assure continuance for the moment, and this requires a sacrifice.

As such, continuance is attained through sacrifice and instability, just as his accession came with the death of men and horses. This is hence not a stable period of kingship, but instead a period of continual fluctuations and suffering to attempt to be in harmony with the divine order.

"Oh good man, I say it again: sinful people can be purified by sacrifice, penance and offerings."

However, this seems problematic. While Yudhistira wishes to be an ascetic, they are promised a quick way out of this, which will allow them not to disturb their social role. This is in some ways a forged or assimilated version of genuine virtues, in the form of grand, conventional demonstration. Roman Catholic Indulgences, and Protestantism generally, served a similar function. However, in the process, ascetic virtues like sacrifice and penance are proclaimed as counter-acting sin, and hence as notably positive things or things which lead in the opposite direction to sin. In this sense, again, their ascetic impulse is furthered rather than otherwise.

In general, then, these means serve to counter-act the sins and the state of sin which these place them into. They are therefore advocated, and he is to do these. Although sins manifest themselves, or culminate, in a certain form, these serve to abate this or act against this directly, which is hence an aim they share.

"The high-souled gods and demons perform sacrifices to secure religious merit."

This kind of thing manifests a slightly Buddhistic tendency. If the 'gods' are such mostly nominally, but otherwise act similarly to humans, then the 'religious' clearly appeals to an uncertain force which stands above them, and is to be done penance to. Buddhism, likewise, would subject all things to a universal force, and in this sense is only 'atheistic' by a small and mostly nominal variation. It arose quite easily in a religion polytheistic to the point of triviality. Christianity, though resistant, leads to similar phenomena, due to things such as the Trinity and multiplicity of God in that religion. Christianity gives commands without caring if it is an atheist, Jew or otherwise listening, pretending that vague platitudes will always have a clear meaning, and hence ultimately allows easily for a religious which goes beyond God. A strictly monotheistic Christianity, given the mildness of the religion, would seem quite too trivial to be widely adopted among anyone particularly religious.

In any case, even the gods perform these sacrifices, they are hence standard and occur frequently. They have a penchant which is not only occasional, as when kings do them or people opt to do them, but eternal, in nature - they are not performed just once or twice, on a whim, but there is an endless pattern formed by the gods' performance of them, that people can partake in. They are hence firmly established. In this sense, the gods serve as something akin to what many speculate Stonehenge is for, to keep the time. Still, this is a limited paraphrase of the purpose of deities, and in a sense a parasitic use of them, or one where they are used as an image, but otherwise iffy. Nonetheless, the Roman Catholic Church did not follow it, or made its rituals merely human in nature or performance, ultimately, tied to the specific circumstances and continuity of the Church, and hence Protestantism's discarding of much of this need come as no surprise.

"Prepare you, O king, a Rajasuya offering before, or a horse-sacrifice and maybe a Sarvamedha or Naramedha. Yes, just like Rama, Dasaratha's son, and as the pious Bharata, have done it, you execute in accordance with the authorities a horse sacrifice with rich gifts to the Brahmins."

 Hence, they are to form a part of this cyclical progression, founded among the gods. The gods in the sense give this demonstration a cyclical nature, and these luminaries, though speculated to be incarnations of deities, function to elevate it from there, or give the specific occurrence worth among this cycle. By itself, this appeal need not mean much unless one has a particular tie to historical re-enactment, but in the context it is notable. Of course, such sacrifice of horses would be looked on differently later on, and hence the religious status of these texts now might be uncertain. The gods used to freely commune with men, now they do so less commonly, but nonetheless more has changed in this time in terms of mores than then, and yet without divine sanction. These deities seemingly do not wish to clarify their position on these things.

Perhaps, despite the Church's cautions, they too have been made a victim of 'enthusiasts' who claim to speak for God, based on some random encounter, and hence can take these changing mores as indeed a divine reprimand. This can only be done because their texts are highly flexible.

Hence, such sacrifices are a cyclical thing, but take on greater intensity due to their treatment by venerated people, and this is how Yudhistira is to be persuaded.


'Yudhishthira replied, Undoubtedly a horse sacrifice cleanses a king. But I have another intention that thou mayest listen. After this devastating destruction among my relatives, I can not even give away small gifts, because I do not have more resources."

Hence, Yudhistira is caught in a certain sense of contradiction. Though they need cleansing from sin, they cannot give away gifts, to attempt to ease this problem, because they lack resources. This is in part due to the destruction. Though they are caught in sin, they are also not afforded of the means to heal themselves by official or 'easy' means.

This is a highly ascetic viewpoint, from one perspective. They wish to posit that, from the point of view of poverty, these kinds of demonstration cannot cleanse, whatever their heritage. Hence, they are viewing things from so to speak an ascetic perspective, one where they must be able to achieve heritage without such worldly possessions, one where the ascetic stripping away of these things is presupposed and one is to begin from there. Hence, the ascetic is supposed to be the beginning of any religious task, and indeed a highly ascetic sage shall have to be drawn on even to resolve this scenario amicably. The essentially or personally religious is that which can be done without such means, which are not essential to it, and indeed which in the pursuing of duty might cut them away and leave one hypothetically having to ignore them and act. While only loosely touched on, they hence imply a rather ascetic tendency, although one that might not be realised as yet, for they are still fixated on personal themes and interests from their position.

Nonetheless, more notable is the 'bind' that they are moored in here: caught in sin, but due to these circumstances unable to free themselves from it, and so on. This passage is one of the more complex in this section, and summarises a situation more involved than most of the war.

"I can not ask among the sons of the slain kings for riches, these grieving, inexperienced and yet already injured youths."

Hence, again, having to propitiate their sins, they have given themselves a situation where they cannot find favour among others, for they have just fought them. They must attempt to atone for, among other things, their perception among these people, but have no means of doing so. They have as it were cut away the legs on which they stand.

"And after this devastation of the earth, how can I raise taxes there to celebrate a sacrifice?"

This theme continues on - after this devastation, they can hardly atone as easily, with the risk of offence or aggravation. They have bound themselves, and yet must attempt to escape by further action.

"Oh ascetic, Duryodhana's stubbornness met the kings of the earth for their destruction, and we all have harvested shame. For riches and treasures Duryodhana and his brothers have ravaged the earth, and now the treasury is empty."

The stubbornness of Duryodhana has left the earth empty. In this, Yudhistira might be absolving themselves of their own sin somewhat. In that sense, the sacrifice is already given, although in a sense people who wish to 'absolve' themselves of sin by a gesture like a sacrifice presumably already accept that they are free of it from the first, and the rest is only convincing others.

In any case, the acts of Duryodhana have taken the gifts of the earth, and hence by seeking these none is left for Yudhistira. They have therefore ravaged the earth until there was little for Yudhistira to take, apparently, and even less from their people, who are stubborn and will not give.

This point about Duryodhana is poignant for Dhritarashtra's earlier speech, they condemn Dhritarashtra rather than just mourning them, in the wake of their death. In a certain sense, Duryodhana, in ravaging the earth for its treasures, has left it dry and barren, and therefore harmed the chances of those without these finding or using them.

They have sent it into a negative situation which is now a problem for Yudhistira. In this sense, Duryodhana was also unlikely to aid with this, and was inimical to it, or became a force which by their sins depleted the earth and their side in the battle, rather than winning per se.

"In a horse sacrifice the gifts of the earth are the first rule. Although the reversal of this rule is endorsed by some scholars, but I do not want to hurt. So I graciously grant your esteemed Council in this matter, oh dear."

In order to sacrifice, some stable means of procuring the sacrifice is a start. Otherwise it is either a rare thing, or otherwise. As such, this in a sense becomes a religious issue, or the continuance of the ritual in the divine order, drawn upon, becomes the basis for the sporadic occurrence of these sacrifices among people.

However, these means are seemingly lacking, and will have to be found otherwise. They hence have little incentive to keep going.

"After these words Vyasa thought for a while, and then he said to Yudhistira, Your now empty treasury should be refilled. In the Himalayas there's a lot of gold, which the Brahmins have left there, for they could not carry all of it away."

Vyasa hence says that, for the moment, they should take some leftover gold from the Himalayas, which was of the king Marutta. This is a somewhat exaggerated legend, so far as the gold goes - people in this epic slay thousands, some have much gold despite rarely seeming to go anywhere with it, people in other epics have multiple heads and arms, etc. - and bespeak a certain indifference to it.

As such, Yudhistira is still able to replenish what Duryodhana has left of the earth, by seeking out gold from elsewhere. This gold is associated with ascetism and such, which again seems to suggest an ascetic or pseudo-ascetic path for Yudhistira, although they are probably too late for this aim to be fully realised.

This must be sought in a slightly remote and high place, the Himalayas. It previously belonged to others, but they have left some for Yudhistira to take. Yudhistira may hence take this to perform the sacrifice, at the moment, although there is the acknowledgement that it is what the Brahmins have 'left behind,' or in brief the sacrifice is merely a substitute for truly religious life.

The Brahmins hence, like those who claimed rent, carry away a certain sum of gold, and then leave the rest to be found. They do not distribute the gold, but simply attempt to keep it. Nonetheless, in this case, they were the source of the gold which resulted, or contributed to it, and hence claim some of what occurred.

Yudhistira, interested, enquires further into this.

"And Vyasa replied, If you are curious to learn everything about this king from the House of Karandhama, then listen to me, as I tell of the mighty monarch, who had enormous wealth."

 Vyasa promises to tell them more of the past bearer of this wealth, Marutta, and this wealth. It shall in all likelihood, as it is mythological in character or exaggerated to an indefinite extent, be merely mythological or involve some sort of divine interaction or defiance, and hence the intervention of Brahmins and ascetics. This divine interaction helps to give this wealth its 'indefinite' character, although of course wealth is generally a matter of specifics and particular quantities, and hence this wealth is in a sense metaphorical as much as it is anything else. Vyasa hence ends this section with a claim along the lines of: 'Let me tell you a story in the form of a dream, / I don't know why I have to tell it but I know what it means, / Close your eyes, just picture the scene, / As I paint it for you,' albeit less flamboyant. Yudhistira, by contrast, is in a sense restored to their general role here - though they have gone in a different direction, mostly, they are now called upon to take 'what the Brahmins have left behind,' hence merely to try and limply catch up if they wish to take an ascetic path. Nonetheless, the discussion so far is interrupted by this tale, which nonetheless elucidates from an external perspective the relevant categories.

In a sense, then, this discussion does not come to a clear resolution, but instead resolves in a story. However, it has covered much of note about the situation. They are bound in a scenario where they are unable to procure what they need to go on, and need a sacrifice. These are a periodic thing, with notable examples, nonetheless this periodic nature is disrupted, and hence they must explore the treasure of Marutta, or go on an innovative journey. This hence sets them 'out of tune' or departed from the divine order, or from the cycle of sacrifices and their eternal order. They must hence eventually resort to more extreme means if Yudhistira is to compensate for this distance, and voyage to attempt to meet the gods and show allegiance. In this work, Yudhistira is unlikely to be given an ending which does not satisfy this redemptive plot-line, although the complete accuracy of this may be questioned because the angle of the work is already quite clear. Yudhistira's purification is in a way a means of reassuring the kings of the day that their salvation is also vouched for. In any case, due to Duryodhana's ravaging of the earth, or struggle against it, Yudhistira is forced to look for a religious sacrifice for the purpose of off-setting his sins, or at least to display this, which leads to a somewhat ascetic tendency arising nonetheless due to the religious means. While he is not wont to run off to the forest like the Buddha, which is in itself a political act, though one which the Buddha doesn't necessarily want to acknowledge - despite their act being meant to have general significance, they attempt to avoid acknowledging this and so restrict their 'religion' to a primarily personal or felt one which is idle on more notable matters and allows the state freedom to operate, so long as it give shallow demonstration -, nonetheless there is a tendency to give up what they hold. Hence, they are faced with a possible solution to the general situation, a possible direction which will free them of this inability to sacrifice, at least for the moment, but nonetheless requires them first to hear through its story and abide by the precepts of this story, or at least claim to. Hence, they must first grasp a religious moral or the general form in which Marutta gained this, so as to be one appropriate in some way to claim Marutta's fortune, before they may go on to attempt the sacrifice.